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SUMMARY
This thesis uncover the dynamics of asset prices in response to informational
events. These studies can provide insights to understand not only the behavior of fi-
nancial market participants but also the economic mechanisms by which asset prices
form. The first essay, “Complementarity of Passive and Active Investment on Stock
Price Efficiency”, examines how passive and active investment collectively affect the
efficiency of stock prices. I document the complementary role of passive and active in-
vestment in the improvement of stock price efficiency. The relationship between stock
price efficiency and passive/active investment, which is one of the long-standing theme
in finance, is subject to an endogeneity problem. Using the annual reconstitution of
Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes as an instrument, I find an improvement in efficiency
due to an exogenous increase in passive investment, specifically in stocks widely held
by actively managed funds. These active funds are compensated with higher returns
for their effort. An increase in analyst following and a decrease in analyst forecast
dispersion are identified as economic channels of the efficiency improvement. The
result implies that active funds seek out inefficient stocks and ultimately experience
superior returns due to the improvement in efficiency from passive investment. This
study highlights the complementarity of passive and active investment on stock price
efficiency, which has not been documented in the literature.
In the second essay, “The Role of Efficient Analysts in Stock and Option Markets”,
we investigate the fundamental role of analyst recommendations in terms of the true
efficient price discovery using the signal-to-noise volatility ratio constructed with high-
frequency data. While exiting studies on the effect of analyst recommendations focus
on their ex post impact on stock prices, we find that only recommendation revisions
xi
that contribute to the true efficient price discovery play an influential role in the
stock and option markets. In particular, abnormal stock returns are observed in
expected directions only for the recommendations that deliver information about
the true efficient price of a stock. Furthermore, we observe that those informative
revisions resolve uncertainty about a firm and reduce jump risk in its stock price. This
study highlights the intrinsic role of analysts in financial market, and documents that
the analysts who do their fundamental work indeed affect stock and option markets.
In the third essay,“Realized Skewness for Information Ambiguity”, we propose
realized skewness constructed using high-frequency data as a measure of information
ambiguity. In this working paper, we rely on the fact that ambiguity-averse inves-
tors respond asymmetrically to ambiguous (intangible) information. We find that a
significant decrease of realized skewness around analysts’ earnings forecasts and re-
commendation releases. Furthermore, as realized skewness proxies the degree of infor-
mation ambiguity, we document that negative realized skewness predicts subsequent
lower returns around information releases after controlling for return continuations.
To further prove an economic significance of our finding, we provide a zero-net inves-
tment strategy incorporating our finding, which achieves a Sharpe ratio of 1.766 with
0.83% of monthly average returns. The results highlight how the asymmetric beha-
vior of investors in response to information releases can be used to infer subsequent
dynamics of asset prices.
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CHAPTER I
COMPLEMENTARITY OF PASSIVE AND ACTIVE
INVESTMENT ON STOCK PRICE EFFICIENCY
1.1 Introduction
Over the last 40 years, in which mutual funds have grown dramatically as investment
vehicles,1 passive and active investment have been at the center of many debates.
Warren Buffett, who is regarded as one of the greatest stock market investors, in his
annual letter stated “Over the years, I’ve often been asked for investment advice.
... My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index fund.”2 On
the contrary, analysts at AllienceBernstein, a global asset management firm, in their
report boldly titled “The Silent Road to Serfdom: Why Passive Investing Is Worse
Than Marxism,” argue forcefully that the rise of passive investing presents dangerous
real-world barriers to the efficient allocation of capital in the economy.3 While these
two strategies are at opposite ends in terms of investment objective, each has been
documented to have a significant role in influencing financial markets.4 However,
there is a lack of evidence as to how these two investment strategies, particularly
1Since the inception of the first index fund, Vanguard 500 Index Fund, in 1976 with $11.3 million
assets under management, the mutual fund industry has grown tremendously. At the end of 2016,
the size of mutual fund industry in the U.S. is $16.3 trillion, according to the Investment Com-
pany Institute (see http://www.icifactbook.org/ch2/17_fb_ch2). This amount takes account
for almost 80% of total market capitalization of the S&P 500 index as of December 2016.
2Source: http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2016ltr.pdf. Warren Buffett further
recommends a S&P 500 index fund over hedge funds which are known as financial “elites” to provide
absolute-returns using a long-short strategy.
3Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-23/bernstein-passive-
investing-is-worse-for-society-than-marxism
4In regards to the impact of passive investment on corporate governance, see, for example, [11]
and [22]. [24] document the impact of hedge funds on corporate governance. Among many others,
[61] document a relationship between mutual fund flows and the cross-section of stock returns. [29]
and [87] show that hedge funds improves the efficiency of stock prices.
1
jointly, affect the extent to which stock prices reflect all available information. In this
paper, I examine the collective impact of passive and active investment on stock price
efficiency using a causal setting.
The investment objectives of passively and actively managed funds reflect how
they appreciate observed stock prices in terms of efficiency. Passive mutual funds aim
to deliver the returns of a market index or benchmark portfolio (for example, S&P
500 index or Russell 2000 index) at a low cost because they consider stock prices
to already be efficient. On the contrary, active mutual funds aim to outperform a
benchmark portfolio by selecting securities based on their research at a relatively
higher cost because they believe observed prices of some stock do not fully reflect
available information. By the nature of their investment objective, they need each
other: passively managed funds need the presence of actively managed funds in order
to have stock prices efficient enough, and actively managed funds also require a set of
passively managed funds that gives active funds a comparative advantage of providing
superior returns.
Due to the collaborative nature of the philosophy of passive and active invest-
ment, it is essential to examine the collective impact of the two types of investment
on stock price efficiency. In the one extreme case, where all mutual funds are mana-
ged passively because stock prices are fully efficient, investors who spent effort and
resources to gather and process information would not be compensated. This leads to
the conclusion that a perfectly efficient market is impossible if information is costly
([69]). In the other extreme case if stock prices were sufficiently inefficient, many
actively managed funds would be able to outperform their benchmarks. However, as
more active funds exploit the inefficiencies, such opportunities become more elusive
and prices become more efficient ([96]). The degree of inefficiency determines the wil-
lingness of investors to gather and trade on the information. Actively managed funds
justify higher fees and expenses than passively managed funds as a compensation for
2
their effort on security analysis ([78], [50]).
In this paper, I analyze in two steps the question of how passive and active in-
vestment collectively affect stock price efficiency, and I document the complementary
role of passive and active investment on stock price efficiency. In the first step, I
separately investigate the impact of passive investment on stock price efficiency as
no prior guidance exists to clearly show the directional association between passive
investment and stock price efficiency.5 My investigation reveals that an increase in
passive investment improves stock price efficiency. In the second step, the collective
impact of passive and active investment is examined by investigating how stock price
efficiency varies based on the mix of passive and active investment in a stock. I find
evidence that a material presence of active investors is necessary for passive invest-
ment to improve stock price efficiency. The finding implies the complementarity of
passive and active investment in the efficient price discovery.
It is unclear how the investment of passive mutual funds affects price efficiency of
securities. On the one hand, passive investment might inhibit price efficiency because
passively managed funds would buy or sell a security depending on its relevance in
mimicking a market or benchmarked index no matter how a security is priced relative
to its fundamental (or intrinsic) value. In addition, because weights of individual
stocks in passively managed funds are mechanically determined by their weights in
the benchmarked portfolio or the index, the sensitivity of each stock to available in-
formation cannot be fully reflected in its weight in the portfolio. This mechanism of
passive investment might lead to a breakdown of the link between the intrinsic value
and the transaction prices of a security ([17], [43]). Recent debate in the finance in-
dustry argues that the current predominance of passive investment since the financial
crisis in 2008 might undermine the efficient allocation of capital. On the other hand,
5I do not separately analyze the impact of active investment on stock price efficiency, as it is
widely believed the positive impact of active investment on the efficiency. For active investment and
stock price efficiency, see [29] and [87] among many others.
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passive investment might enhance the efficiency of securities as investors basically
trade a basket of securities via passively managed funds, which enables information
to be reflected for a broader set of stocks. Furthermore, stocks that experience an
increase in passive investment exhibit an increase in liquidity and firm transparency
(see, for example, [22]) and improvement in governance quality (see, for example,
[11]).
Several empirical issues make it challenging to investigate the impact of passive
investment on stock price efficiency. First and foremost, but often ignored in the asset
pricing literature, a causal relationship between passive investment and stock price
efficiency is subject to a severe endogeneity issue. That is, investment by passive
mutual funds could be correlated with other factors, such as transaction cost or
information asymmetry. For example, [52] documents that mutual funds have a strong
preference for stocks with low transaction costs, high liquidity, and low idiosyncratic
volatility. Second, an ordinary least squares estimation of passive investment on stock
price efficiency is subject to omitted variable bias. It is still questionable whether
observable control variables and fixed effects can fully capture characteristics that
simultaneously determine passive investment and stock price efficiency. To overcome
these empirical challenges, I use the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes to
exploit exogenous variation in passive fund investment.
My identification strategy relies on two salient features of firms around the cutoff
for Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. First, firms on either side of the index threshold do
not exhibit any systematic differences with respect to firm characteristics (For exam-
ple, see [34]). Second, because the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes are value-weighted,
firms near the top of the Russell 2000 index have significantly higher portfolio weights
in the index compared with firms near the bottom of the Russell 1000 index. Thus,
the value-weighted construction of the Russell indexes creates variation in passive
fund investment that is plausibly exogenous to security price efficiency. These two
4
characteristics of firms around the threshold allow us to exploit exogenous variation
in passive investment.
The empirical design is based on two-stage least-squares specifications using the
Russell indexes reconstitution as an instrument to overcome the endogeneity issue.
The first stage examines passive fund holdings as a function of index inclusion at
the threshold, and the second stage tests the impact of passive investment on price
efficiency measures. In particular, in the first stage estimation, the empirical speci-
fication is a sharp regression discontinuity design to capture exogenous variation in
passive investment around the Russell index threshold, similar to the specification
used in [42]. In the second stage, I use the exogenous variation in passive fund hol-
dings estimated from the first stage as an instrument to identify its impact on price
efficiency. Using this empirical design, I find a stark difference in passive mutual fund
holdings for stocks around the threshold of the Russell indexes. Investment of passi-
vely managed funds is about 33.4% higher for firms in the top 250 of the Russell 2000
index relative to firms in the bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index. The difference
is statistically and economically significant. However, I do not find a significant dis-
continuity in active investment around the threshold, as our instrument is expected
to capture exogenous variation only in passive investment.
I use four measures of price efficiency to examine the impact of passive investment
on stock price efficiency in the second stage estimation. First, I construct the pricing
error measure of [73], which captures the temporary deviation of a transaction price
from the (unobservable) efficient price of a security. Second, following [20], I compute
the absolute value of return autocorrelation to capture how closely transaction pri-
ces of a security follow a random walk. Third, I construct the lower-frequency price
delay measure of [74], which captures how quickly prices incorporate market-wide in-
formation. Lastly, I use a well-known anomaly in financial markets, the post-earnings
5
announcement drift, as the fourth measure of efficiency (see [12]). These unique me-
asures of price efficiency allow us to examine the impact of passive investment on
different dimensions of price efficiency: low-frequency, high-frequency, and anomaly.
I find that passive investment, on average, improves the efficiency of security
prices. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in passive fund investment
in a security is associated with a 0.699, a 0.496, and a 1.103 standard deviation
decrease in the pricing error, the absolute value of return autocorrelation, and the
price delay measure, respectively. I also find evidence of a decrease in the post-
earnings announcement drift as passive fund investment increases. Additionally, I
find that stocks with higher active investment exhibit relatively weaker post-earnings
announcement drift relative to stocks with lower active investment.
In the main findings, I document a complementary role of passive and active
investment on stock price efficiency: the improvement of price efficiency arises for
stocks that are analyzed and invested by actively managed funds when information
is fully shared with passively managed funds. In particular, I find evidence of a
stark improvement in stock price efficiency due to passive investment only when
actively managed funds hold significant amounts of the shares outstanding. I sort
sample stocks into quartiles based on percent of shares outstanding held by active
mutual funds. I find that for stocks in the top quartile, a one standard deviation
increase in passive investment is associated with a 0.891, a 0.657, and a 1.214 standard
deviation decrease in the pricing error, the absolute value of return autocorrelation,
and the price delay measure, respectively. However, I do not find evidence of efficiency
improvement when active mutual funds have minimal investment For stocks in the
bottom quartile, a one standard deviation increase in passive investment is associated
with a 0.189 and a 0.215 standard deviation increase in the pricing error and the
absolute value of return correlation, and a 0.155 standard deviation decrease in the
price delay measure. All of these changes do not have any statistical significance.
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I find evidence that actively managed funds are compensated for their efforts in
collecting and processing information. Stocks in the top quartile based on percent of
shares outstanding held by actively managed funds deliver significantly higher returns
than stocks in the bottom quartile given an equal increase in passive investment. This
finding indicates that stocks that are analyzed and invested by actively managed
funds compensate those funds with high returns when information is fully shared
with passively managed funds.
I also identify economic channels of the efficiency improvement. In particular, I
find evidence that stock price efficiency improves due to an increase in analyst fol-
lowing and a decrease in analyst forecast dispersion. Recently, [22] document that
higher institutional ownership is associated with greater management disclosure and
analyst following, resulting in lower information asymmetry. My empirical analy-
ses reveal that an increase in analyst following and a decrease in analyst forecast
dispersion arises for stocks that experience an exogenous passive investment with a
significant presence of active mutual funds.
The overall findings in this paper indicate that passive and active mutual funds
are complementary to each other in the price discovery process. The impossibility of a
perfectly efficient market implies the fact that passively managed funds themselves are
not able to make security prices fully efficient because they do not have any incentive
to gather and process information. Thus, combined with the significant presence
of actively managed funds who exert their effort to gather and process information,
security prices become more efficient as information is fully shared with passively
managed funds, and actively managed funds are compensated with high returns for
their effort.
This paper contributes to several aspects of the literature in finance. First, to
the best of my knowledge, this is the only paper which empirically documents the
complementarity between passive and active investment in the context of the price
7
discovery process. Academic researchers, as well as practitioners, have focused on
the substitutable nature of passive and active mutual funds by studying relative
performances of those funds ([57], [49]). However, this paper addresses on what
ground passive or active mutual funds would prevail in the financial market. On
the one hand, if stock prices are significantly inefficient in incorporating information,
investors will invest only in actively managed funds until markets become efficient
enough. On the other hand, if stock prices are perfectly efficient, no active fund
would exist. My findings imply that society requires sizable portions of both passive
and active mutual funds for stock prices to be sufficiently efficient.
Second, this paper contributes to the recent literature on the economic consequen-
ces of passive investment and composite securities such as ETFs (Exchange Traded
Funds). [71] finds that ETFs and passive mutual funds deprive the liquidity of the
underlying security, and [80] show that an increase in ETF ownership is associated
with reduced price efficiency. [65] find evidence that ETF trading actually increase
price efficiency for small stocks. My findings suggest that passive investment (or
ETF trading) does not play alone in the efficient price discovery process. That is, the
efficient price discovery requires both active and passive investment.
Finally, this paper extends the growing literature on the consequences of passive
owners in financial markets. When passive owners have the largest stakes of firms,
they have strong incentives to influence the governance of a firm (for example, see [11])
and information disclosure behavior ([22]). My findings complement this literature
by documenting the positive influence of passive investment on the extent to which
stock prices reflect information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the
various measures of price efficiency used in the main analysis. Section 1.3 explains
background information on the construction of the Russell indexes and my empirical
design. Section 1.4 describes the data. Section 1.5 provides empirical results. In
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Section 1.6, I describe several robustness tests. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Measuring Price Efficiency
I employ various approaches to measure how efficiently security prices incorporate
information. Two of my main measures of informational efficiency captures how clo-
sely transaction prices move relative to random walk using high-frequency transaction
data. The third measure that I use in the paper is based on daily returns. This ap-
proach considers the speed with which public information is incorporated into prices
using daily individual stock and market returns. I also exploit the well-recognized
anomaly in financial markets, post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), to study
the impact of passive investment on price efficiency.
1.2.1 High-frequency efficiency measure
I use two different measures of price efficiency constructed using high-frequency data.
The first measure is the pricing error based on [73]. He assumes that an observed
transaction price, pt, is composed of an unobservable efficient price, mt, and a pricing
error, st and that the efficient price is considered as an expected value of a security
conditional on all available information. Thus, the pricing error captures the tempo-
rary and non-informational related deviation of the transaction price from the efficient
price. Following [73] and [20], I estimate a vector autoregressive (VAR) system to
separate changes in the efficient price from temporary deviations. In particular, I
estimate a dispersion of the pricing error, σ(s), from the VAR model as the pricing
error is assumed to be a zero-mean and stationary process. In the main analysis, I
scale the dispersion with the dispersion of the intraday transaction prices in order
for cross-sectional comparison. That is, I refer the ratio of the standard deviation
of s to the standard deviation of transaction prices, σ(s)/σ(p), as the pricing error.
Appendix A.1 provides details on the model and estimation.
As a second measure of price efficiency, I use the absolute value of intraday return
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autocorrelation. Intuitively, if security prices are perfectly efficient in incorporating
information, the movement of prices should follow a random walk. This measure is
computed from intraday transaction data and captures temporary deviation from a
random walk. Thus, if the investment of passive mutual funds improves the price
efficiency, the transaction prices should exhibit low autocorrelation in either direction
resulting in the small absolute value of autocorrelation. Similar to [20] and [38],
I choose a thirty-minute interval to estimate return autocorrelation of transaction
prices and denote |AR30| as the absolute value of the autocorrelation.
1.2.2 Low-frequency efficiency measure
For a low-frequency measure of price efficiency, I construct a price delay measure
introduced by [74], which captures the speed of adjustment of an individual stock to
incorporate market-wide information. If today’s stock prices cannot fully incorporate
information due to inefficiency, remaining information will be gradually absorbed
into prices. Based on this intuition, the price delay is estimated from a market model
regression that is extended to include the lagged market returns. [68] and [101] apply
the price delay measure in an international context.
The original price delay measure suggested by [74] is an annual frequency using
weekly returns in the estimation. However, it is likely that the impact of passive funds
investment is concentrated around the time of reconstitution of the Russell indexes.
Thus, using an annual frequency measure might not be precise enough to capture the
impact of passive funds on price efficiency. Following [20], I modify the approach of
[74] and compute monthly price delays using daily returns, contemporaneous market
returns, and five days of lagged market returns as the following regression:
ri,t = αi + βirm,t +
5∑
n=1
δ−ni rm,t−n + εi,t, (1)
where ri,t is the return from stock i on day t and rm,t is the market return on day t.
Then, I estimate a second regression that restricts the coefficients on lagged market
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returns to zero. The price delay measure is calculated as one minus a ratio of the
R-squared from the restricted model over the R-squared from the unrestricted model:





That is, the price delay measure captures the fraction of variation of contemporaneous
individual stock returns explained by lagged market returns.
1.2.3 Post-earnings announcement drift
Since [12] documented that abnormal returns of stocks with positive (negative) ear-
nings surprises tend to exhibit positive (negative) subsequent returns for several
weeks following the earnings announcement, this well-established phenomenon, post-
earnings announcement drift (PEAD), indicates some degree of informational ineffi-
ciency in the financial markets. If an exogenous increase in passive investment on a
stock impairs its price efficiency due to a lack of security analysis or monitoring, the
stock which experienced an increase in passive investment should exhibit strong post-
earnings announcement drift. However, if an increase in passive investment improves
price efficiency through corporate governance or quality revelation, the post-earnings
announcement drift should be attenuated.
I compute earnings surprises as the difference between actual earnings and the
most recent I/B/E/S consensus forecasts of analysts. Then I construct post-earnings
announcement drift as cumulative abnormal returns over five- and ten-day windows
starting from the second trading day after the earnings announcement. Abnormal
returns are computed as a stock’s raw returns net of value-weighted CRSP returns.
1.3 Empirical Design
The empirical approach of this paper consists of two stages. In the first step, I se-
parately investigate the impact of passive investment on stock price efficiency using
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an instrument to capture an exogenous increase in passive investment. In the se-
cond step, changes of price efficiency depending on the mix of passive and active
investment are examined. Actively managed funds try to outperform a market or
benchmark index by researching and investing in individual stocks with inefficient
prices. Whereas passively managed funds mechanically track their benchmark index
because they believe stock prices are efficient so that it is impossible to outperform
the market return. However, a recent dramatic growth and predominance of passive
mutual funds casts doubt on their contribution to stock price efficiency, because their
main objective is to match the performance of a market index by holding a basket of
representative stocks in the index in proportion to their weights in the index.
Examining how passive investment affects stock price efficiency, is empirically
challenging due to several reasons. First and foremost, but often ignored in the asset
pricing literature, a causal relationship between passive investment and stock price
efficiency is subject to a severe endogeneity issue. That is, investment by passive
mutual funds could be correlated with other factors, such as transaction cost or
information asymmetry. For example, [52] documents that mutual funds have a strong
preference to stocks with low transaction cost, high liquidity, and low idiosyncratic
volatility. Second, an ordinary least squares estimation of passive investment on stock
price efficiency is subject to omitted variable bias. It is still questionable whether
observable control variables and fixed effects can fully capture characteristics that
simultaneously determine passive investment and stock price efficiency. To overcome
this empirical challenge, I use the index assignment of firms into the top of the
Russell 2000 (annual reconstitution) as exogenous variation in passive mutual fund
investment.
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1.3.1 Russell Indexes Construction
The Russell 1000 index consists of the largest 1,000 U.S. listed firms, while the Russell
2000 index comprises the subsequent 2,000 largest firms. These indexes provided and
maintained by FTSE Russell represent approximately 98% of the entire public equity
market in the U.S, and are widely used as benchmarks. [34] document that the dollar
amount of institutional assets benchmarked to the Russell 1000 index is $90 billion,
while the Russell 2000 index is tracked by around $200 billion.
Reconstitution of these Russell indexes provides us a clean empirical laboratory
to examine the impact of passive investment on price efficiency by generating an exo-
genous shock to passive mutual fund holdings. As the first step of the reconstitution,
every year on the last trading day of May, stocks are ranked by their market capitali-
zations.6 Second, on the last Friday of June, the indexes are reconstituted such that
firms ranked from 1st to 1,000th and firms ranked from 1,001st to 3,000 constitute
the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000 indexes, respectively. Each stock’s weight in the
index is determined by its float-adjusted market capitalization at the end of June.
The float adjustment accounts for the value of shares that are not publicly available.7
Since 2007, Russell has adopted a banding policy to mitigate turnover of mem-
bers in the indexes and to reduce unnecessary trading. Under the banding policy,
firms with a certain range of the cutoff would not switch indexes unless the market
capitalization of a firm deviates far enough to ensure an index membership change.
In particular, all stocks included in the Russell 1000 and 2000 in the previous year
are ranked from smallest to largest at the end of May, then a cumulative market
capitalization is computed for every stock. This cumulative market capitalization of
6ADR, ADS, preferred stocks, redeemable shares, warrants, rights, and trust receipts are
excluded.
7For example, shares held by a government or by an employee stock ownership plan will be exclu-
ded when the Russell calculates a firm’s float-adjusted market capitalization. Detailed mechanism of
the float-adjustment made by the Russell is unknown. This is why I control for the float-adjustment
using other proxy, which will be explained in Section 1.3.2.
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each stock is expressed as a percentage of the total market capitalization of all stocks
in Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes. Based on these values, stocks switch from their
current index only if they move beyond a 5% band around the cumulative market
capitalization of the 1,000th stock. I use market capitalization obtained from the
CRSP to compute these values and the implied cutoffs for each year from 2007 to
2016.8
The index assignment has a significant effect on portfolio weights, in particular for
stocks assigned to the top of the Russell 2000 index, because the Russell indexes are
value-weighted. For example, the 1,001st largest stock at the end of May in 2006 will
be assigned to the Russell 2000 index and be given a very large weight in the index
once the annual reconstitution is completed at the end of June, while the 1,000th
largest stock will be assigned to the Russell 1000 index and be given a very small
weight in the index. Figure 1 plots weights of stocks in their indexes around the
cutoff in 2006 and shows a significant difference of portfolio weights between stocks
in the bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index and those in the top 250 of the Russell
2000 index. While the average portfolio weight of stocks in the top 250 of the Russell
2000 index is around 0.123%, the average weight of the bottom 250 stocks of the
Russell 1000 index is around 0.015%. That is, the stocks assigned in the top 250 of
the Russell 2000 index are given almost 8.2 times greater weights in the index than
those assigned in the bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index.
The index assignment, which causes the difference in portfolio weights of stocks
in the indexes, further impacts the investment of passive mutual funds. Passive
mutual funds aim to minimize tracking error in mimicking their benchmarked indexes
by adjusting their holdings based on weights of stocks in the indexes. Thus, it is
important for passive mutual funds to match their holdings according to weights for
8[34] also computed these implied cutoffs each year to examine the price effects of index inclusion,
while [11] and [42] drop observations after 2006. Main analyses presented in the paper use the implied
cutoffs, but all results are robust if I drop observations from 2007.
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stocks in the top of the index because those stocks are more likely to influence the
overall performance of the index than stocks in the bottom of the index when the
benchmarked index is value-weighted. Even some mutual funds tracking an index
could choose to hold a few representative stocks in the index based on their weights
and exclude some stocks in the bottom of the index (see [62]). For example, if a
stock is assigned into the top 250 of the Russell 2000 index from the bottom 250 of
the Russell 1000 index, passive mutual funds tracking the Russell 2000 index would
significantly increase their holdings of the stock in order to minimize tracking error.
Figure 2 visually highlights the impact of index assignment on passive mutual
fund investment. In Figure 2, I plot the average percentage of shares outstanding
held by all (top panel), passive (middle panel), and active mutual funds (bottom
panel) to total shares outstanding of firms over 100 bins across all years. The x-
and y-axes represent a firm rank of weight in the index at the end of June and an
average percentage holdings by each type of mutual fund at the end of September,
respectively. The figure displays a large discontinuity in the percentage of passive
mutual fund holdings (middle panel), while the average percentage holdings by active
mutual funds do not exhibit any discontinuity around the cutoff. As [34] show that
there is no structural break with respect to firm characteristics (size, ROE, ROA,
EPS, etc.) around the index cutoff, the discontinuity in the passive mutual fund
holdings is due to the index assignment causing differences in weights between the
top of the Russell 2000 index and the bottom of the Russell 1000 index. This allows
us to use the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes as a valid instrument to
capture exogenous variation in passive mutual fund investment.
1.3.2 Empirical Specification
To formally test the impact of passive investment on stock price efficiency in the first
step, I use an identification strategy using inclusion in the Russell 2000 index as an
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instrument for passive fund investment. Once I identify the impact of an exogenous
increase of passive investment on price efficiency, I further investigate the role of active
investment in conjunction with an increase of passive investment in the second step.
In particular, I examine price efficiency measures in a narrow bandwidth around the
cutoff as a function of instrumented passive fund holdings following [90]. In the first
stage of the estimation, I capture exogenous variation in passive investment using
the instrument, the Russell index assignment. That is, the first stage regression is as
below:
Passive%i,t = τRussell2000i,t + δ1(Rank
∗
i,t − c) + δ2Russell2000i,t(Rank∗i,t − c)
+ δ3FloatAdji,t + δ4Liquidity Controls + αt + θi + εi,t,
(3)
where Passive%i,t is the percentage of shares held by passive mutual funds. For
mutual fund holdings, I use the reports of funds filed in S12 mutual fund holdings
database at the end of September in year t, which is the first quarter-end after annual
reconstitution of the Russell indexes. Russell2000i,t is a dummy variable equal to one
if a firm i is included in the Russell 2000 index in year t as of the end of June. Rank∗i,t
is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization at the time of index assignment.9
c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding policy and is
calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented. Russell uses
a proprietary float-adjustment process that results in firms with low floating shares
ranked lower in an index than predicted by their market capitalization as of the end
of May. Thus, I construct a variable, FloatAdji,t, as a difference between the rank
implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank assigned in the index
by the Russell at the end-of-June of firm i in year t and is used as a proxy for the
adjustment made by Russell for floating shares. I also control for liquidity effect
by adding proxies for liquidity (Liquidity Controls include [5] measure and zeros
9I do not use actual rankings or weights of stocks because of potential endogeneity concerns about
unobserved determinants of actual weights assigned by Russell. [34] discuss about reasons why the
actual weights or rankings should not be used as an instrument.
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introduced by [67]. The construction of these variables are explained in detail in
Appendix A.2)10, as [22] document that higher institutional ownership is associated
with higher trading volume and liquidity.
In the second stage regression, I estimate the impact of instrumented passive fund
holdings on various measures of price efficiency.
Efficiencyi,t = β
̂Passive%i,t + γ1(Rank∗i,t − c) + γ2Russell2000i,t(Rank∗i,t − c)
+ γ3FloatAdji,t + γ4Liquidity Controls + κt + ηi + εi,t,
(4)
where Efficiencyi,t are various price efficiency measures for firm i in year t. As the
mutual fund holdings are measured at the end of September, I take an average of a
variable from July (the first month after the reconstitution) to September in year t.
The key feature of the empirical design is to identify exogenous variation in
passive investment, which I examine around the Russell 2000 inclusion threshold.
To identify variation around the threshold, I control for the distance to the thres-
hold of observed market capitalization ranking, (Rank∗i,t − c) as well as for the in-
teraction Russell2000i,t(Rank
∗
i,t − c) of firm i in year t.11 Thus, my key instrument
is Russell2000i,t, conditional on market capitalization ranking, (Rank
∗
i,t − c), and the
interaction Russell2000i,t(Rank
∗
i,t − c). Both regressions include year and firm fixed
effects. All standard errors from the estimation of the above regressions are clustered
at the firm level.
1.3.3 Optimal Bandwidth
I use regression discontinuity around the Russell indexes cutoff with an instrument
estimation to examine the impact of passive investment on price efficiency. Thus the
10[67] examine and run horseraces of various measures of liquidity. They find that the illiquidity
measure of [5] and zeros (the proportion of positive-volume days with zero returns) outperform in
capturing the price impact.
11(Rank∗i,t− c) and Russell2000i,t(Rank
∗
i,t− c) control for the mechanical relationship with market
capitalization ranking on either side of the cutoff. Thus, they isolate any difference in passive mutual
fund holdings around index inclusion at the cutoff.
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choice of bandwidth, i.e., how many firms on either side of the cutoffs are used in
the estimation, is another variable to be determined. The choice should balance the
benefits of more precise estimates as the sample size grows and the costs of increased
bias. [34] use a bandwidth of 100 around the cutoff in estimating the deletion and
addition effect of indexing. [11] use a bandwidth of 250 in their main analysis on the
influence of passive owners, while [42] provide the results for the bandwidth of 100
and 500 in examining the effect of institutional ownership on payout policy.
To determine the optimal bandwidth for the main analysis, I use the optimal rule
of thumb bandwidth selection procedure prescribed in [28]. Over the full sample pe-
riod, the optimal bandwidth estimated using this process is 276. While the optimal
bandwidth over the period from 1996 to 2006 (before the banding policy was im-
plemented) is 118, the bandwidth from 2007 to 2016 (after the banding policy was
implemented) is 341. In my main analysis, I use a bandwidth of 250 around the
cutoff. I test and confirm the robustness of findings using the bandwidths of 100 and
500 reported in Section 1.6.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 High-, low-frequency, earnings announcement, and analyst data
Two measures of price efficiency explained in Section 1.2.1 are constructed using high-
frequency transaction data. I collect high-frequency data on security prices from the
Trade and Quote (TAQ) database.12 One of price efficiency measure, which captu-
res how fast market-wide information is incorporated into security price, uses daily
returns. Thus, I obtain daily stock prices and CRSP value-weighted market returns
from the CRSP database. When I construct earnings announcement surprises and
post-earnings announcement drift, I use both I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT databases.
Data to construct analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion is obtained from
12Due to the limitation of data subscription, high-frequency data is only available from January
2001 to December 2014.
18
I/B/E/S. Other accounting variables are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.
1.4.2 Mutual fund holdings data
My sample consists of the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes constituents from 1996 to
2016. I obtain mutual fund ownership data for the sample firms from the S12 mutual
fund holdings data provided by Thomson Reuters. All mutual funds in the U.S. are
required to report their stock holdings to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Before 2004, funds were required to report holdings twice a year, but many mutual
fund voluntarily reported their holdings other two quarters. However, since 2004,
all mutual funds must report the holdings every quarter. There are multiple mutual
funds that report their holdings more than once in a given month. For those funds, I
keep only the last report of the month. As I use the Russell Indexes reconstitution as
an instrument to capture exogenous variation of passive investment, I collect mutual
fund holdings reports from the S12 database at the end of September, which is the
end of the first quarter after annual reconstitution (at the end of June) of the Russell
indexes.
To classify a mutual fund as passively or actively managed, I follow a method used
by [76] and [11]. Using the linking file provided by Wharton Research Data Services
(WRDS), I merge the mutual fund holdings data from Thomson Reuters with the
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) mutual fund data, which contains
detailed information on fund names, investment objectives, management companies,
and so on. From the merged data, I identify a passively managed fund if a name of the
fund contains a string that represents it as an index fund, or if an investment objective
code in the database classifies the fund as an index or a passively managed fund. All
other funds are classified as actively managed funds using their investment objective
codes in the CRSP mutual fund database, and the remaining funds that cannot be
classified are left unclassified. For these three types of mutual funds holdings data,
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I further collect each firm’s market capitalization data from the CRSP database by
multiplying the number of shares outstanding with the monthly closing price of a
security. I then compute the percentage of a firm’s market capitalization owned by
passively, actively, and unclassified funds.
1.4.3 Sample and descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of key variables for the main analysis. Panel A
and Panel B report statistics for all firms included in the Russell 1000 and Russell 2000
indexes and firms in the 250 bandwidth around the cutoff of the indexes, respectively.
For any firms once included in the Russell 1000 or 2000 indexes in the sample period
from 1996 to 2016 (Panel A), the average percentage of shares outstanding held by
mutual funds is around 15%, and active mutual funds represent the largest portion
of the mutual fund holdings at around 9%. Passive mutual funds and unclassified
mutual funds account for 2.6% and 3.4% of shares outstanding, respectively. The
average size of firms in my sample is around $4.9 billion.
Panel B of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for a restricted sample of firms in a
250 bandwidth for the main analysis. Total mutual fund holdings of stocks around the
bandwidth are slightly higher compared to those in Panel A. The average percentage
of all mutual fund holdings is around 17.6%, and passive, active, and unclassified
mutual fund holdings account for 2.9%, 10.7%, and 4.0%, respectively. As firms in
Panel B represent mid- and small-cap stocks, an average size of firms, $1.7 billion,
is smaller than that of firms in Panel A, which consist of all stocks in the Russell
1000 and Russell 2000 indexes. Descriptive statistics for the main measures of price
efficiency, the absolute value of return autocorrelation and the price delay measure,
are comparable to Panel A, suggesting that the size of a firm is not a decisive factor
of stock price efficiency.
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1.5 Empirical Results
1.5.1 Passive Investment and Price Efficiency
In this section, I provide one of the main results of the paper about the impact
of passive investment on price efficiency using the Russell 2000 index inclusion as
an instrument in the regression discontinuity design. While the main analyses use
a bandwidth of 250 as described in Section 1.3.3, in Table 2 I report descriptive
statistics of key variables for firms in the bottom of the Russell 1000 index and the
top of the Russell 2000 index for different choices of bandwidths. For ±100, ±250,
and ±500 firms around the threshold of the Russell indexes, Panel A, Panel B, and
Panel C, respectively, report an average, median, and standard deviation of variables.
As expected for a valid instrument to capture exogenous variation in passive fund
investment, I observe higher mutual fund holdings on stocks in the top of the Russell
2000 than those in the bottom of the Russell 1000, which is largely due to higher
holdings from passive mutual funds. For example, in Panel B of Table 2, the top 250
firms in the Russell 2000 index have 2.32% greater aggregate mutual fund holdings
compared to the bottom 250 firms in the Russell 1000 index; almost half of this
difference results from greater holdings by passive funds. Passive investment is about
33% higher for firms in the top 250 of the Russell 2000 index relative to firms in
the bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index. From the descriptive statistics, I find
less pricing error and price delay for stocks in the top of the Russell 2000 index.
I also observe higher liquidity (lower Amihud and zeros) for stocks in the top of
the Russell 2000, and this pattern confirms the finding of [22] that an increase of
institutional ownership improves trading volume and liquidity. Thus, I explicitly
control for liquidity in the main analyses. In the following subsections, I formally test
and document the impact of passive investment using my identification strategy.
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1.5.1.1 First-stage estimation: Passive investment around the index threshold
In this subsection, I report estimates of the first-stage regression of passive mutual
fund holdings on the Russell 2000 inclusion around the threshold, conditional on mar-
ket capitalization ranking and the interaction between the inclusion and the ranking.
In particular, I estimate the following equation:
MF Holdings%i,t = τRussell2000i,t + δ1(Rank
∗
i,t − c) + δ2Russell2000i,t(Rank∗i,t − c)
+ δ3FloatAdji,t + δ4Liquidity Controlsαt + θi + εi,t,
(5)
where MF Holdings%i,t is the percentage of firm i’s shares at the end of the first
quarter (end of September) of year t held by different categories of mutual funds:
all mutual funds, passively managed funds, actively managed funds, and unclassified
mutual funds. Other variables are explained in detail in Section 1.3.2.
The estimation results are provided in Table 3, confirming that the inclusion of
a stock in the Russell 2000 index is strongly associated with an increase in passive
fund investment. The statistical significance remains strong even after controlling
for liquidity by adding the illiquidity measure of [5] and the proportion of days with
positive-volume and zero returns (zeros). While the graphical analysis in Figure 2
shows stark differences in mutual fund holding around the index threshold, especially
in passively managed fund holdings, the results in Table 4 provide point estimates of
the causal effect of the index inclusion on mutual fund investment. Column (2) in
Table 4 shows that passive mutual fund holdings are significantly higher for stocks
in the top 250 of the Russell 2000 index than for those in the bottom 250 of the
Russell 1000 index. In particular, those firms just included in the top of the Russell
2000 index have 33.5 percentage point more shares held by passively managed funds,
and this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. However, in column (1)
of Table 4, aggregate mutual fund holding does not show a statistically significant
difference between stocks in the top of the Russell 2000 and those in the bottom of the
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Russell 1000.13 As other types of mutual funds, including actively managed funds, do
not have a strong incentive or motivation to mechanically track an index portfolio, I
do not observe any discontinuity in mutual fund holdings by active mutual funds and
unclassified funds around the Russell index threshold.
1.5.1.2 Impact of passive investment on price efficiency
In this subsection, I examine how passive fund investment affects the efficiency of
security prices. From this point, I scale both price efficiency measures (Efficiencyi,t)
and passive fund holdings percentage (Passive%i,t) by their sample standard deviati-
ons so that the point estimate of β in Equation (4) can be interpreted as the standard
deviation difference in a price efficiency measure for one standard deviation increase
in Passive%i,t.
Table 4 reports the two-stage least-squares estimates of passive fund holdings on
price efficiency measures described in Equations (3) and (4). Panel A and Panel B
provide the results for the first-stage (Equation(3)) and second-stage (Equation(4)),
respectively. The first-stage estimates using scaled variables by their sample standard
deviation confirm that stocks assigned into the top 250 of the Russell 2000 index have
significantly (at the 1% level) higher ownerships by passively managed funds.14 The
point estimate in column (1), for example, shows an increase in passive mutual fund
holdings of about a half of a sample standard deviation.
The results of the second-stage regression are provided in Panel B of Table 4. I
find that investment of passive mutual funds has a positive impact on my measures
of price efficiency. The coefficient estimates on the instrumented passive mutual
fund holdings in Equation (4) are statistically negative at the 1% level for all three
13[11] show that aggregate mutual fund ownership is significantly (at the 10% level) higher for 250
stocks in the top of the Russell 2000. A reason why I do not find a significant difference is that I
(1) use a different regression specification similar to [42] and (2) include both year and firm fixed
effects. Thus, the estimates identify within-year and -firm variation of passive investment depending
on the Russell 2000 index inclusion.
14For all columns in Table 4, F-statistics and t-statistics exceed the thresholds suggested by [103].
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price efficiency measures: the pricing error of [73] (column (1)), the absolute value of
autocorrelation (column (2)), and the price delay of [74] (column (3)). In particular,
one standard deviation increase in passive fund investment on a security is associated
with a 0.699, a 0.496, and a 1.103 standard deviations decrease in the pricing error,
the absolute value of return autocorrelation, and the price delay, respectively. That
is, the finding suggests that an exogenous increase of passive investment improves the
efficiency of security prices. This finding is robust to different choices of bandwidths
and specification, which is also provided in Section 1.6.
The main results in Table 4 are robust to the implementation of a banding policy
of Russell. As Russell implements the policy to reduce turnover of stocks inclusion
and deletion in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes from 2007, I first confirm the
robustness of the first-stage estimation results before and after the banding policy
implementation. In an unreported analysis, the first-stage regressions are quantita-
tively similar before and after banding, which indicates that the estimation of the
implied threshold from 2007 is accurate. Also, due to the robustness of the first-stage
results, I also find that second stage results are similar before and after banding.
1.5.2 Passive, Active Investment, and Price Efficiency
In this subsection, I consider a role of active investment in the association between
passive investment and price efficiency improvement. [69] argue that perfectly infor-
mationally efficient markets are impossible because information is costly. If a market
is perfectly efficient, the compensation to information gathering and processing is
zero. Alternatively, the degree of inefficiency determines the effort that investors are
willing to gather and trade on the information. In the mutual fund industry, actively
managed funds charge relatively higher fees and expenses than passively managed
funds as a compensation for their effort on security analysis. Given the impossibility
of a perfectly efficient market and a presence of actively managed funds, there exists
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opportunities to obtain excess returns until information is fully reflected in stock pri-
ces. That is, the presence of actively managed funds would be a key determinant of
the extent to which stock prices reflect information.
I investigate any significant differences in price efficiency measures in regard to
a mix of passive and active mutual fund investment. I expect to observe high price
efficiency for stocks with high passive investment as well as high active investment.
To examine this, I conduct a double-sorting analysis. That is, I first sort all sample
firms into tercile portfolios based on the percentage of shares held by passive mutual
funds. Then, for each tercile, firms are sorted into tercile portfolios based on the
percentage of shares held by active mutual funds. I examine three different price
efficiency measures for double-sorted portfolios.
I find evidence that the three price efficiency measures (pricing error, absolute
value of autocorrelation, and price delay) are significantly lower when both passive
and active funds share a significant portion of the company’s stock. Table 5 reports
averages of price efficiency measures for the bottom (Low) and top (High) tercile
portfolios and the differences of averages between the top and the bottom terciles
(Diff(H-L)) along with their t-statistics. In Panel A of Table 5, the average pricing
error for firms in the bottom terciles of both active and passive investment is 0.1692,
while the average for firms in the top terciles of both active and passive investment
is 0.1029. The differences in all price efficiency measures are statistically significant.
Thus, I observe that security prices are more efficient for stocks whose shares are
largely held by both passive and active funds.
In the regression framework, I also find evidence that the presence of actively
managed funds plays a critical role in the price efficiency improvement from passively
managed funds. In particular, I find that an exogenous increase in passive investment
causes an improvement in price efficiency only when there exists enough shares held
by actively managed funds. To examine the role of active investment in the regression
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framework, I sort sample firms into quartiles based on their percentage holdings owned
by actively managed funds each year and examine the impact of passive investment
on price efficiency measures for each quartile using Equations (3) and (4).
Table 6 reports the results for the second-stage estimation.15 Panel A, Panel B,
and Panel C show the estimation results for the pricing error of [73], the absolute value
of autocorrelation, and the price delay of [74], respectively. The estimated coefficients
on the instrumented passive investment are positive and statistically significant only
for the top quartiles of active fund holdings at the 1% level. The estimates indi-
cate that, for example, when a stock is largely held by actively managed funds (top
quartile), a one standard deviation increase in Passive% is associated with a 0.891
standard deviation decrease in the pricing error, a 0.657 standard deviation decrease
in the absolute value of autocorrelation, and a 1.214 standard deviation decrease in
the price delay. However, if a stock is rarely held by active mutual funds (bottom
quartile), passive investment does not improve any stock price efficiency.
I next analyze whether those stocks largely held by actively managed funds com-
pensate active funds for their effort on information gathering and processing. To test
whether active funds are compensated, I sort all sample firms into quartiles based on
percentage shares held by actively managed funds each year, and examine cumulative
returns and cumulative trading volume from July to September of a corresponding
year.16 In particular, I estimate a similar two-stage IV regression with replacing
a dependent variable in Equation (4) to cumulative returns or cumulative trading
volumes.
Table 7 provides the second-stage regression results of cumulative returns (Panel
A) and cumulative trading volumes (Panel B). I find evidence that stocks whose
15The first-stage regressions results for all quartiles are similar to the results in Table 4, and
F-statistics and t-statistics exceed the suggested threshold by [103].
16I do not use abnormal returns or trading volumes, because there is no systematic difference in
firms around the index threshold. See, for example, [34] and [42].
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shares are largely held by actively managed funds deliver higher cumulative returns
and lower cumulative trading volumes once stocks are included in the top 250 of the
Russell 2000 indexes, relative to stocks with minimal active investment. In Panel A,
the coefficient estimates on Passive% are positive and statistically significant (at the
10% level) in columns (3) and (4), indicating higher cumulative returns for stocks
with high active fund holdings. In Panel B, the coefficient estimates on Passive%
monotonically decrease with the percentage of active fund holdings, and a difference
of estimates between the top and the bottom quartiles is statistically significant. The
findings in Table 7 suggest that active mutual funds maintain their holdings and
are compensated with high returns from stocks experiencing an increase of passive
investment, as information on stocks included in the index with significant weights is
fully revealed by passive funds and other market participants.
1.5.3 Passive/Active investment and post-earnings announcement drift
In this subsection, I analyze how passive investment is associated with post-earnings
announcement drift. [12] first document that returns tend to be positive after positive
earnings surprises and negative after negative surprises, indicating that stock prices do
not fully and immediately incorporate information at the time of the announcement.
[18] find that post-earnings announcement drift is a manifestation of investors’ failure
to recognize the information in the earnings surprises. Thus, if the investment of
passive and active funds affects price efficiency as described in previous sections, the
investment would affect post-earnings announcement drift in similar manners. To
examine the impact of passive and active investment on post-earnings announcement
drift, I examine two weeks following the earnings announcement. I focus earnings
announcements of firms between July and September and sort them into quartiles
based on earnings surprises. Then, I investigate returns on the first trading day after
the announcements and cumulative returns over one- and two-week windows.
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I first find that post-earnings announcement drift prevails in not only all firms
included in either the Russell 1000 or 2000 indexes but also in firms around the in-
dex cutoff. Table 8 reports, for each quartile of earnings surprises, average abnormal
returns on the first trading days (column under Announcement Day), average cumu-
lative returns from one-day after the first trading day over 5 trading days (columns
under [+1,+5]) and over 10 trading days (column under [+1,+10]) for all firms in
the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (columns under Full Sample) and for firms in a
250 bandwidth around the index threshold (columns under Bandwidth=250 ). For
example, for firms in the 250 bandwidth with the most negative earnings surprises
(quartile 1), an average abnormal return on the first trading day after the announ-
cements is -0.426% (with t-statistics of -27.989). Firms in the bandwidth with the
most positive earnings surprises (quartile 4) exhibit significantly positive abnormal
returns on the first trading day of the announcements with 0.492% (with t-statistics of
-36.904). This finding on significant abnormal returns on the announcement confirms
that earning announcement effects are very strong in my sample. I also observe signi-
ficant post-earnings announcement drift, which is the strongest for the most negative
and the most positive earnings surprise portfolios. While 5-trading day cumulative
abnormal returns starting from the second trading day after the announcement date
[+1,+5] are -0.745% (with t-statistics of -6.483) for stocks with the most negative
earnings surprises and 6.47% (with t-statistics of 5.859) for stocks with the most
positive surprises.
I now examine how post-earnings announcement drift is affected by passive and
active investment. In this analysis, I only focus on two quartiles with extreme ear-
nings surprises (quartile 1 and 4) as they exhibit the most significant post-earnings
announcement drift. I find evidence that, in general, a degree of post-earnings an-
nouncement drift decreases as stocks have a greater amount of passive mutual fund
investment. In addition, I find that stocks with higher active investment exhibit
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relatively smaller earnings surprises. Table 9 reports the analysis on post-earnings
announcement drift. In Panel A, I split firms around the index cutoff (with a band-
width of 250) based on their assignment in the Russell indexes. That is, in column
(1) and column (2), I report 5-trading day cumulative abnormal returns for the most
positive and the most negative earnings surprises quartiles for firms included in the
bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index and firms included in the top 250 of the Russell
2000 index. In the last column, differences between column (1) and column (2) are
reported with t-statistics. I find that a degree of post-earnings announcement drift is
smaller for stocks included in the top of the Russell 2000 index than for stocks in the
bottom of the Russell 1000 index, and the difference is statistically significant at the
1% level for both the most negative and the most positive earnings surprise quartiles.
In Panel B and Panel C, I further split firms in Panel A into stocks in the top
quartile of active fund holdings and stocks in the bottom quartile of active fund
holdings, respectively. I find evidence that for both samples of firms, post-earnings
announcement drift is less pronounced for firms in the top of the Russell 2000 than
for those in the bottom of the Russell 1000 index. However, it is noteworthy that a
degree of post-earnings announcement drift is much weaker when stocks are largely
held by actively managed funds. Comparing Panel B with Panel C in Table 9, the
magnitude of post-earnings announcement drift, both in column (1) and column (2),
is much smaller for stocks with high active holdings, even though differences are both
significant in the last column. This finding suggests that investment of active mutual
funds plays a complementary role in price efficiency improvement along with passive
investment, consistent with my main finding in Section 1.5.1.
1.5.4 Economic Channels of Price Efficiency Improvement
In this subsection, I examine possible economic channels of the efficiency impro-
vement. Analyst play an important role as information intermediaries by gathering
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and processing information about firms. Recently, [22] document that higher in-
stitutional ownership is associated with greater analyst following and lower analyst
forecast dispersion, resulting in lower information asymmetry. Thus, I expect that
analysts contributes the efficiency improvement for stocks experiencing both passive
and active mutual fund investment, documented in the previous subsections.
Using the regression discontinuity framework used in Section 1.5.2, I investigate
the effect on analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion of passive fund invest-
ment depending on the investment of active mutual funds.17 I find that an exogenous
increase in passive investment causes an increase in analyst following and a decre-
ase in analyst forecast dispersion only when there exists significant shares held by
active mutual funds. Table 10 reports the second-stage regression results of analyst
following (Panel A) and analyst forecast dispersion (Panel B) on passive fund inves-
tment for each quartile based on active fund investment. In particular, for stocks in
the top quartile of active mutual fund investment, a one standard deviation increase
of passive fund investment is associated with 1.336 more unique analysts providing
one-year-ahead annual forecast and a 0.387 standard deviation decrease in analyst
forecast dispersion. However, I do not find any statistical association of analyst fol-




There exists some confusion in the literature about how best to exploit the Russell
index setting and whether to use an instrumental variable estimation or fuzzy or
sharp regression discontinuity design. Theoretically, a discontinuity design is called
17Analyst Following is constructed as the number of unique analysts providing one-year-ahead
annual forecasts, and Analyst Forecast Dispersion is constructed as the standard deviation of the
consensus one-year-ahead annual earnings estimates divided by the absolute value of the mean
consensus estimate. These monthly variables are averaged from July to September every year.
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the sharp regression design if a treatment is known to depend in a deterministic way on
some observable variables, while one is called the fuzzy regression design if a treatment
is a random variable given as a conditional probability of some observable variables
(see, for example, [90] and [70]). My approach exploits a sharp regression discontinuity
design using an instrument as the main variables of interest are mutual fund holdings
and various measures of price efficiency after the Russell reconstitution. That is, a
sharp regression discontinuity setting is appropriate for my analysis because I am able
to observe actual assignments of firms into the indexes at the time of analysis. [34]
use a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in investigating returns due to buying and
selling between the ranking date (the end of May) and the reconstitution date (the
end of June). Their choice of a design is appropriate because a treatment (the index
inclusion) can only be predicted using a market capitalization at the end of May.
I consider other empirical designs and confirm that my finding is robust to different
specifications. [11] examine how passive owners affect the governance of a firm using
the Russell index setting. Thus, for another possible specification, I examine my
main finding using the regression specification of [11]. In particular, I estimate the
following first-stage regression:





+ δN+1FloatAdji,t + αt + θi + εi,t,
(6)
where Market Capi,t is the end-of-May CRSP market capitalization of firm i in year
t. Other variables are constructed in the same way as described in Section 1.3.
In this specification, I include a set of firms’ log market capitalizations by varying
the polynomial order N to control for firms’ sizes. In the second stage regression,
I estimate the effect of instrumented passive fund holdings from Equation (6) on
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+ γN+1FloatAdji,t + κt + ηi + εi,t.
(7)
Similar to my main analyses in Section 1.3, I include both firm and year fixed effects,
and all standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
I find that my main finding on the impact of passive investment on stock price
efficiency is robust to not only the specification of Equations (6) and (7) but also all
to different values for the polynomial N . Table 11 reports the estimated coefficients
on Passive%i,t from the second-stage regression for the pricing error of [73] (columns
(1), (2), and (3)), the absolute value of return autocorrelation (columns (4), (5),
and (6)), and the price delay measure of [74] (columns (7), (8), and (9)). I find a
statistically negative relationship between Passive%i,t and all efficiency measures that
is robust to various polynomial order controls for market capitalization, indicating the
improvement of price efficiency due to an exogenous increase of passive investment.
I further confirm the finding that passive and active investment play a comple-
mentary role in the improvement of stock price efficiency. Using the alternative
specifications with Equations (6) and (7), I estimate the impact of passive investment
on stock price efficiency depending on the investment of active mutual funds. Each
panel in Table 12 provides the regression results for each measure of price efficiency.
Consistent with findings in Section 1.5.2, I find that the strongest improvement in
stock price efficiency when actively managed funds own significant amounts of shares
outstanding. Whereas I observe an insignificant change in price efficiency when active
funds own small amounts of shares outstanding.
1.6.2 Different Bandwidths
In Section 1.3.3, I discuss the choice of optimal bandwidth around the threshold
of the Russell indexes. Recent research using the empirical setting of the Russell
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indexes use different values of bandwidth. For example, [11] use a bandwidth of
250 around the threshold in their main analysis, while [34] use a bandwidth of 100. I
choose a bandwidth of 250 in the main analyses based on the investigation on optimal
bandwidth using a procedure prescribed in [28]. However, to test the robustness of
findings, I reexamine the main results in Section 1.5 using different bandwidths.
I find that main results of the paper are robust to different choices of bandwidth.
Table 13 provides the second-stage estimation results using Equations (3) and (4).
Panel A and Panel B report the estimated coefficients for bandwidths of 100 and 500,
respectively. In Panel A, I find that the estimated coefficient on Passive%i,t is statis-
tically significant at the 5% level for the pricing error and the price delay measures,
but I do not find statistical significance for the absolute value of autocorrelation. This
lack of statistical power in the estimates is due to a small number of observations and
a narrow bandwidth to capture variation in passive fund investment after the banding
policy of Russell. When I use a bandwidth of 500, I find that, in Panel B, Passive%i,t
is significantly associated with all price efficiency measures at the 1% level.
I also confirm that the main finding on the complementarity of passive and active
investment on stock price efficiency is robust to different choices of bandwidth around
the index cutoff. Table 14 reports the second-stage regression results using Equations
(3) and (4) depending on the investment of active mutual funds. Panel A and Panel B
provide the results for bandwidths of 100 and 500, respectively. In Panel A, I do not
include the firm-fixed effect due to the limited number of observations for the small
bandwidth. Due to limited space, I report the results for the bottom (column (1),
(2), (3)) and top (column (4), (5), (6)) quartiles. In unreported results, I also find a
monotonic increase in the improvement along with an increase of active investment.
Consistent with the finding in Section 1.5.2, I find the strongest improvement in
stock price efficiency when actively managed funds own significant amounts of shares
outstanding for both choices of bandwidths.
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1.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the collective impact of passive and active investment on
stock price efficiency. The collaborative nature of objectives of passive and active
investment requires the impact of passive and active funds to be jointly analyzed.
Using the annual reconstitution of Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes, I document the
complementary role of passive and active investment on the discovery of efficient
stock prices. For the first set of my findings, I find that an exogenous increase in
passive investment improves the efficiency of stock prices. For the second set of my
findings, I further find that the improvement of price efficiency arises for stocks that
are analyzed and invested by actively managed funds when information is fully shared
with passively managed funds.
This paper addresses one of the long standing and important questions in finance
regarding the extent to which stock prices reflect information. The impossibility of a
perfectly efficient market implies the fact that passively managed funds themselves are
not able to make security prices fully efficient because they do not have any incentive
to gather and process information. Furthermore, it cannot be an equilibrium where
only actively managed funds exist in society. Thus, my finding implies that, combined
with the significant presence of actively managed funds which gather and process
information, security prices become more efficient as information is fully shared with
passively managed funds, and actively managed funds are compensated with high
returns for their effort. To the best of my knowledge, the present paper is the only
one to investigate the complementary effect of passive and active investment on price
efficiency.
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Figure 1: Index Portfolio Weights around the Russell 1000/2000 Cutoff in 2006
The figure plots the portfolio weights of the firms around the cutoff for the Russell 1000 and 2000
indexes (bandwidth=250, i.e., bottom 250 firms in the Russell 1000 index and top 250 firms in the
Russell 2000 index). The portfolio weights are measured in percentage and plotted against the
end-of-June rank of weights in the indexes as of the end of June in 2006.
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Figure 2: Mutual Fund Holdings Discontinuity around Russell Cutoff
The figure plots the mutual fund holdings after the reconstitution of the Russell 1000 and 2000
indexes from 1996-2016. The top, middle, and bottom graphs represent total, passive, and active
mutual fund holdings, respectively. The x-axis represents the rank of weight in the index. Thus, the
firms that are in Russell 1000 are on the left-hand side of the horizontal line, and the firms that are
in Russell 2000 are on the right-hand side of the line. The y-axis represents the ratio of shares held
by mutual funds to total shares outstanding. The figures plot the average mutual fund holdings
over 100 bins across all years. The solid line represents a third-order polynomial regression curve.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
The table reports descriptive statistics of variables of main interest in the paper. Panel A (Panel
B) provide mean, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile, standard deviation, and a number of
observations in each column for all firms included in the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (firms
in a 250 bandwidth around the cutoff between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes) from 1997 to
2016. Total Mutual Fund Holdings, Passive Fund Holdings, Active Fund Holdings, and Unclassified
Holdings are the percentage of share owned by all mutual funds, passive mutual funds, active mutual
funds, and unclassified mutual funds, respectively. Holdings data is for the most recent records (from
Thomson Reuters Database) after the annual reconstitution of the Russell indexes. Market Cap is
the market capitalization (in million) of a firm at the end of June each year. Pricing Error is the
ratio of standard deviation of the discrepancies between the log transaction price and the efficient
price to the standard deviation of the efficient prices based on [73]. |AR(30)| is the absolute value
of the thirty-minute return autocorrelation following [20]. Price Delay and Amihud are a measure
of price delay following [74] and an illiquidity measure of [5], respectively. Zeros is the proportion
of positive-volume days with zero returns.
Mean p25 Median p75 SD Obs
Panel A. Full Sample
Total Mutual Fund Holdings (%) 14.55 6.91 12.88 20.71 9.65 51835
Passive Fund Holdings (%) 2.60 0.43 1.70 3.81 2.71 51835
Active Fund Holdings (%) 8.57 3.45 7.26 12.27 6.46 51835
Unclassified Holdings (%) 3.38 0.34 1.37 4.13 5.07 51835
Market Cap (Million) 4874.52 293.18 786.10 2620.20 18812.30 51835
Pricing Error 0.129 0.631 0.098 0.144 0.083 40244
|AR(30)| 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.02 40244
Price Delay 0.48 0.23 0.44 0.73 0.29 51835
Amihud(×100) 1.92 0.07 0.31 1.37 5.09 51835
Zeros 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.06 51835
Analyst Following (3-month) 8.44 3.00 6.00 11.00 8.45 51835
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (3-month) 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.56 51835
Panel B. Bandwidth = 250
Total Mutual Fund Holdings (%) 17.63 9.42 16.33 24.48 10.33 9084
Passive Fund Holdings (%) 2.89 0.32 1.88 4.17 3.12 9084
Active Fund Holdings (%) 10.73 5.50 9.47 14.82 6.92 9084
Unclassified Holdings (%) 4.01 0.61 1.83 4.68 5.56 9084
Market Cap (Million) 1664.13 1142.74 1546.55 2072.99 720.40 9084
Pricing Error 0.936 0.569 0.908 1.549 0.107 6756
|AR(30)| 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.02 6756
Price Delay 0.46 0.21 0.41 0.70 0.29 9084
Amihud(×100) 0.35 0.07 0.14 0.34 1.06 9084
Zeros 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.05 9084
Analyst Following (3-month) 9.09 4.00 7.00 12.00 7.57 9084
Analyst Forecast Dispersion (3-month) 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.54 9084
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Table 2: Mutual Fund Investment and Price Efficiency around the Index Cutoff
The table reports descriptive statistics of key variables around the Russell index cutoff for different
bandwidths depending on the index assignment. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C reports statistics
(mean, median, and standard deviation) of main variables for firms in the 100, 250, and 500 band-
widths, respectively, around the cutoff between the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes from 1996 to
2016. In each panel, descriptive statistics are reported separately depending on whether firms are
assigned in the Russell 1000 index or Russell 2000 index.
Panel A. Bandwidth = 100
Russell 1000 bottom 100 Russell 2000 top 100
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Total Mutual Fund Holdings (%) 15.66 13.46 9.43 19.25 18.25 11.10
Passive Fund Holdings (%) 1.86 0.94 2.35 3.43 2.58 3.51
Active Fund Holdings (%) 10.23 8.78 6.41 11.59 10.45 7.28
Unclassified Holdings (%) 3.57 1.50 5.09 4.24 1.95 6.01
Market Cap (Million) 1240.32 1114.11 625.67 1854.22 1717.17 652.80
Pricing Error 0.086 0.069 0.112 0.089 0.077 0.121
|AR(30)| 0.26 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.26 0.01
Price Delay 0.52 0.49 0.30 0.43 0.36 0.29
Amihud(×100) 0.53 0.17 1.51 0.27 0.11 0.48
Zeros 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05
Panel B. Bandwidth = 250
Russell 1000 bottom 250 Russell 2000 top 250
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Total Mutual Fund Holdings (%) 16.46 15.07 9.52 18.78 17.84 10.95
Passive Fund Holdings (%) 2.36 1.37 2.66 3.40 2.56 3.43
Active Fund Holdings (%) 10.30 9.06 6.61 11.16 9.97 7.19
Unclassified Holdings (%) 3.80 1.80 5.08 4.22 1.87 5.99
Market Cap (Million) 1784.44 1707.17 821.77 1545.62 1453.86 580.37
Pricing Error 0.088 0.713 0.093 0.094 0.068 0.114
|AR(30)| 0.26 0.26 0.02 0.26 0.26 0.01
Price Delay 0.49 0.44 0.30 0.44 0.38 0.29
Amihud(×100) 0.35 0.13 1.01 0.36 0.15 1.11
Zeros 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.05
Panel C. Bandwidth = 500
Russell 1000 bottom 500 Russell 2000 top 500
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD
Total Mutual Fund Holdings (%) 16.78 15.60 9.44 18.07 17.10 10.76
Passive Fund Holdings (%) 2.57 1.56 2.79 3.29 2.48 3.31
Active Fund Holdings (%) 10.35 9.22 6.48 10.69 9.51 7.15
Unclassified Holdings (%) 3.86 1.82 5.15 4.09 1.81 5.86
Market Cap (Million) 2565.70 2357.68 1288.22 1250.56 1138.14 548.49
Pricing Error 0.069 0.079 0.068 0.108 0.098 0.124
|AR(30)| 0.26 0.26 0.01 0.26 0.26 0.02
Price Delay 0.47 0.42 0.30 0.45 0.39 0.29
Amihud(×100) 0.24 0.09 0.78 0.51 0.20 1.38
Zeros 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.06
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Table 3: Impact of Index Assignment on Mutual Fund Investment
This table reports the regression discontinuity estimates of mutual fund investment on the Russell
1000 and 2000 indexes assignment. Dependent variables are the percentages of share holdings by all
mutual funds (column (1)), passive mutual funds (column (2)), active mutual funds (column (3)),
and unclassified mutual funds (column (4)). R2000 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm
is included in the Russell 2000 index. Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization
at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding
policy and is calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is the
difference between the rank implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank in the
index assigned by the Russell at the end-of-June. Amihud is the illiquidity measure of [5], and Zeros
is the proportion of positive-volume days with zero returns. The sample consists of 500 firms around
the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (i.e., bandwidth = 250) for which I obtain mutual fund holdings
data from Thomson Reuters Database. Both year and firm fixed effects are included, and standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable: Percentage of holdings by
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Mutual Funds Passive Active Unclassified
R2000 0.235 0.334*** -0.338 0.203
(0.60) (3.77) (-0.99) (1.26)
(Rank* - c) -2.264* 0.208 -1.395 -0.942*
(-1.84) (0.69) (-1.31) (-1.71)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 -0.516 -0.375*** -0.0302 -0.214*
(-1.42) (-4.40) (-0.10) (-1.69)
FloatAdj 2.201* -0.324 1.372 0.917*
(1.76) (-1.08) (1.25) (1.69)
Amihud 9.896 8.000*** 2.198 -1.581
(1.53) (5.42) (0.38) (-0.92)
Zeros -6.787*** -0.622* -4.241*** -1.908***
(-4.08) (-1.69) (-3.12) (-3.37)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.805 0.871 0.692 0.860
Obs 8836 8836 8836 8836
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Table 4: Impact of Passive Investment on Price Efficiency
This table reports the results for an instrumental variable estimation of price efficiency on passive
mutual fund investment based on Equation (3) and (4). Panel A reports the first stage estimates of
passive mutual fund holdings on the Russell index assignment. Panel B reports the estimates of the
second stage regression of price efficiency on passive mutual fund holdings estimated from the first
stage. R2000 is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm is included in the Russell 2000 index.
Pricing Error is the ratio of standard deviation of the discrepancies between the log transaction
price and the efficient price to the standard deviation of the efficient prices based on [73]. |AR(30)|
is the absolute value of the thirty-minute return autocorrelation following [20]. Price Delay is a
measure of price delay following [74]. Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization
at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding
policy and is calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is the
difference between the rank implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank in the
index assigned by the Russell at the end-of-June. Amihud is the illiquidity measure of [5], and Zeros
is the proportion of positive-volume days with zero returns. The sample consists of 500 firms around
the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (i.e., bandwidth = 250) for which I obtain mutual fund holdings
data from Thomson Reuters Database. Both year and firm fixed effects are included, and standard
errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,








Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay
Passive(%) -0.699*** -0.490*** -1.081***
(-3.75) (-3.57) (-4.49)
(Rank* - c) 0.437* 0.238 0.908***
(1.81) (1.14) (3.41)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.00821 0.00142 -0.135*
(0.07) (0.02) (-1.87)
FloatAdj -0.109 -0.123 -0.899***
(-0.16) (-0.51) (-3.08)
Amihud -0.495*** -0.217** 0.0411
(-3.03) (-2.11) (1.03)
Zeros 0.752*** 0.0375** 0.0644***
(4.01) (2.07) (3.15)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.786 0.884 0.114
Obs 6246 6246 8836
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Table 5: Double-sorting on Passive and Active Investment and Price Efficiency
The table reports the results of a double-sorting analysis on passive and active investment. Firms in
the sample are sorted into terciles based on the percentage shares of passive mutual fund holdings
each year. For each tercile, firms are sorted into terciles based on the percentage of active mutual fund
holdings. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C report the results for the pricing error of [73], the price delay
measure of [74], and the absolute value of return autocorrelation of [20], respectively. Low and High
represent the averages of price efficiency measures for bottom and top terciles, respectively. Diff(H-
L) provides the differences of price efficiency measures between top and bottom tercile portfolios.
T-statistics are provided in the parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Pricing error
Passive (%)
Active (%) Low High Diff(H-L)
Low 0.1692 0.1154 -0.0538***
t-stat (-4.31)




Panel B. Absolute value of autocorrelation
Passive (%)
Active (%) Low High Diff(H-L)
Low 0.2637 0.2622 -0.0015*
t-stat (-1.71)




Panel C. Price delay
Passive (%)
Active (%) Low High Diff(H-L)
Low 0.5552 0.4557 -0.0996***
t-stat (-3.98)





Table 6: Collective Impact of Passive and Active Investment on Price Efficiency
The table reports the regression results of price efficiency on the passive fund holdings depending
on its shares percentage owned by active mutual funds. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C report the
results for the pricing error of [73], the price delay measure of [74], and the absolute value of return
autocorrelation of [20], respectively. Each column corresponds to the results for quartiles based on
the percentage of shares held by active mutual funds. Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market
capitalization at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000
before banding policy and is calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented.
FloatAdj is the difference between the rank implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual
rank assigned in the index by the Russell at the end-of-June. Amihud is the illiquidity measure of [5],
and Zeros is the proportion of positive-volume days with zero returns. The sample consists of 500
firms around the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (i.e. bandwidth = 250) for which I obtain mutual
fund holdings data from Thomson Reuters Database. Both year and firm fixed effects are included,
and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Pricing Error
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) 0.189 -0.344 -0.437 -0.891***
(0.35) (-1.11) (-1.71) (-3.94)
(Rank* - c) -0.431 0.163 0.099 0.311
(-1.02) (0.78) (0.81) (-1.35)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.081 0.109 -0.0719 -0.0493
(0.93) (1.09) (-0.87) (-0.56)
FloatAdj -0.439 -0.761 -0.196 -0.771
(-0.49) (-0.88) (-0.26) (-0.95)
Amihud -2.493*** -2.221*** -1.064** -1.121**
(-3.18) (-2.99) (-2.14) (-2.22)
Zeros 0.0741 0.0738 0.643 0.431
(1.01) (1.12) (0.89) (0.69)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.822 0.694 0.751 0.843
Obs 1298 1244 1244 1305
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Panel B. Absolute Value of Autocorrelation
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) 0.215 -0.766 -0.597** -0.657***
(0.67) (-1.07) (-2.31) (-2.78)
(Rank* - c) -0.801 0.530 0.610 0.321
(-1.04) (0.45) (1.16) (0.89)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 -0.154 0.129 -0.0767 -0.130
(-0.69) (0.42) (-0.48) (-0.76)
FloatAdj 1.184 -0.494 -0.563 -0.0786
(1.38) (-0.37) (-0.99) (-0.22)
Amihud -1.395*** -0.194*** -1.742** -0.764
(-4.06) (-3.01) (-2.20) (-1.33)
Zeros 0.0545 0.0377 0.00923 -0.00557
(0.74) (0.70) (0.22) (-0.18)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.902 0.877 0.905 0.891
Obs 1298 1244 1244 1305
Panel C. Price Delay
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) -0.155 -2.381 -0.595* -1.214***
(-0.40) (-0.63) (-1.66) (-3.44)
(Rank* - c) 0.517 2.444 0.804 1.016**
(0.83) (0.58) (1.56) (2.27)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 -0.201 0.0960 -0.161 -0.346**
(-0.95) (0.15) (-1.12) (-2.26)
FloatAdj -0.437 -2.481 -0.828 -0.808*
(-0.71) (-0.54) (-1.51) (-1.80)
Amihud -0.0271 0.0395 -0.714 -0.347
(-0.16) (0.31) (-1.08) (-0.49)
Zeros 0.0341 -0.0359 0.0924*** 0.0568
(0.58) (-0.26) (2.63) (1.52)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.505 -1.083 0.501 0.217
Obs 1838 1729 1728 1842
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Table 7: Performance of Stocks Held by Active Mutual Funds
The table reports the regression results of stock return and trading volume on the passive fund
holdings depending on its shares percentage owned by active mutual funds. In Panel A (Panel B),
a dependent variable is the cumulative return (the cumulative trading volume) of a stock from July
to September, which corresponds to the period from the index reconstitution to the mutual fund
holdings report date. Each column corresponds to the results for quartiles based on the percentage
of share held by active mutual funds. Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization
at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding
policy and is calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is the
difference between the rank implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank assigned
in the index by the Russell at the end-of-June. Proxies for liquidity (the illiquidity measure of [5]
and the Zeros) are included in the regression. The sample consists of 500 firms around the Russell
1000 and 2000 indexes (i.e. bandwidth = 250) for which I obtain mutual fund holdings data from
Thomson Reuters Database. Firm fixed effect is included, and standard errors are clustered at the
firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Return from July-to-September
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) 2.483 3.394 4.415* 5.954***
(0.89) (1.57) (1.85) (2.99)
(Rank* - c) -0.544 4.980 8.193* 14.35***
(-0.06) (0.91) (1.78) (4.02)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 1.257 -5.270 -1.138 -1.249
(0.45) (-1.50) (-0.38) (-0.49)
FloatAdj 0.258 -0.0973 -2.025 -6.129*
(0.03) (-0.02) (-0.46) (-1.86)
Liquidity Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.397 0.344 0.335 0.307
Obs 1838 1729 1728 1842
Panel B. Trading Volume from July-to-September
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) 0.574*** 0.736*** 0.449*** 0.145**
(5.10) (4.49) (6.46) (2.44)
(Rank* - c) -1.893*** -1.920*** -1.620*** -1.480***
(-6.70) (-9.48) (-13.72) (-14.12)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.103 0.0243 0.175** 0.101
(0.95) (0.20) (2.07) (1.31)
FloatAdj 0.912*** 1.213*** 0.698*** 0.440***
(3.36) (6.30) (5.51) (4.55)
Liquidity Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.873 0.817 0.853 0.863



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 9: Passive, Active Investments, and Post-Earnings Announcement Drifts
The table reports averages of post-earnings announcement drift of firms sorted on earnings surprises
and active mutual fund investments, depending on the index assignment of a firm. In Panel A,
the sample consists of 500 firms around the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes with the bandwidth of
250. Firms are sorted into quartiles based on earnings surprises calculated as the difference between
actual earnings and the most recent consensus forecast recorded in I/B/E/S. The last three columns
report the averages of cumulative returns over 5 trading days from the second trading day after
the announcement for firms assigned to bottom 250 of the Russell 1000 index, for firms assigned
to top 250 of the Russell 2000 index, and the differences of them. Panel B and Panel C report
the results for the firms included in the bottom quartile and top quartile of active mutual fund
holdings, respectively. An abnormal return is calculated as the difference between a raw return and
a value-weighted CRSP stock return. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Firms Around the Cutoff (Bandwidth = 250)
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Russell 1000 Russell 2000
Quartiles bottom 250 top 250 Diff.
1 Most Negative CAR -1.004% -0.335% -0.669%***
t-stat (4.544)
4 Most Positive CAR 0.668% 0.460% 0.208%***
t-stat (2.760)
Panel B. Low Active Holdings
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Russell 1000 Russell 2000
Quartiles bottom 250 top 250 Diff.
1 Most Negative CAR -2.301% -0.828% -1.473%***
t-stat (9.825)
4 Most Positive CAR 1.406% -0.894% 2.300%***
t-stat (11.232)
Panel C. High Active Holdings
(1) (2) (1)-(2)
Russell 1000 Russell 2000
Quartiles bottom 250 top 250 Diff.
1 Most Negative CAR -0.811% 0.037% -0.847%***
t-stat (6.321)
4 Most Positive CAR 0.714% 0.887% -0.173%**
t-stat (2.169)
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Table 10: Economic Channels of Efficiency Improvement: Analyst Following and Ana-
lyst Forecast Dispersion
The table reports the regression results of the number of analyst following and the analyst forecast
dispersion on the passive fund holdings depending on its shares percentage owned by active mutual
funds. In Panel A (Panel B), a dependent variable is the the number of unique analyst following
(the analyst earnings forecast dispersion) of a stock from July to September, which corresponds
to the period from the index reconstitution to the mutual fund holdings report date. Each column
corresponds to the results for quartiles based on the percentage of share held by active mutual funds.
Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of
the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding policy and is calculated separately every year
after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is the difference between the rank implied by the end-
of-May capitalization and the actual rank assigned in the index by the Russell at the end-of-June.
Proxies for liquidity (the illiquidity measure of [5] and the Zeros) are included in the regression.
The sample consists of 500 firms around the Russell 1000 and 2000 indexes (i.e. bandwidth = 250)
for which I obtain mutual fund holdings data from Thomson Reuters Database. Firm fixed effect
is included, and standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Analyst Following from July-to-September
Active Fund Holdings (%)
1 (Low) 2 3 4 (High)
Passive(%) -0.0421 -0.169 0.357 1.336**
(-0.06) (-0.26) (0.48) (2.11)
(Rank* - c) -7.236*** -8.194*** -7.216*** -7.654***
(-6.27) (-6.88) (-5.84) (-6.61)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 1.259** 1.823** 1.241 0.741
(2.30) (2.16) (1.49) (1.10)
FloatAdj 4.847*** 5.956*** 4.851*** 5.492***
(4.42) (5.48) (4.19) (5.28)
Liquidity Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.752 0.787 0.770 0.735
Obs 1666 1639 1690 1796
Panel B. Analyst Forecast Dispersion from July-to-September
Passive(%) 0.110 -0.0582 -0.0951 -0.387**
(1.07) (-0.36) (-0.55) (-2.09)
(Rank* - c) -0.235 0.305 -0.0361 -0.0703
(-0.72) (1.10) (-0.13) (-0.35)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.0831 -0.0725 0.196 -0.00836
(0.62) (-0.31) (1.19) (-0.05)
FloatAdj -0.0115 -0.428* 0.0512 0.0330
(-0.03) (-1.90) (0.14) (0.17)
Liquidity Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.336 0.489 0.340 0.425



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 13: Robustness of Finding to Different Bandwidths: Passive Investment and
Price Efficiency
This table reports the results of an instrumental variable estimation of price efficiency on passive
mutual fund investment based on Equations (3) and (4) when I use different bandwidths around the
Russell indexes cutoff. Panel A and B provide the results when the bandwidths are 100 and 500,
respectively. Pricing Error is the pricing error measure of [73]. |AR(30)| is the absolute value of
the thirty-minute return autocorrelation. Price Delay is the measure of price delay following [74].
Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of
the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding policy and is calculated separately every year
after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is the difference between the rank implied by the
end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank in the index assigned by the Russell at the end-of-
June. Amihud is the illiquidity measure of [5], and Zeros is the proportion of positive-volume days
with zero returns. Both year and firm fixed effects are included, and standard errors are clustered
at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Panel A. Small Bandwidth = 100 Panel B. Large Bandwidth=500
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay
Passive(%) -0.342** 0.0109 -0.894** -0.711*** -0.392*** -0.748***
(-2.33) (0.04) (-2.45) (-4.87) (-4.71) (-6.53)
(Rank* - c) 0.019 -1.021 0.998 0.304** 0.0111 0.481***
(1.11) (-1.04) (1.14) (2.01) (0.16) (6.79)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.00551 0.197 -0.506*** 0.011 0.0315 -0.193***
(0.08) (1.13) (-3.06) (0.21) (0.60) (-4.31)
FloatAdj 0.963 1.134 -0.999 -0.174 0.136 -0.443***
(0.65) (1.07) (-1.08) (-0.39) (1.54) (-5.23)
Amihud -0.222* -0.231** 0.0581* -0.554*** -0.198*** 0.0628*
(-1.74) (-2.43) (1.70) (-3.98) (-2.83) (1.68)
Zeros 0.391*** 0.0283 0.0886*** 0.899*** 0.0334*** 0.0669***
(-2.99) (0.78) (2.65) (4.91) (2.89) (5.72)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.844 0.897 0.334 0.229 0.247 0.348
Obs 2175 2175 3048 12954 12954 18390
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Table 14: Robustness of Finding to Different Bandwidths: Passive/Active Investment
and Price Efficiency
This table reports the results for an instrumental variable estimation of the complementary role of
passive and active investment in the efficient price discovery based on Equations (3) and (4) when
I use different bandwidths around the Russell indexes cutoff. Panel A and B provide the results
when the bandwidths are 100 and 500, respectively. Pricing Error is the pricing error measure of
[73]. |AR(30)| is the absolute value of the thirty-minute return autocorrelation. Price Delay is the
measure of price delay following [74]. Rank∗ is the rank of a firm based on market capitalization
at the time of assignment. c is a cutoff of the Russell 1000 index, which is 1000 before banding
policy and is calculated separately every year after banding policy is implemented. FloatAdj is
the difference between the rank implied by the end-of-May capitalization and the actual rank in
the index assigned by the Russell at the end-of-June. Amihud is the illiquidity measure of [5], and
Zeros is the proportion of positive-volume days with zero returns. Only year fixed effect is included
in Panel A, while both year and firm fixed effects are included in Panel B. Standard errors are
clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A. Small Bandwidth = 100
Active Fund Holdings (%)
Bottom Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay
Passive(%) -0.0181 -0.0383 -0.256*** -0.249* -0.254*** -0.654***
(-0.23) (-0.57) (-3.30) (-1.71) (-2.73) (-4.17)
(Rank* - c) -0.275 -0.805 0.643 -1.046 -0.732 1.353
(-0.18) (-0.91) (0.85) (-1.46) (-0.67) (1.32)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 -0.541** -0.249 -0.552*** 0.175 0.0850 -0.200
(-2.22) (-1.63) (-4.70) (1.18) (0.43) (-1.20)
FloatAdj 0.862 1.227 -0.548 1.249* 0.999 -1.397
(0.59) (1.40) (-0.72) (1.72) (0.89) (-1.35)
Amihud -1.733*** -1.901*** 0.241 -0.210 -0.146 0.397
(-6.37) (-4.97) (1.21) (-0.44) (-0.30) (1.19)
Zeros 0.111 0.0798* 0.127*** 0.0116 -0.0199 0.0187
(1.41) (1.89) (3.15) (0.29) (-0.36) (0.40)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.820 0.836 0.292 0.859 0.863 0.0577
Obs 656 656 962 651 651 950
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Panel B. Large Bandwidth = 500
Active Fund Holdings (%)
Bottom Top
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay Pricing Error |AR(30)| Price Delay
Passive(%) -0.182* -0.174*** -0.328*** -0.312*** -0.319*** -0.460***
(-1.95) (-3.37) (-5.62) (-5.61) (-4.71) (-5.66)
(Rank* - c) 0.241** 0.0758 0.307*** -0.00733 0.0653 0.356***
(2.05) (1.02) (4.58) (-0.10) (0.71) (4.32)
(Rank* - c) × R2000 0.0917 0.190** -0.182*** 0.0495 -0.0125 -0.209***
(0.86) (2.45) (-2.84) (0.70) (-0.15) (-3.11)
FloatAdj 0.0353 0.151* -0.360*** 0.204*** 0.157 -0.298***
(0.29) (1.92) (-5.34) (2.71) (1.63) (-3.52)
Amihud -1.040*** -1.150*** 0.106 -0.568 -0.404 -0.0727
(-5.56) (-5.94) (1.39) (-1.21) (-0.87) (-0.79)
Zeros 0.129*** 0.0909*** 0.105*** 0.0131 -0.00274 0.0733***
(4.19) (4.48) (6.61) (0.77) (-0.13) (3.53)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.820 0.833 0.223 0.857 0.871 0.177
Obs 3311 3311 4793 3347 3347 4798
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CHAPTER II
THE ROLE OF EFFICIENT ANALYSTS IN STOCK AND
OPTION MARKETS
2.1 Introduction
Security analysts are important contributors to the information efficiency of financial
markets. They gather and process a variety of information about a security and pro-
vide refined opinions about its attractiveness to other market participants. As noted
in [53], their efforts are fundamental to making financial markets more efficient. In
other words, it is expected on average that they deliver valuable information through
their recommendations, making transaction prices move closer to the intrinsic value
of the stock. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to examine the fundamental
contribution of analysts to stock price discovery as information intermediaries. In
particular, we aim to differentiate the degree of their contribution toward efficient
price discovery using individual analyst recommendations rather than the consensus
recommendation. We believe understanding this heterogeneity in the analysts’ con-
tributions is important because their contribution to price discovery fundamentally
justifies the reaction of stock prices.
Existing studies in the literature have investigated the average impact of analyst
recommendations by measuring mean (or median) magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of
market price reactions or abnormal stock returns to analyst reports.1 Unlike these
studies on the overall impact of analyst recommendations, [92] consider one dimen-
sion of heterogeneity across different analysts, which is whether the recommendation
1See [59], [60], and [81], among many others.
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is influential/noticeable or not. In this paper, we start by examining a different di-
mension of heterogeneity on how much a recommendation of an analyst contributes
to efficient price discovery. Then, we further investigate the impact of recommenda-
tions contributing to the efficient price discovery in stock and option markets, where
implications for participants’ investment decision making and uncertainty resolution
due to the contribution of analysts can be well-examined.
In order to assess individual analysts’ direct contribution toward efficient price
discovery, we measure how much influence their recommendation revisions have on
variations in the fundamental value of a corresponding stock. We make the usual
assumption that observed prices can be decomposed into the true efficient price (in-
trinsic value or random walk component) of a security and the noise component
(pricing error or market microstructure noise).2 Then, we measure the variation in
efficient prices generated by the recommendation revisions relative to the variation in
noise in observed prices. If an analyst delivers an important information contributing
to making the relevant security price more efficient, changes in observed prices in
response to the information are expected to be driven more by efficient prices than
noise component. This idea of using variances to measure the impact of informa-
tion releases is in a similar spirit of [16], which captures the information content of
earnings announcements. Based on this intuition, we propose using the ratio of the
volatility of the true efficient price process to the volatility of the noise in transaction
prices in order to capture the fundamental role of analysts’ recommendation.
Since the approach is based on two nonparametric volatility estimators, our signal-
to-noise volatility ratio is robust to model specification. It is also less data intensive
compared to other parametric approaches such as [73] who specifies a set of vector
autoregressive models to estimate the variance of the true efficient price component
and the variance of the noise component. While the pricing error of [73], which is
2We follow existing studies for this assumption. Among many others, see [73], [13], and [14].
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basically a reciprocal of our SNR measure, has been widely used in various studies,
this is the first paper that investigates the impact of analysts’ recommendations on
price efficiency with our new robust approach.3
Using the SNR, we first confirm that analysts on average contribute to efficient
price discovery. Specifically, we find evidence that the SNR is significantly associated
with both downgrade and upgrade recommendation revisions even after controlling
for other firm characteristics as well as firm- and time- fixed effects. After confirming
evidence of average impact, we further study the degree of their contribution toward
efficient price discovery and their different impact on the stock market. While security
analysts make an effort to collect and process information for their analyses, we expect
some degree of heterogeneity in their contributions to efficient price discovery. To
make the discussion simple, we refer to these analysts contributing to efficient price
discovery as “efficient analysts” and the other analysts not contributing to efficient
price discovery as “noisy analysts.” Effort and resources that analysts spend for their
analyses to discover the efficient price justify abnormal returns generated by stock
price changes. Consistently, we find evidence that revisions of efficient analysts with
higher SNRs generate greater abnormal stock returns than revisions of noisy analysts
with lower SNRs. Furthermore, we document that only highly efficient revisions with
high SNRs produce significant abnormal stock returns, whereas other revisions do
not generate any significant stock price reactions. This finding suggests that analysts
contributing to stock market efficiency eventually generate stock price reaction in
actual transactions.
A closer analysis further reveals that only those efficient analysts’ recommenda-
tion revisions generate abnormal stock returns in expected directions. In particular,
3Recently, [99] use a variance ratio of 1-minute and 30-minute realized variance estimates as a
measure of efficiency. In this paper, we use different frequencies for our measure of efficiency because
we believe that 1-second and 5-minute intervals are appropriate choices for our sample firms with
the guidance of the empirical analysis of [13] and [14].
55
only downgrade and upgrade revisions with higher SNRs produce negative and po-
sitive abnormal returns around the issuance, respectively. However, noisy analysts’
downgrade revisions with lower SNRs generate unexpected positive abnormal returns,
possibly due to increase in noise variance. Noisy analysts’ upgrade revisions with lo-
wer SNRs do not create any significant abnormal returns. This finding implies that
only those efficient analysts contributing to stock market efficiency eventually move
stock prices in the predicted direction as their recommendations suggest.
In addition to stock market reactions, we study the role of efficient analysts in
option markets to examine their impact on the activity of informed traders and the
resolution of uncertainty. First, if a recommendation revision delivers valuable infor-
mation about a firm’s fundamentals, we expect committed or informed traders to exe-
cute their trades where the potential profit from the transactions can be maximized.
Option markets allow us to investigate the association of analysts’ recommendation
revisions with informed trading, as informed traders utilize options to exploit the
informational advantage as discussed in [47] and [32], among others. Recently, [98]
suggest that the relative trading activity in option markets, measured by the ratio of
option trading volume to the underlying stock trading volume (O/S ratio) is signifi-
cantly associated with informed trading in option markets. Based on this finding, we
hypothesize that a recommendation revision made by efficient analysts would increase
trading activity of option markets relative to that of underlying stock markets. Con-
sistent with the hypothesis, we find that the O/S ratio significantly increases when
the recommendation revisions with high SNRs are issued. This evidence suggests
that option market participants recognize and attempt to exploit the issuance of ef-
ficient analysts’ recommendation revisions, which deliver valuable information about
the intrinsic value of a security.
Second, if a recommendation revision contributes to discover the efficient price of
a security, uncertainty about a firm’s future prospect can be significantly resolved.
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In theory, the release of important information about a firm’s performance and sus-
tainability resolves the uncertainty about the firm’s future prospects, as shown for
earnings announcements in [48]. We test whether efficient analysts play a similar
role in relevant markets. Since the price of an option contract reflects market parti-
cipants’ expectation about the firm, we expect that recommendation revisions made
by efficient analysts help resolve uncertainty about the related firm and also reduce
jump risks in stock prices. Consistent with our expectation, we find evidence that
an issuance of downgrade recommendation revisions with high SNRs reduces future
uncertainty measured with the average implied volatility of at-the-money (ATM) call
and put options of a firm. Furthermore, we also document that downgrade revisions
with high SNRs reduce the jump risks in stock prices, which is measured with the
slope of implied volatility of out-of-the-money (OTM) put options following [86]. This
finding suggests that future stock price movements will be relatively smooth because
the issuance of efficient analysts’ recommendations works toward resolving extreme
uncertainty about a firm.
Our study contributes to several strands of literature in finance. First, to the
best of our knowledge, this is the only paper in the literature which differentiates the
impact of security analysts from that of noisy analysts on contributing to efficient
price discovery. Most existing studies have used average effects (see [81]), influential
individual recommendations4 (see [92]), or stock price reaction (see [60]) to measure
their impact. These existing studies implicitly assume that significant reactions ob-
served in stock prices indicate the strong impact of analyst recommendations without
considering the presence of noise. Therefore, it is impossible to tell whether the chan-
ges in these measures are due to valuable information regarding the intrinsic value
of a firm or due to the noise coming from other confounding effects, liquidity issues,
or market frictions. Unlike these studies, our proposed SNR measure controls for the
4[92] focus on individual recommendations that visibly affect stock price.
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amount of noise in the market, and hence robust to their presence while capturing
the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendations.
Second, this is the first paper which utilizes information from high-frequency data
in order to examine the fundamental role of analysts in contributing to efficient price
discovery. Despite the advance in the realized variance literature,5 there have not
been many studies which actually take advantage of the development of techniques
to address economically critical questions in the literature on analysts, namely dis-
tinguishing efficient analysts from noisy analysts. As demonstrated in this paper, the
measure can allow us to differentiate their impact in the relevant markets.
Finally, this is the first paper to investigate the impact of efficient analysts on
option markets. There is no study particularly focusing on how analysts’ recommen-
dation revisions would affect option markets, while existing papers studies options
prices in response to scheduled news events such as earnings announcement ([45],
[44], [79]), monetary policy announcements ([35]), and political events ([86]). We
prove that recommendation revisions made by efficient analysts contributing to effi-
cient price discovery tend to not only generate significant stock market reactions but
also reduce implied volatility and jump risks in option markets. Our new measure
of SNR allows us to identify a market phenomenon that has not been proven in the
literature, and we expect it can be used for other related purposes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the met-
hodology we use to describe the SNR measure along with the background literature
as well as develops testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes our sample and provides
the summary statistics of main variables in our study. Section 2.4 presents our main
finding of this paper. We demonstrate the robustness of our main finding in Section
5Among many others, see [108], [1], and [13, 14] for the cases with the presence of microstructure
noise. Under the assumption of no-microstructure noise, several studies use realized variance as a
consistent estimator of integrated variance of the true efficient price process. For example, see [15]
and [9] among many others.
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2.5 and conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Methodology
In the literature on analyst recommendations, most studies use abnormal returns or
trading volume around their issuances to examine the effect of recommendation revi-
sions. These measures may contain noise, making it difficult to draw proper inferences
on the fundamental role of security analysts: to gather, analyze, and ultimately pro-
vide information about a firm’s value. In this section, we explain our approach to
distinguish the impact of a recommendation regarding the unobservable true value
of a firm from noise. We first suggest how to control for noise when measuring vari-
ation of true efficient prices reflecting the true value of a firm. Then, based on our
proposal, we list the testable hypotheses to examine the impact of efficient analysts’
recommendations on both stock and option markets.
2.2.1 Signal-to-Noise Volatility Ratio (SNR)
A firm value is represented by the true efficient price of a security. These efficient
prices are not observable. In price data, they are often contaminated by noise due
to market frictions. Essentially, our observed prices are a combination of these two
unobservable components. In order to determine whether an analyst contributes to
the discovery of true firm value or whether he/she induces more noise to observed pri-
ces, we suggest gauging the impact of analyst recommendations on the efficient price
discovery by investigating the relative variations of the two components at the time
of an analyst recommendation release. Our approach leverages recent developments
in the literature on realized variance that separately estimates the variances of true
efficient prices and noise.
We denote M and p̃i,t,k as the number of intraday discrete observations and the
k-th logarithmic transaction, or quote price, of stock i on day t, respectively. This
observed price p̃i,t,k consists of a true equilibrium price component pi,t,k related to a
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firm value and a microstructure noise component εi,t,k as follows:
p̃i,t,k = pi,t,k + εi,t,k, k = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (8)
When we observe a change in observed price p̃i,t,k around the time when a recom-
mendation revision is issued, it is difficult to distinguish whether the change is from
the change in the efficient price pi,t,k or from the change in the noise component εi,t,k.
Our approach to resolve this difficulty is based on the intuition that the variation of
pi,t,k will be affected more (less) than the variation of εi,t,k by the issuance of a revision
if the revision contains more (less) valuable information about the true value of a firm.
The relative ratio of these two variations tells us whether an analyst contributes to
stock price efficiency.
To estimate the variation of each component in observed price p̃i,t,k, we make the
standard assumption on the true efficient price process. In particular, we assume that
the logarithmic efficient price pi,τ for stock i follows the diffusion process as in







where φi,τ is a drift,
6 σi,τ is a spot volatility, and Wτ is a standard Brownian motion
of stock i. If this continuous process representing a firm value is observable at dis-
crete times in the absence of a noise component, one can express the k-th intraday
logarithmic return of stock i on day t as
ri,t,k = pi,t,k − pi,t,k−1, k = 1, 2, · · · ,M. (10)
Following the literature on realized variance, we define realized variance as the sum





6For our analysis using high-frequency data, the drift term is negligible compared to the volatility
process due to the order of magnitude. We include it in Equation (9) for a generality.
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If we assume the absence of a noise component in data, the realized variance is a
consistent estimator for the integrated variance of the true efficient price process as




σ2i,sds→ 0, as M →∞. (12)
However, we know that the presence of a noise component is not negligible in
observed prices. Then, an observed return can be represented as a sum of a change
in a true equilibrium price and a change in a noise component:
r̃i,t,k = (p̃i,t,k − p̃i,t,k−1)
= (pi,t,k − pi,t,k−1) + (εi,t,k − εi,t,k−1)
= ri,t,k + ηi,t,k.
(13)
The observable price and efficient price can significantly diverge in reality due
to liquidity or other frictions in financial markets (for example, see [104]). Thus,
in the presence of noise, Equation (12) does not hold. As shown in [13], under the
assumption of Equation (9) for the efficient price process and the assumption that
the noise component εi,t,k is independent and identically distributed with a mean of
zero and has a bounded fourth moment, the realized variance estimator does not




r̃2i,t,k →∞, as M →∞. (14)
That is, the sum of squared intraday returns contaminated by noise results in the
infinite accumulation of microstructure noise as we increase the sampling frequency,
M . Based on this result, a simple technique is provided by [13] to identify the
variance of the efficient price process and the variance of microstructure noise using
high-frequency data recorded at different frequencies.
7See [9] and [15] among others.
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The technique is twofold. First, the variance (as well as other higher moments)








i,t), q = 2, 3, 4 as M →∞8. (15)
Second, using the sampling frequency of high-frequency data that optimally balances
the finite sample bias and the variance of the estimator, we can extract the information
about the variance of the true efficient price process from the traditional realized
variance estimator 9. Thus, we are able to infer the variance of market microstructure
noise using the highest-frequency data as well as the variance of the true efficient price
process using the optimally sampled high-frequency data.





the j-th intraday logarithmic returns sampled at the highest frequency and at the
optimal sampling frequency of stock i on day t following [13], respectively. Using
these two different frequencies of returns, we further denote the estimator of the
noise component volatility and the estimator of the efficient price volatility of stock



























where J and K are the numbers of intraday returns at the highest frequency and at
the optimal sampling frequency, respectively (J > K).
Using the results above, we construct our measure to examine the contribution of
analysts’ recommendations to the efficient price discovery, the signal-to-noise volatility
8See Theorem 2 and Appendix of [14] for details.
9See Section 4 of [13] and [14] for details.
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This efficiency measure allows us to gauge the relative variation in true efficient prices
compared to the variation in noise when an analyst issues a recommendation revision.
It indicates how informative the revision is regarding the true efficient price after
controlling for the variance of the noise component. If an analyst recommendation
contains valuable information on the true efficient price, the release would affect
the variation of the efficient price process, leading to a relative increase of V
(opt)
i,t ,
and hence, an increase in SNRi,t. However, if an analyst recommendation does not
provide any material information about the true value of a firm, but only induces
other market frictions, such as illiquidity or herding behavior of investors, it would
result in an increased variation of noise, leading to a relative increase of V
(highest)
i,t , and
hence, a decrease in SNRi,t.
The main difference between this measure and other existing approaches to assess
the impact of analysts is that our measure focuses on the fundamental role of efficient
analysts, which is the discovery of efficient stock prices, whereas other approaches use
a secondary outcome of analysts, such as stock price reaction, abnormal returns, or
trading volumes. Furthermore, it takes into account the presence of noise prevailing
in the observed market data. Therefore, we expect this measure to be robust to noise
and useful for any analysis regardless of presence or amount of noise in data.
2.2.2 Testable Hypotheses for Informative Revisions
We evaluate the impact of recommendation revisions on stock and option markets
where efficient prices of underlying assets are potentially affected by the release of
efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions. Since our measure helps us to differen-
tiate more efficient analysts’ recommendations from less efficient recommendations,
we specifically investigate the degrees of market reactions in both markets. We can
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first confirm existing evidence that analyst recommendation revisions contribute to
the discovery of the efficient stock price by considering the response of SNR around
analyst revisions. Then, we set up three hypotheses for our study as follows.
In the stock market, if an analyst recommendation revision indeed contains valu-
able information about the true firm value, we expect the recommendation revision
to be more efficient and so generate a greater degree of stock market reaction. This
leads to our first testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1 An analyst recommendation revision release with higher signal-to-
noise volatility ratio (SNR), containing more valuable information about the efficient
price of a security, generates a stronger market reaction and produces greater (abnor-
mal) returns with the expected direction.
In testing this hypothesis, we use upgrade and downgrade revisions separately to
determine if efficient upgrade revisions generate greater abnormal returns, while ef-
ficient downgrade revisions generate lower abnormal returns. This test is important
because ultimately the directional information of recommendation revisions matters
for investors.
We also investigate how option markets respond to efficient analysts’ recommen-
dations. [98] document that the trading volume in derivate markets relative to the
trading volume in underlying securities increases around information events, such as
earnings announcements. In addition, [85] and [75] show that informed traders par-
ticipate in option markets to exploit their informational advantages. If an analyst
recommendation revision is an important informative event, we expect the trading
volume in the option market relative to the trading volume in the stock market to
increase on revision release days. Using our SNR measure, we can specifically test
whether more efficient analysts’ recommendations increase the relative option market
volume more. This leads to our second hypothesis.
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Hypothesis 2 An analyst recommendation revision with higher signal-to-noise vo-
latility ratio (SNR), containing more valuable information about the efficient price of
a security, generates stronger option market trading activities.
Lastly, we aim to examine if analyst recommendation revisions deliver material
information to resolve uncertainty about the prospect of a firm. If a revision contains
more information about the efficient price, reflecting the true value of a firm, more
uncertainty is expected to be resolved, and hence, uncertainty is expected to decrease
to a greater extent, relative to a less efficient revision. In the option market literature,
the implied volatility or the slope of implied volatility has been used to measure
uncertainty about the prospective of a firm. This leads to our third hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 An analyst recommendation revision with higher signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR), containing more valuable information about the efficient price of a security,
resolves uncertainty about a firm better, relative to a revision with lower SNR.
2.3 Data and Sample
The sample period of our analysis spans from January 2001 to September 2014. The
main variable of interest, the signal-to-noise volatility ratio (SNR), requires the use
of two different frequencies of high-frequency data. We obtain tick-by-tick quote and
trade data from the Trade and Quote (TAQ) database. In the empirical analysis, we
focus on stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index.10 From the composite of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, we cover the NYSE-listed 25 stocks because
it is ideal for our purpose to use all available quotes from a consolidated exchange for
consistency.
We obtain stock recommendation data from the Thomson Financial’s Instituti-
onal Brokers Estimate (I/B/E/S) U.S. detail file. Analyst recommendation release
10In our sample, we include the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index as of September
2014.
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dates are also obtained from the same file. The I/B/E/S standardizes analyst re-
commendations and converts them into numerical scores, where “1” is strong buy,
“2” is buy,“3” is hold, “4” is underperform, and “5” is sell. We reverse them so that
higher numerical values correspond to more favorable recommendations. Previous
research documents that recommendation revisions are more informative than levels
of recommendations (see, for example, [21] and [82] among many others), so we focus
on recommendation revisions computed as the difference between the current rating
and the previous rating. Data on implied volatility and trading volume of individual
options are obtained from OptionMetrics. We also collect data on market capitaliza-
tion, trading volume, daily bid-ask spreads, and other stock price related data from
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Accounting data, such
as the book value of firms, are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.
To construct the signal-to-noise volatility (SNR) ratio, we first apply a common
filter to remove quotes whose associated price changes or spreads were larger than
10% following [13]. Using the filtered quote data, we aggregate quotes to the second
by averaging midprices of all quotes arriving within each second. Then, we use these
one-second frequency quotes to estimate the variance of the microstructure noise
process, V
(1sec)
i,t , using Equation (16).
[13] use the conditional mean-squared error (MSE) to estimate the variance of the
true efficient price of a security. To evaluate the optimal sampling frequency for each
security, they balance the trade-off between bias and the variance of an estimator. In
our analysis, instead of estimating optimal sampling frequencies for each security, we
construct five-minute returns as differences between logarithmic prices sampled every
five-minutes. [13] analyze stocks in the S&P 100 index in the month of February
2002. The average, minimum, and maximum of optimal sampling frequencies of the
stocks in their sample are around 4.0, 0.4, and 13.6 minutes, respectively. The average
optimal sampling frequencies of securities that overlap in our sample is 3.9 minutes.
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We use a five-minute frequency as an optimal frequency for our analysis to estimate
a realized volatility of the true efficient price process, V
(5min)
i,t , using Equation (17).
11













Table 15 presents descriptive statistics of variables used in this paper by each year
and by each security in Panel A and Panel B, respectively. We report averages of daily
closing prices, daily returns, volatility estimates for the true efficient prices (V (5min)),
volatility estimates for the noise (V (1sec)), SNRs, daily stock trading volumes, daily
option trading volumes, O/S ratios, market capitalizations, book-to-market ratios,
and [5] illiquidity measures in each column. The time-series averages of the true
efficient price volatility and the noise process volatility are 21.38% and 0.12%, and
the average of the SNRs is 176.2. In Panel A of Table 15, we observe a cross-sectional
variation of the SNRs, where Walt Disney (Symbol: DIS) shows the lowest ratio of
166.9 and UnitedHealth Group (Symbol: UNH) shows the highest ratio of 186.3. With
the face values of these numbers, assuming the independence between the true efficient
price process and the noise component, 0.0032% (= 1/(176.2)2) of the variance of
observed prices is due to the variance of the noise component when we sample 5-
minute returns.
In Table 16, we report descriptive statistics of our main variable of interest, the
SNR. From this point, we take the log of the SNR, as the ratio is strongly positively
skewed. For our regression analyses, we use the log of the SNR (log(SNR)). Panel A
of Table 16 provides the summary statistics of log(SNR) for each firm in our sample.
The mean and the median of log(SNR) are 5.153 and 5.159, respectively. In Panel
11Our choice of a five-minute sampling frequency for the true efficient price variance estimation can
be considered conservative. Following [13], we randomly select a subset of stocks studied in this paper
and estimate the optimal sampling frequencies for those stocks each month. The average, minimum,
and maximum optimal sampling frequencies are 3.6, 3.03 (Caterpillar Inc. Symbol: CAT) and 4.02
(American Express Company. Symbol: AXP) minutes, respectively. Even though optimal sampling
frequencies are relatively high in recent periods, the 5-minute sampling frequency is a conservative
choice to prevent the variance estimator from contamination due to the noise component.
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B of Table 16, we report the correlation coefficients matrix of variables, including
log(SNR). log(SNR) shows positive correlations with stock trading volume, option
trading volume, and bid-ask spread. The correlation coefficient between log(SNR)
and daily returns is 0.0027, which is not statistically different from zero. This small
correlation tells that the construction of our efficiency measure, log(SNR), is not
mechanically related to the daily return of a stock.12
2.4 Empirical Findings
In this section, we first investigate how our measure, the SNRs, behaves around the
timing of recommendation revision issuances. Once we formally examine the rela-
tionship between our measure of efficiency contribution and the issuances of recom-
mendation revisions, we then further investigate efficient analysts’ impacts on stock
markets relative to noisy analysts. Next, we examine the impact of revisions contri-
buting to stock price efficiency on option market activity and uncertainty resolution
in option markets.
2.4.1 Recommendation Revisions and Stock Price Efficiency
We examine how the SNR is associated with the issuance of recommendation revisions.
On average, we would expect the SNRs to be strongly associated with the issuance of
analyst recommendation revisions if analysts work as important contributors to stock
price efficiency. To check this, we merge the SNRs with the recommendation revisi-
ons data. Before formally testing the association using regression analysis, we first
examine how recommendation revisions are related to the SNRs, raw daily returns,
abnormal daily returns, and O/S ratios.
12We also checked the correlation of log(SNR) with an absolute value of a daily stock return, and
the correlation coefficient is 13.36%. If we restrict our sample with large price changes, for example
observations with ±5% or ±10% return in a day, then the correlation coefficients are not statisti-
cally different from zero, which again confirms no mechanical relation between the construction of
log(SNR) and daily returns.
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Table 17 reports the averages of the SNRs, raw daily returns, abnormal daily re-
turns from [55], and O/S ratios. Panel A reports the results for daily observations
that are not accompanied by recommendation revisions. Panel B and Panel C report
the results for those that are accompanied by downgrade and upgrade revisions, re-
spectively. Comparing the SNRs in Panel A with those in other panels, we observe
increases in the SNRs when the observations are accompanied by recommendation
revisions. The daily returns and the abnormal returns in Panel B and Panel C are
in line with prior research that shows recommendation revisions have a significant
impact on stock returns.13 We also find evidence that information inflow due to revi-
sions is exploited in the option market by observing an increase in O/S ratio around
recommendation revision issuances. The finding on the O/S ratio implies increa-
sed activity of informed traders in the option market around the revision issuances,
consistent with [98]. We investigate this finding in more detail in Subsection 2.4.3.
Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the SNR around recommendation revisions.
The variation of the SNRs suggests that, on average, recommendation revisions con-
tain valuable information about the true efficient price of a security as we observe the
spikes of the SNRs on the days of revision issuances. To further confirm this finding,
we test the following regression model at a firm-day observation level:
log(SNRi,t) = β × d revisioni,t + γ′Xi,t + θi + δt + εi,t, (19)
where the dependent variable, log(SNRi,t), is the log of the SNR for firm i on day
t, and d revisioni,t includes either d upi,t or d downi,t, which is equal to one if an
observation is accompanied by a downgrade or an upgrade revision, respectively.
Alternatively, we include both d upi,t and d downi,t to estimate coefficients simul-
taneously. Because the contribution of a revision to stock price efficiency might be
13For example, [107] shows that recommendations of security analysts generate significant abnor-
mal returns around the new buy and sell recommendations.
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associated with firm characteristics, we include various control variables in the regres-
sion. Xi,t represents a vector of control variables for firm i on day t, including the size
(log(ME)), the book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), the trading volume (log(vol)) and
the [5] illiquidity measure (Amihud). Detailed definitions of variables are provided
in Appendix B.1. We include firm fixed effects (θi) to control for any time-invariant
unobservable heterogeneity across firms and day fixed effects (δt) to control for time-
varying factors that might drive the changes of the SNRs for all firms.
Table 18 shows the results for the regression specification in Equation (19). The
positive and statistically significant coefficients on d down and d up indicate that
the SNR increases when recommendation revisions are released. In columns (3), (5),
and (6) of Table 18, we find that the significance remains intact after controlling
for firm characteristics and the illiquidity measure. The results suggest that the
recommendation revisions of analysts in general contain valuable information on the
true efficient price of a security.
2.4.2 Efficient Analysts’ Recommendations and the Stock Market
Prior research has considered the value of analyst recommendations based on their
impact on observed stock market returns14, which could be possibly confounded with
liquidity issues or herding behavior of stock market participants. Therefore, in this
paper, we argue that the true value of a recommendation revision should be evaluated
by considering the contribution of analysts to the efficient stock prices, which is a
fundamental role of analysts in financial markets.
In this section, we test Hypothesis 1 as to whether recommendation revisions with
more information regarding the true efficient price (i.e., higher SNRs) generate greater
abnormal stock returns in the expected directions. We run the following regression
14Among many others, for example, see [107], [81], and [92].
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specification at the firm-day observation level:
ARi,t = β1× d revisioni,t + β2× d revisioni,t× log(SNRi,t) + θi + γ′Xi,t + εi,t, (20)
where the dependent variable, ARi,t, is an abnormal return of firm i on day t from the
[55] three-factor model. log(SNRi,t) is the log of the SNR for a firm i on day t, and
d revisioni,t includes either d upi,t or d downi,t, which is equal to one if an observation
is accompanied by a downgrade or an upgrade revision, respectively. Alternatively, we
include both d upi,t and d downi,t to estimate coefficients simultaneously. Xi,t repre-
sents a vector of control variables for firm i on day t, including the size (log(ME)), the
book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), the trading volume (log(vol)) and the [5] illiquidity
measure (Amihud). Detailed definitions of variables are provided in Appendix B.1.
[66] suggest using a firm-fixed effect even when one uses a stock return as a dependent
variable to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Following [66], we include firm fixed
effects (θi) to control for any time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity across firms.
The regression coefficient of interest β2 would be expected to be negative for down-
grade revisions and positive for upgrade revisions because we expect that downgrades
and upgrades contributing to the improvement in price efficiency tend to generate
greater negative and greater positive abnormal stock returns, respectively.
Consistent with our expectation, we find evidence that only revisions contribu-
ting to the discovery of the efficient stock prices generate abnormal returns in the
expected directions. Table 19 provides the results for the regressions using Equation
(20). The regression coefficients in columns (1) and (3) are negative and positive,
respectively, and both are statistically significant. This result is consistent with the
existing findings that downgrade and upgrade revisions generate negative and positive
abnormal returns on average. Interestingly, when we include log(SNR) and interact
it with the downgrade and upgrade dummies, it does not generate the expected stock
market reaction. In column (5), we find that the coefficient on d down is positive
and significant while the coefficient estimate on d down× log(SNR) is negative and
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significant. In column (6), only the interaction term of the upgrade revision dummy
with the SNR shows positive significance.
To further tease out how different levels of the SNRs of revisions result in different
responses in the stock market, we construct and analyze the subsamples separately:
the downgrade revision sample and the upgrade revision sample. In addition, we
create dummy variables, d low, d mid, and d high, which are equal to one if an ob-
servation is in the bottom, middle, or top terciles of log(SNR), respectively. With
these subsamples and the dummies for terciles of the SNRs, we test whether re-
commendation revisions with higher SNRs generate greater abnormal returns in the
expected direction. The regression results are provided in Table 20. The coefficient
estimates in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) suggest that, as documented in the li-
terature, downgrade revisions usually exert a greater impact on stock returns than
upgrade revisions. In columns (3), (4), and (5), we find that only efficient analysts’
downgrade revisions with high SNRs generate greater negative reactions in the stock
market, whereas noisy analysts’ downgrade revisions with low SNRs generate unex-
pected positive stock market reactions. These results demonstrate how our measure
can be utilized to distinguish efficient analysts’ downgrade revisions from noisy ana-
lysts’ downgrade revisions.
2.4.3 Efficient Analysts’ Recommendations and the Option Market
According to our finding in the previous subsection, efficient analysts’ recommendati-
ons affect stock market returns in the anticipated directions. Our first question in this
subsection is how informed traders would react around days when analysts release
their recommendation revisions. If recommendations are believed to provide valuable
information to infer the true efficient price of a security, these traders are expected to
execute their transactions where the potential profit is maximized. That is, trading
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options on individual stocks would be much more appealing and preferred than tra-
ding underlying stocks. Since we can identify recommendation revisions contributing
to the improvement in stock price efficiency using our SNR measure, we test how the
issuances of those efficient analysts’ revisions are related to the corresponding stocks’
option market activities.
Another important benefit of considering option market responses is that it allows
us to measure ex-ante market uncertainty. Implied volatility is often used to measure
forward-looking volatility risk. The slope of implied volatility can also be used to
measure extreme uncertainty going beyond regular volatility risk, which is referred
to as jump or tail risk in the literature. These ex-ante uncertainty measures change
over time as information flows. Our questions in this subsection are whether these
forward-looking measures are affected by the efficient analysts’ recommendations and
whether those recommendations play a role in resolving relevant uncertainty. If a
revision delivers important information about uncertain aspect of firm fundamentals,
the release of a revision should help to resolve uncertainty, and hence, the subjective
distribution for pricing related stock options is expected to exhibit lower volatility
risk and a smaller magnitude of jump risk. Therefore, both implied volatility and its
slope are expected to decrease when the revisions with higher SNRs are released. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first study which investigates the impact of ana-
lysts’ recommendations on individual equity option market activities and uncertainty
resolution.
2.4.3.1 Efficient Analysts’ Recommendations and Option Market Activity
As informed traders are market participants who exploit informational advantages in
their investment decisions, the revisions with highly valuable information about the
efficient stock prices are likely to be utilized by them. In this subsection, we investigate
the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on option market activity
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by testing Hypothesis 2.
We consider option market activity following [98], [85], [75], and many others
on informed trading and option market participation. As aforementioned papers
document that informed traders are more likely to actively participate in option
markets, we expect that revisions with greater fundamental information regarding the
true efficient price generate greater option trading volume relative to stock trading
volume. To test the above, we run the following regression specification at a firm-day
observation level:
log(O/S ratioi,t) = β1×d revisioni,t+β2×d revisioni,t×log(SNRi,t)+θi+γ
′Xi,t+εi,t,
(21)
where the dependent variable, log(O/S ratioi,t), is the log of the ratio of option trading
volume to stock trading volume of firm i on day t. As documented in [98], we use
the O/S ratio to capture investor activity in the option market relative to the stock
market. log(SNRi,t) is the log of the SNR for firm i on day t, and d revisioni,t includes
either d upi,t or d downi,t, which is equal to one if an observation is accompanied by a
downgrade or an upgrade revision, respectively. Alternatively, we include both d upi,t
and d downi,t to estimate coefficients simultaneously.
In this subsection on option market analysis, a set of control variables (Xi,t) include
stock market variables as well as option market variables to reduce the concern on
omitted variables. As stock market control variables, we include the size (log(ME)),
the book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), the bid-ask spread of a stock (Stock Spread(%)),
and the [5] illiquidity measure (Amihud). As [98] examine economically plausible
determinants of the O/S ratio, we also include those determinants as control variables:
average option bid-ask spread (Option Spread(%)), average delta of options (Delta,
with put deltas being reversed in sign), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Disp),
institutional ownership (IO ratio), and average implied volatility (avg Ivol). All
variables are defined in detail in Appendix A. Again, we include firm fixed effects (θi)
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to control for any time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity across firms.
We document an increase in informed trader activity in option markets only
around the times when efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions are released. Ta-
ble 21 reports the results for the regression specification (21). The positive and
significant coefficients on d down and d up indicate that downgrade and upgrade re-
visions increase option market activity relative to stock market activity. However,
when we include an interaction term of the revision dummies (d down and d up) and
log(SNR) in the regression specification (columns (3) and (6)), the coefficients on the
revision dummies (d down and d up) become negative, while those on the interaction
terms (d down× log(SNR) and d up× log(SNR)) are positive and significant. These
results show that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, recommendation revisions containing
more valuable information regarding the true efficient price tend to increase option
trading volume compared to stock trading volume, while noisy analysts’ revisions do
not.
2.4.3.2 Efficient Analysts’ Recommendations and Uncertainty Resolution
We have established that recommendation revisions contributing to the improvement
in stock price efficiency generate stronger reactions in both stock and option markets.
Since efficient analysts’ revisions help investors infer the true efficient price of a se-
curity, we are able to further extend our analysis of the impact of those revisions on
uncertainty resolution regarding the future prospects of a firm. If a recommendation
revision provides important information to deduce the true value of a firm, the newly
released information would help resolve uncertainty about a firm’s future prospect.
In this subsection, we formally test Hypothesis 3.
The price of an option contract reflects the expectation of market participants
on future stock price movements, allowing us to study the uncertainty resolution
around a firm’s outlook. Among many other variables in option market data, the
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implied volatility of an option price is a natural proxy for the uncertainty measure
(see [48], for example). To test whether efficient analysts’ revisions reduce the future
uncertainty of a firm using implied volatility, we run the following regression at a
firm-day observation level:
log(ImpV oli,t) = β1×d revisioni,t+β2×d revisioni,t× log(SNRi,t)+θi+γ′Xi,t+εi,t,
(22)
where the dependent variable, log(ImpVoli,t), is the log of implied volatility, which is
measured as the average of implied volatilities of at-the-money (ATM) call and put
options (with 30 days of time-to-maturity) of a firm i on day t obtained from Opti-
onMetrics. log(SNRi,t) is the log of the SNR for firm i on day t, and d revisioni,t
includes either d upi,t or d downi,t, which is equal to one if an observation is accom-
panied by a downgrade or an upgrade revision, respectively. Alternatively, we include
both d upi,t and d downi,t to estimate coefficients simultaneously. The same control
variables are included in Xi,t as in the regression specification (21), except the average
of implied volatility (avg Ivol).
We find evidence that downgrade revisions containing valuable information on the
true efficient price resolve uncertainty about a firm’s future prospect. Table 22 provi-
des the results for the regression analysis using Equation (22). In columns (2) and (5)
of Table 22, we find that recommendation revisions decrease the average of implied
volatilities of call and put options. However, when we include an interaction term
of revision dummies (d down and d up) and log(SNR) in the regression specification
(columns (3) and (6)), we find that only highly efficient analysts’ downgrade revisions
reduce implied volatility.15
15This result may appear difficult to reconcile with the leverage effect in which a decline in prices
is associated with higher volatility due to the firm becoming more levered. We note here that higher
volatility in leverage effect is realized volatility, while our measure of uncertainty in this analysis
is implied volatility which is not realized but depends on investors subjective distribution of future
stock returns. The subjective return distribution is based on the information up to the time of the
issuance of a recommendation revision and does not necessarily determine realized volatility after
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When there exists considerable uncertainty about a firm’s future outlook, investors
may anticipate high volatility and sudden jumps or discontinuities in stock prices in
the near future. Thus, the risk (or likelihood) of jumps or discontinuous changes in
stock prices is another signal indicating significant uncertainty in the firm’s outlook. If
a recommendation revision contains valuable information on the true efficient price of
a stock, it would also reduce the likelihood of jumps or sudden discontinuities in future
stock prices. That is, when an efficient analyst issues a recommendation revision, the
jump risk in the price process would decrease due to uncertainty resolution from the
issuance (Hypothesis 3).
In option markets, the prices of out-of-the-money (OTM) put options are sensitive
to extreme movements in underlying security prices. For this reason, [86] use the slope
of implied volatility to show that political events resolve the risk of jumps in stock
prices. Thus, to test Hypothesis 3, we run the following regression specification:
Slope IVSi,t = β1× d revisioni,t + β2× d revisioni,t× log(SNRi,t) + θi + γ′Xi,t + εi,t,
(23)
where the dependent variable, Slope IVSi,t, is the slope of the implied volatility smile
of options whose underlying asset is a stock of firm i on day t. The slope of the
implied volatility smile is measured by running regressions of implied volatilities of
OTM put options (with 30 days of time-to-maturity) on the deltas of corresponding
options, following [86]. log(SNRi,t) is the log of the SNR for firm i on day t, and
d revisioni,t includes either d upi,t or d downi,t, which is equal to one if an observation
is accompanied by a downgrade or an upgrade revision, respectively. Alternatively,
we include both d upi,t and d downi,t to estimate coefficients simultaneously. The
same control variables are included in Xi,t as in the regression specification (21).
The regression results are reported in Table 23. In column (3), similar to our
the revision. Therefore, we interpret the decrease in implied volatility as a resolution of investors’
perceived uncertainty.
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finding in Table 22, we find a significantly positive coefficient on d down and a sig-
nificantly negative coefficient on d down× log(SNR). On the one hand, the positive
coefficient on d down suggests that noisy analysts’ recommendation revisions increase
jump risk in the price process. On the other hand, as the increase of the SNR due
to recommendation revisions implies that the revision provides valuable fundamental
information on the true efficient price, and efficient analysts’ recommendation revisi-
ons not only resolves the uncertainty of a firm’s future prospects but also reduces the
jump risk in related markets in the future.
In Table 24, we focus on observations with downgrade or upgrade revisions to
examine a direct relationship between log(SNR) and option market variables. In Pa-
nel A and Panel B, we report the coefficient estimates for the regressions of different
option market measures, log(O/S ratio), log(ImpV ol), and Slope IV S on observati-
ons accompanied by downgrade revisions and observations accompanied by upgrade
revisions, respectively. The positively significant estimates in columns (1), (2), (7),
and (8) indicate that both downgrade and upgrade revisions with greater contribu-
tion to stock price efficiency induce stronger activity in the option market relative to
the stock market. Consistent with our finding in Tables 22 and 23, the results from
columns (3) to (6) and from columns (9) to (12) suggest that only highly efficient ana-
lysts’ downgrade revisions resolve the future uncertainty, as measured by the implied
volatility, and decrease the jump risk in prices, as measured by the slope of implied
volatility smile.
Overall, the evidence from stock markets suggests that highly efficient analysts’
downgrade (upgrade) revisions generate greater negative (positive) abnormal returns
because those revisions help to discover information on the true efficient price of a
security. The evidence from option markets indicates that efficient analysts’ down-
grade revisions resolve future uncertainty about a firm and reduce the jump risk in
the price process, whereas upgrade revisions do not.
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2.5 Robustness Checks
2.5.1 Concurrent Earnings Announcements
A firm’s earnings announcement delivers important information to market partici-
pants about a firm’s performance and prospects on future cash flows. [98] propose
the O/S ratio as a measure of informed trading in option market relative to stock mar-
ket increases around the times of earnings announcements of a firm. In addition, [44]
document empirical evidence that implied volatility increases before earnings announ-
cements and decreases after the announcements. Given that analyst recommendations
are often issued around the times of earnings announcements, it is possible that our
finding on efficient analysts’ recommendations is a manifestation of the finding on
earnings announcements. To mitigate this concern, we exclude firm-day observations
used in our previous analysis that are accompanied by actual earnings announcements.
Using this filtered sample, we first investigate the relationship between downgrade or
upgrade recommendation revisions and log(SNR).
In Panel A of Table 25, we provide the results for the filtered sample without any
earnings announcements. The results are very similar to the previous results in Table
18, implying that the revisions, on average, contain valuable information about the
true efficient price of a security. Panel B and Panel C of Table 25 show the results
for the impact of efficient analysts’ revisions on stock and option markets. In Panel
B, similar to Table 20, we examine whether recommendation revisions contributing
to stock price efficiency generate greater abnormal returns than noisy analysts’ re-
commendation revisions. Consistent with our finding in Table 20, we find that more
efficient analysts’ revisions generate greater negative abnormal returns in the stock
market. In Panel C, we also find similar evidence as in Table 24. Namely, efficient
analysts’ recommendation revisions increase trading activity in the option market
relative to that in the stock market, resolve uncertainty about a firm, and reduce
the jump risk in the stock price of a firm. Thus, overall, our findings on the impact
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of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on stock returns, option market acti-
vity, and uncertainty resolution are not driven by the confounding effect of earnings
announcements.
2.5.2 Subsample Period Analysis
Since the construction of our main measure, the SNR, largely depends on high-
frequency data and the presence of microstructure friction, there may be a concern
that any structural breaks or abrupt changes in market microstructure might drive
the variation of the SNR. In this subsection, we aim to mitigate such concerns by
conducting a subsample period analysis. We divide our full sample into two subsam-
ples, one from 2001 to 2007 and the other from 2008 to 2014, and perform the same
analyses on each subsample.
In Panel A of Table 26, we report the results for the relationship between the SNR
and recommendation revisions. Our finding is robust in both subsample periods as
we find the issue of downgrade or upgrade revisions is associated with an increase
in the SNR. The subsample results for the efficient analysts’ revisions and stock
returns are provided in Panel B, and we confirm that our finding in Section 2.4 is
robust. Interestingly, we find evidence that our result becomes stronger (in terms
of coefficients and t-statistics) in later years (2008-2014) than in earlier years (2001-
2007). This is due to the fact that many uninformed stock market participants are now
able to obtain various information including analysts recommendations more easily in
recent years, which is consistent with the findings from the subsample period analysis.
Panel C of Table 26 provides the subsample results on option market activity
and uncertainty resolution. We find that our main finding only holds in the later
subsample period (2008-2014). This finding makes sense because the depth and the
liquidity of the option market have been more well-developed in recent years as we
observe an increase in option trading volume over time in Table 15.
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2.6 Conclusion
We investigate the fundamental role of security analysts in terms of their contribu-
tion to the stock price efficiency by considering their impact on the variation of the
true efficient price after controlling for the presence of noise. Using two different fre-
quencies of high-frequency data, we construct a measure, the signal-to-noise volatility
ratio (SNR), which is defined as a ratio of the efficient price variation to the noise
variation, and find that changes in stock price efficiency are strongly associated with
the issuances of downgrade and upgrade revisions.
We distinguish recommendation revisions that contribute to the improvement in
stock price efficiency (efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions) from those that
amplify the variance of the noise component in the observed stock prices (noisy ana-
lysts’ recommendation revisions). We find that only highly efficient analysts’ down-
grade and upgrade revisions (i.e., high SNR revisions) produce significantly negative
and positive abnormal returns, respectively. However, noisy analysts’ downgrade
revisions generate unexpected positive abnormal returns. Thus, we identify highly
efficient analysts’ revisions which generate significant stock returns as intended by
the revisions.
We also find that efficient analysts’ revisions are well exploited and reflected in
option markets. First, we document that highly efficient analysts’ revisions induce
greater trading volumes in the option markets relative to the stock markets, which is
consistent with the argument that informed traders actively participate in the option
markets to exploit informational advantages. Second, we find evidence that highly
efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions help resolve future uncertainty of a firm
and reduce the risk of jumps in stock prices as they provide important information
to investors. Overall, the findings in this paper suggest that stock and option market
participants rationally respond to the issuances of efficient analysts’ recommendation
revisions that reveal information about the true efficient price of a security.
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Figure 3: Stock Price Efficiency Measure around Recommendation Revisions
The figures below display the measure of stock price efficiency around analyst recommendation
revisions. The upper and lower plots show the dynamics of log(SNR) around downgrade and
upgrade revisions, respectively.
As the first paper that focuses on the fundamental role of security analysts in
discovering the true efficient price of a security, this paper sheds light on the use of
high-frequency data to draw an inference on analyst recommendations regarding the
true price discovery. Our finding further suggests that high-frequency data is a potent
data source, which might enable us to solve other interesting economic questions.
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Table 15: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest in the paper. The sample contains 25 stocks in
the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from January 2001 to September 2014. All variables are at a daily basis for
each firm. Panel A reports the annual averages of variables, and Panel B reports firm-level averages of variables. The
two columns, Avg. price and Daily ret, report the average stock price and the average of daily returns. V (1sec) and
V (5min) are the realized (annualized) volatilities using 1-second returns and 5-minute returns using Equation (16)
and Equation (17), respectively. The signal-to-noise volatility ratio, SNR, is the ratio of V (5min) to V (1sec). Stock
vol and Option vol show the average daily trading volume (in hundreds) of stocks and options, respectively. O/S ratio
is the ratio of option trading volume to stock trading volume. The last three columns, ME, BM, and Amihud, are
the averages of market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and [5] illiquidity measure, respectively.
Panel A. By year
Year Avg. price Daily ret V (5min) V (1sec) SNR Stock vol Option vol O/S ratio ME BM Amihud
2001 57.60 -0.0050% 0.3084 0.0017 183.6 60399.8 4006.7 0.057 112161.9 0.253 0.085
2002 53.74 -0.0450% 0.3137 0.0017 190.1 72539.8 4299.9 0.059 99542.9 0.323 0.115
2003 52.37 0.1222% 0.2124 0.0013 169.9 67754.6 4182.2 0.068 96332.2 0.333 0.084
2004 57.38 0.0601% 0.1641 0.0010 164.2 67084.8 3787.4 0.063 111980.6 0.286 0.056
2005 56.28 0.0166% 0.1611 0.0010 163.0 82841.7 5102.4 0.066 117016.8 0.324 0.057
2006 58.58 0.0757% 0.1625 0.0010 164.7 95527.8 7419.5 0.080 122151.8 0.343 0.056
2007 66.45 0.0401% 0.1936 0.0010 185.5 121853.0 8209.3 0.074 129103.1 0.341 0.093
2008 58.00 -0.0730% 0.3654 0.0021 177.3 179024.8 13890.0 0.076 112251.8 0.450 0.297
2009 50.20 0.1263% 0.2946 0.0017 177.7 178107.9 17251.9 0.096 92222.6 0.535 0.282
2010 60.61 0.0686% 0.1924 0.0010 186.0 149889.3 13669.3 0.105 103582.6 0.472 0.128
2011 68.22 0.0496% 0.2034 0.0011 181.3 133595.9 13308.1 0.118 115294.3 0.476 0.121
2012 74.54 0.0661% 0.1533 0.0009 174.4 105887.8 11900.1 0.131 124742.1 0.459 0.078
2013 86.15 0.1197% 0.1400 0.0008 176.3 92398.8 10655.6 0.140 143058.5 0.404 0.075
2014 95.90 0.0258% 0.1285 0.0008 172.3 83081.4 10440.3 0.149 153379.6 0.390 0.228
Total 64.00 0.0463% 0.2138 0.0012 176.2 106427.7 9151.6 0.092 116630.1 0.38 0.13
Panel B. By firm
Symbol Avg. price Daily ret V (5min) V (1sec) SNR Stock vol Option vol O/S ratio ME BM Amihud
AXP 49.87 0.0515% 0.2531 0.0014 176.2 75146.9 5395.1 0.067 59680.7 0.25 0.21
BA 67.60 0.0458% 0.2363 0.0014 174.4 48657.6 5940.5 0.114 52206.1 0.31 0.12
CAT 71.58 0.0724% 0.2481 0.0014 182.9 58007.6 12274.7 0.171 39718.4 0.29 0.13
CVX 85.25 0.0561% 0.1977 0.0011 175.1 78024.8 6311.1 0.076 155812.4 0.54 0.08
DD 45.27 0.0412% 0.2264 0.0013 171.2 51997.9 2915.4 0.052 43051.6 0.37 0.16
DIS 34.79 0.0565% 0.2366 0.0014 166.9 96951.0 4068.8 0.044 66311.7 0.54 0.20
GE 27.82 0.0144% 0.2258 0.0013 177.1 381022.3 25259.2 0.056 284570.6 0.46 0.22
GS 131.26 0.0488% 0.2570 0.0014 178.4 68349.3 22321.1 0.292 60765.0 0.64 0.07
HD 41.60 0.0470% 0.2420 0.0014 180.8 117843.1 7449.5 0.065 76699.1 0.29 0.18
IBM 123.16 0.0411% 0.1873 0.0011 170.5 66857.6 16946.2 0.256 167373.4 0.19 0.05
JNJ 65.87 0.0374% 0.1572 0.0009 179.9 99672.1 4982.4 0.052 184463.9 0.23 0.06
JPM 40.65 0.0562% 0.2716 0.0015 177.5 233289.4 27619.1 0.100 135148.0 0.79 0.18
KO 49.79 0.0277% 0.1684 0.0010 174.0 88899.0 5334.3 0.055 130491.7 0.17 0.09
MCD 54.80 0.0500% 0.1966 0.0012 173.8 66389.3 6005.2 0.081 60468.5 0.25 0.11
MMM 93.34 0.0447% 0.1876 0.0011 173.4 33432.7 3082.6 0.098 59038.1 0.20 0.07
NKE 70.24 0.0757% 0.2241 0.0012 185.2 26179.2 2673.2 0.086 24543.9 0.34 0.11
PFE 26.46 0.0135% 0.2123 0.0012 174.6 329499.9 12655.3 0.037 187085.5 0.44 0.18
PG 69.66 0.0390% 0.1611 0.0009 174.8 87470.4 6949.3 0.067 166463.9 0.29 0.07
TRV 60.16 0.0618% 0.2214 0.0013 178.9 37093.8 547.1 0.016 27818.2 0.94 0.17
UNH 56.34 0.0733% 0.2513 0.0014 186.3 63512.5 4408.8 0.068 48297.1 0.35 0.17
UTX 75.66 0.0513% 0.2046 0.0012 167.2 38587.2 2302.5 0.056 60004.9 0.27 0.09
V 123.90 0.1306% 0.2054 0.0012 171.7 52160.0 10657.3 0.213 62689.4 0.51 0.09
VZ 38.82 0.0336% 0.2099 0.0012 173.4 125127.5 7940.3 0.051 111995.5 0.70 0.13
WMT 56.10 0.0264% 0.1862 0.0010 183.4 122475.8 10329.6 0.079 218598.9 0.26 0.10
XOM 68.35 0.0438% 0.1935 0.0011 178.6 184616.5 15587.0 0.082 351697.3 0.39 0.08
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Table 16: Description of Signal-to-Noise Volatility Ratio
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the signal-to-noise volatility ratio (SNR), which is the
main variable of interest in the paper. In this table, the log of SNR is computed as the log ratio of
V (5min) to V (1sec). The sample contains 25 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from
January 2001 to September 2014. In Panel A, we report the summary statistics of the log(SNR) for
each firm. The mean, median, and standard deviation are reported in the second, third, and fourth
columns, respectively. The minimum, maximum, 10th percentile, and 90th percentile are reported
in the last four columns. In Panel B, the correlation matrix of the log(SNR) along with daily
returns (Daily ret), stock trading volume (Stock vol), option trading volume (Option vol), firm size
(log(ME)), book-to-market ratio (log(BM)), and bid-ask spread (Stock Spread(%)), is provided. *
indicates statistical significance at the 10% level.
Panel A. Summary Statistics for Each Firm
Symbol Mean Median SD Min Max p10 p90
AXP 5.155 5.163 0.191 3.366 5.830 4.907 5.389
BA 5.144 5.146 0.183 3.705 6.005 4.914 5.371
CAT 5.195 5.194 0.165 3.999 5.985 4.986 5.399
CVX 5.148 5.152 0.193 4.065 6.226 4.914 5.387
DD 5.125 5.124 0.192 4.154 6.475 4.886 5.356
DIS 5.095 5.111 0.210 4.238 6.069 4.821 5.346
GE 5.162 5.164 0.167 3.684 6.016 4.956 5.373
GS 5.167 5.174 0.182 3.399 5.973 4.955 5.382
HD 5.179 5.186 0.193 3.821 5.943 4.943 5.414
IBM 5.120 5.125 0.199 3.818 6.214 4.870 5.365
JNJ 5.170 5.165 0.194 3.846 6.394 4.926 5.412
JPM 5.162 5.175 0.184 3.856 5.733 4.923 5.387
KO 5.139 5.141 0.192 4.172 5.931 4.897 5.374
MCD 5.137 5.138 0.195 3.744 6.212 4.905 5.370
MMM 5.135 5.157 0.212 3.307 6.002 4.858 5.380
NKE 5.203 5.205 0.188 3.789 6.390 4.972 5.424
PFE 5.145 5.148 0.185 4.279 6.015 4.910 5.374
PG 5.146 5.146 0.187 4.056 6.527 4.923 5.371
TRV 5.163 5.157 0.198 4.476 6.795 4.925 5.399
UNH 5.206 5.207 0.205 3.904 6.884 4.958 5.447
UTX 5.100 5.110 0.200 4.140 5.892 4.854 5.343
V 5.120 5.128 0.221 4.492 5.961 4.825 5.401
VZ 5.133 5.139 0.211 3.481 6.497 4.880 5.385
WMT 5.191 5.194 0.200 3.945 6.085 4.950 5.431
XOM 5.172 5.172 0.162 4.109 5.858 4.972 5.379
Total 5.153 5.159 0.194 3.307 6.884 4.912 5.387
Panel B. Correlation Matrix
log(SNR) Daily ret Stock vol Option vol log(ME) log(BM)
Daily ret 0.0027
Stock vol 0.1125* -0.0092*
Option vol 0.0945* 0.0153* 0.4312*
log(ME) -0.005 0.0044 0.4089* 0.1789*
log(BM) -0.0044 -0.0126* 0.3212* 0.1676* -0.1275*


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 18: Analyst Recommendation Revisions and Stock Price Efficiency
In this table, we investigate how our measure of stock price efficiency is related to the issuances of
analyst recommendation revisions. The table reports the regression result of the efficiency measure
on dummy variables of upgrade and downgrade revisions with other control variables. The dependent
variable, log(SNR), is the log of the signal-to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price
efficiency. The dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is
accompanied by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(ME), log(BM),
log(vol), and Amihud are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, trading volume, and
illiquidity measure of [5], respectively. All specifications in the table below include the firm- and the
day-fixed effects, and the t-statistics are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: log(SNR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d down 0.0428*** 0.0436*** 0.0191*** 0.0196***
(8.08) (8.24) (3.73) (3.84)
d up 0.0412*** 0.0403*** 0.0189*** 0.0195***
(7.54) (7.37) (3.56) (3.67)
log(ME) 0.00996*** 0.00991*** 0.0101***
(3.26) (3.24) (3.30)
log(BM) -0.0261*** -0.0262*** -0.0260***
(-11.87) (-11.88) (-11.82)
log(vol) 0.0858*** 0.0859*** 0.0853***
(43.33) (43.32) (42.99)
Amihud 0.131*** 0.131*** 0.131***
(13.89) (13.90) (13.90)
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82627 82627 82627 82627 82627 82627
R-squared 0.218 0.219 0.251 0.218 0.251 0.251
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Table 19: Efficient Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions and Stock Market Reaction
The table investigates the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on the stock market
reaction. The table reports the regression result of abnormal stock returns on dummy variables of
upgrade and downgrade revisions interacting with the signal-to-noise volatility ratio (SNR). The
dependent variable, AR(0,0), is an abnormal return from the Fama and French (1993) three-factor
model. The dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is
accompanied by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(SNR) is the log
of the signal-to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price efficiency. log(ME), log(BM),
log(vol), and Amihud are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, trading volume, and
illiquidity measure of [5], respectively. All specifications below include the firm-fixed effect, and the
standard errors are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: AR(0, 0)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d down -0.00692*** 0.0570*** 0.0588***
(-15.95) (5.22) (5.34)
d down× log(SNR) -0.0123*** -0.0127***
(-5.82) (-5.94)
d up 0.00707*** -0.0160 -0.0152
(15.90) (-1.44) (-1.37)










Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82576 82576 82576 82576 82576 82576







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 21: Efficient Analysts’ Recommendation Revisions and Option Market Activity
This table investigates the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on option market
activity. The table reports the regression results of option market trading activity on dummy
variables of upgrade and downgrade revisions interacting with the signal-to-noise volatility ratio
(SNR). The dependent variable, log(O/S ratio), is the log of the ratio of option trading volume to
stock trading volume to capture investor activity in the option market relative to the stock market.
The dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is accompanied
by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(SNR) is the log of the signal-
to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price efficiency. log(ME), log(BM), Amihud, and
Stock Spread(%) are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, illiquidity measure of [5],
and percentage of bid-ask spread of underlying stock, respectively. Option related controls are the
percentage of option bid-ask spread (Option Spread(%)), average of option deltas (Delta, with put
deltas being reversed in sign), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Disp), institutional ownership
(IO ratio), and average of implied volatility (avg Ivol). All specifications below include the firm- and
the day-fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: log(O/S ratio)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








log(ME) 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.469*** 0.469***
(31.97) (31.95) (31.95) (31.93)
log(BM) -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352*** -0.352***
(-33.99) (-34.00) (-34.02) (-34.02)
Amihud -0.339*** -0.341*** -0.338*** -0.339***
(-9.67) (-9.69) (-9.62) (-9.64)
Stock Spread(%) -0.209*** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.208***
(-11.23) (-11.23) (-11.22) (-11.22)
Option Spread(%) -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.269*** -0.268***
(-4.29) (-4.29) (-4.30) (-4.29)
Delta 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.289*** 0.290***
(3.08) (3.08) (3.04) (3.06)
Analyst Disp -0.205*** -0.203*** -0.208*** -0.208***
(-4.45) (-4.39) (-4.50) (-4.51)
IO ratio -0.645*** -0.646*** -0.646*** -0.645***
(-8.44) (-8.45) (-8.46) (-8.44)
avg Ivol 3.269*** 3.270*** 3.268*** 3.268***
(40.63) (40.64) (40.61) (40.61)
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 77697 76983 76983 77697 76983 76983
R-squared 0.522 0.574 0.574 0.522 0.574 0.574
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Table 22: Efficient Analysts’ Revisions and Implied Volatility
This table investigates the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on future uncer-
tainty about a firm measured from option data. The table reports the regression result of op-
tion implied volatility on dummy variables of upgrade and downgrade revisions interacting with
the signal-to-noise volatility ratio (SNR). log(ImpVol) is the log of option implied volatility. The
dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is accompanied
by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(SNR) is the log of the signal-
to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price efficiency. log(ME), log(BM), Amihud, and
Stock Spread(%) are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, illiquidity measure of [5], and
percentage of bid-ask spread of underlying stock, respectively. Option related controls are the per-
centage of option bid-ask spread (Option Spread(%)), average of deltas of options (Delta, with put
deltas being reversed in sign), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Disp), institutional ownership
(IO ratio), and average of implied volatility (avg Ivol). All specifications below include the firm- and
the day-fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: log(ImpVol)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
d down 0.0236*** -0.0167*** 0.201*
(4.98) (-3.88) (1.83)
d down× log(SNR) -0.0419**
(-1.98)
d up 0.0136*** -0.0225*** 0.0567
(2.99) (-5.45) (0.50)
d up× log(SNR) -0.0152
(-0.70)
log(ME) -0.0211*** -0.0211*** -0.0210*** -0.0210***
(-7.92) (-7.92) (-7.91) (-7.91)
log(BM) -0.00721*** -0.00724*** -0.00719*** -0.00720***
(-4.21) (-4.23) (-4.20) (-4.20)
log(vol) 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.153***
(81.39) (81.44) (81.45) (81.53)
Amihud 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.283*** 0.283***
(14.56) (14.56) (14.55) (14.55)
Stock Spread(%) 0.00455 0.00455 0.00452 0.00452
(1.57) (1.57) (1.56) (1.56)
Option Spread(%) -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298*** -0.298***
(-25.87) (-25.87) (-25.87) (-25.87)
Delta -0.417*** -0.417*** -0.416*** -0.416***
(-25.28) (-25.29) (-25.25) (-25.27)
Analyst Disp 0.249*** 0.249*** 0.250*** 0.250***
(12.30) (12.28) (12.27) (12.27)
IO ratio 0.0908*** 0.0909*** 0.0910*** 0.0909***
(7.40) (7.41) (7.42) (7.41)
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82613 81871 81871 82613 81871 81871
R-squared 0.852 0.883 0.883 0.852 0.883 0.883
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Table 23: Efficient Analysts’ Revisions and the Slope of Implied Volatility Smile
This table investigates the impact of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on the jump risk
measured from option data. The table reports the regression result of the slope of implied volatility
smile on dummy variables of upgrade and downgrade revisions interacting with the signal-to-noise
volatility ratio (SNR). Slope IV S is the slope of implied volatility smile constructed by running
the regression of the out-of-the-money put option prices on their deltas of a firm each day. The
dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is accompanied
by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(SNR) is the log of the signal-
to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price efficiency. log(ME), log(BM), Amihud, and
Stock Spread(%) are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, illiquidity measure of [5],
and percentage of bid-ask spread of underlying stock, respectively. Option related controls are the
percentage of option bid-ask spread (Option Spread(%)), average of deltas of options (Delta, with
put deltas being reversed in sign), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Disp), institutional ownership
(IO ratio), and average of implied volatility (avg Ivol). All specifications below include the firm- and
the day-fixed effects, and the standard errors are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Slope IV S
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)








log(ME) -0.0000593*** -0.0000594*** -0.0000591*** -0.0000591***
(-4.42) (-4.43) (-4.41) (-4.41)
log(BM) -0.000151*** -0.000152*** -0.000151*** -0.000151***
(-16.38) (-16.41) (-16.36) (-16.36)
log(vol) 0.000180*** 0.000182*** 0.000180*** 0.000180***
(20.94) (21.07) (20.94) (20.95)
Amihud 0.00101*** 0.00101*** 0.00101*** 0.00101***
(16.60) (16.60) (16.57) (16.58)
Stock Spread(%) -0.00000660 -0.00000659 -0.00000663 -0.00000664
(-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.41) (-0.41)
Option Spread(%) -0.000737*** -0.000738*** -0.000738*** -0.000739***
(-11.69) (-11.71) (-11.69) (-11.70)
Delta -0.00135*** -0.00135*** -0.00135*** -0.00135***
(-16.73) (-16.77) (-16.72) (-16.73)
Analyst Disp 0.000799*** 0.000795*** 0.000800*** 0.000801***
(10.18) (10.10) (10.16) (10.16)
IO ratio 0.000000652 0.00000196 0.00000165 0.00000140
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 82613 81871 81871 82613 81871 81871


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 25: Robustness Test: Excluding Earnings Announcements
Thjs table shows that our results of efficient analysts’ recommendation revisions on stock and option
markets are not driven by earnings announcements of a firm. We exclude firm-day observations if
they are accompanied by earnings announcements. In Panel A, we report the regression result
to show that the relationship between our measure of stock price efficiency, the SNR, and the
release of downgrade or upgrade revisions is not driven by earnings announcements. In Panel B
and Panel C, we show the robustness of the finding in stock and option markets, respectively.
log(SNR) is the log of the signal-to-noise volatility ratio, which measures stock price efficiency. The
dummy variables, d down and d up, are indicators equal to one if an observation is accompanied
by a downgrade revision and an upgrade revision, respectively. log(ME), log(BM), log(vol), and
Amihud are the market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, trading volume, and illiquidity measure
of [5], respectively. In Panel C, option related controls are included: the percentage of option bid-ask
spread (Option Spread(%)), average of deltas of options (Delta, with put deltas being reversed in
sign), analyst forecast dispersion (Analyst Disp), institutional ownership (IO ratio), and average
of implied volatility (avg Ivol). t-statistics are clustered at a daily level. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Stock Price Efficiency and Recommendation Revisions
Dependent Variable: log(SNR)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
d down 0.0412*** 0.0203*** 0.0208***
(7.73) (3.95) (4.04)
d up 0.0363*** 0.0176*** 0.0182***
(6.57) (3.26) (3.36)
log(ME) 0.0104*** 0.0103*** 0.0105***
(3.39) (3.36) (3.42)
log(BM) -0.0253*** -0.0254*** -0.0253***
(-11.45) (-11.47) (-11.41)
log(vol) 0.0836*** 0.0837*** 0.0832***
(42.06) (42.05) (41.75)
Amihud 0.130*** 0.131*** 0.131***
(13.72) (13.72) (13.73)
Firm-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day-Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 81392 81392 81392 81392 81392





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 27: Influential Analyst vs. Efficient Analyst
This table investigates whether the impact of efficient analysts is permanent or transitory by exami-
ning dynamics of abnormal returns on and after the date of revision issuance. For each firm in the
sample, we construct quartile portfolios based on log(SNR). Panel A and Panel B report average
cumulative abnormal returns for each quartile for upgrade and downgrade revisions, respectively.
Panel A. Upgrade revisions
(1) Abnormal return on day of revision
On SNR
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) -1.635% -1.366% -1.568%
Return 2 0.019% 0.004% -0.024%
3 (High) 1.703% 1.627% 2.047%
(2) CAR(1,5)
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) 0.804% 0.108% -0.417%
Return 2 -0.057% 0.175% 0.649%
3 (High) 0.054% -0.001% 0.416%
(3) CAR(1,10)
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) 1.336% -0.403% -0.289%
Return 2 -0.142% 0.416% 0.809%
3 (High) 0.090% 0.221% 0.548%
Panel B. Downgrade revisions
(1) Abnormal return on day of revision
On SNR
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) -1.950% -1.849% -2.264%
Return 2 -0.093% -0.113% -0.088%
3 (High) 1.214% 1.357% 1.432%
(2) CAR(1,5)
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) -0.330% -0.438% 0.178%
Return 2 -0.165% -0.414% -0.081%
3 (High) 0.249% -0.745% -0.686%
(3) CAR(1,10)
1 (Low) 2 3 (High)
On Daily 1 (Low) -0.301% -0.359% 0.352%
Return 2 -0.411% -0.116% 0.163%
3 (High) 0.347% -0.476% -0.390%
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CHAPTER III
REALIZED SKEWNESS FOR INFORMATION
AMBIGUITY
3.1 Introduction
Investors process financial market news, or signals, every day. When there is incom-
plete knowledge about signal quality, and hence when the quality of information is
difficult to judge, investors face ambiguous information. When interpreting such am-
biguous news, investors do not know the exact probability distribution to describe the
relevant information. The impact of ambiguous information on various financial deci-
sions has been proven important in many recent studies (for example, [51], [91], and
[77] among others). In this paper, we empirically investigate the effect of ambiguous
information on investors’ responses and its implications on asset prices. Specifically,
we focus on the asymmetric response of investors to the releases of ambiguous infor-
mation and its association with subsequent stock returns.
If the exact distribution of the signals is not known due to the ambiguity of infor-
mation, investors dislike the situation (i.e., become averse) and are expected to re-
spond asymmetrically to the releases of such information. This is because ambiguity-
averse investors behave as if they take the worst-case assessment of the ambiguous
information. For example, if an investor views the ambiguous information as good
news, the worst case scenario is that the information is unreliable. On the other hand,
if an investor views the ambiguous information as bad news, the worst case scenario
is that the information is reliable. Given this asymmetric assessment, the investor’s
response to ambiguous information releases becomes asymmetric.1 The greater the
1[51] provide a theoretical framework showing how ambiguous information generates asymmetric
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degree of information ambiguity, the distribution of investor response would be more
negatively skewed.
Given the aforementioned intuition behind the negative skewness, we propose to
use realized skewness constructed using high frequency data to assess the ambiguity
of information. The use of intraday data is important because it allows us to precisely
capture the asymmetric response of investors to the release of ambiguous information,
which can be much weaker or even absent when using daily data. We confirm the ne-
gatively skewed stock return distribution around the ambiguous information releases.
In particular, we examine how realized skewness varies around the releases of analyst
earnings forecasts and recommendation revisions, which are two main examples of
ambiguous (or intangible) information. We document that average realized skewness
on days with ambiguous information releases is significantly lower than the average
realized skewness on days without those information releases. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper that empirically documents that realized skewness
of individual stock returns is associated with the information ambiguity.
Our empirical analyses reveal that our realized skewness measure, as a proxy for
information ambiguity, has a strong predictive power in explaining subsequent stock
returns around the information releases. The literature on return continuation due
to investors’ under-reactions documents a strong drift of stock prices around news
events. Similarly, we find that realized skewness predicts subsequent five, ten, and
twenty-day cumulative returns after earnings forecasts and analyst recommendation
releases. Our finding implies that the initial reaction of investors to news releases
is incomplete, especially when the information is ambiguous, resulting in the short-
term return predictability. We interpret that investors require more time and effort
to quantify the impact of information for their financial decision making when infor-
mation is more ambiguous. This evidence is consistent with [109] which documents
stock return distribution.
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stronger return continuation around information releases when information ambiguity
about a firm is more prominent. However, unlike [109], we first focus on asymmetric
responses of investors generated by ambiguous information releases, and further relate
the asymmetric responses to subsequent return dynamics. Furthermore, we use high-
frequency data to capture more frequent time variation of information ambiguity in
relevant markets because information is much quickly incorporated into stock prices
in recent years due to advances in information technology ([27]).
The finding on realized skewness explaining the pattern of subsequent stock re-
turns around information releases is unique in that the existing evidence on return
reversal or continuation is not able to explain our finding. The vast literature on
short-term return predictability documents evidence that a large price movement
tends to exhibit a drift when the movement is accompanied by the news releases,
while it tends to exhibit a reversal when there are no relevant information releases.
We find that a return continuation (i.e., a positive predictability of contemporaneous
stock returns in explaining subsequent returns) does not exist once we account for
information ambiguity proxied by realized skewness. That is, while realized skewness
strongly predicts a pattern of subsequent stock returns, a contemporaneous return
does not play any role in predicting subsequent returns.
As more negatively skewed stock returns imply greater information ambiguity, we
further divide our sample into positive and negative skewness subsamples. From the
subsample analysis, we find that the predictive power of realized daily skewness is
significant for the negative realized skewness sample, while the predictive power is
insignificant for the positive skewness sample. This finding suggests that stocks with
greater negative realized skewness experience stronger under-reaction by investors,
yielding lower returns in subsequent periods. However, stocks with less information
ambiguity (with positive realized skewness) experience a much lower degree of under-
reaction, resulting in insignificant return predictability.
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We verify the economic significance of the main result of this paper by demon-
strating the superior performance of a trading strategy that exploits our finding on
skewness. The main results of this paper suggest two different aspects of stock return
predictability, both of which can be used in investment strategies. First, realized
skewness is able to predict subsequent returns on days with the release of ambigu-
ous information due to investors’ under-reactions. Second, a contemporaneous stock
return is able to predict subsequent returns on days without such information due
to short-term return reversals. These two distinctive patterns can be exploited inde-
pendently because the contemporaneous variables in each case are different: realized
skewness or return. Thus, we provide a zero-net investment trading strategy that
exploits both features.
In our zero-net investment trading strategy, one portfolio is constructed with
stocks experiencing the release of analyst earnings forecasts or recommendations over
the last week of each month, and the other portfolio includes all other stocks wit-
hout this information over the same week. For the first portfolio with information,
stocks are further categorized into a positive realized skewness portfolio and a nega-
tive realized skewness portfolio to exploit investors’ under-reactions due to informa-
tion ambiguity.2 For the second portfolio, stocks are also separated into a negative
return portfolio and a positive return portfolio to exploit the return reversals on no-
information days.3 The zero-net investment portfolio combines these four portfolios
by taking long positions on a positive realized skewness portfolio and a negative re-
turn portfolio while taking short positions on a negative realized skewness portfolio
and a positive return portfolio.
The performance of our zero-net investment trading strategy with a Sharpe ratio
2We use an average of realized skewness over the last week of each month to categorize stocks
into a positive or a negative realized skewness portfolio.
3We use an average of daily returns over the last week of each month to categorize stocks into a
positive or a negative return portfolio.
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of 1.766 is superior to other well-known zero-net investment portfolios, such as market
portfolio (in excess of risk-free rate), size portfolio, value portfolio, and momentum
portfolio. In particular, the inclusion of our finding on realized skewness increases
the Sharpe ratio by 57% relative to that of the return reversal strategy (1.126). The
return of the zero-net investment strategy is not exposed to common risk factors (the
market, size, value, and momentum factors). The alpha of the strategy after taking
the [30] four factors into account is 86.77 bps per month.
The other possible approach to investigate information ambiguity at a frequency
comparable to our analysis is to use well-known proxies in the literature on infor-
mation asymmetry,4 because the release of information considered in this paper is
strongly associated with the changes in the proxies for asymmetric information. Using
various proxies for information asymmetry, such as the bid-ask spread, idiosyncratic
volatility, illiquidity measure, and change in turnover ratio – all of which are widely be-
lieved to capture some degree of information ambiguity at a daily or higher frequency
– we show that realized skewness shares a similar aspect of information ambiguity
with other existing proxies. In addition to the theoretical guidance that realized
daily skewness can be considered a proxy for information ambiguity, we find that re-
alized skewness has the unique ability to explain return continuations not possessed
by other existing proxies for information ambiguity. In particular, an orthogonalized
component of realized skewness that eliminates common components explained by
existing proxies (orthogonalized realized skewness) remains statistically significant in
explaining subsequent returns under severe information ambiguity.
The present paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, our finding on
realized skewness extends the recent studies on realized higher moments by showing
that higher moments can be a useful tool to better understand the rapidly changing
4For example, see [106] and [63] for the bid-ask spread, [26] for liquidity, [46] for trading volume,
and [84] for idiosyncratic volatility. Further discussion is provided in Section 3.5.
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environment of the financial market. [4] is one of a few papers that studies realized
higher moments using high-frequency data. They find that the weekly average of re-
alized daily skewness is negatively priced in the cross-section of stock returns, which
is explained by the skewness preference of investors. Different from their study docu-
menting weekly realized skewness as a risk factor, our study views realized skewness
as a measure of information ambiguity at a higher frequency.5 [72] document that
negative skewness tends to be more pronounced for stocks with larger market capita-
lization than those with smaller market capitalization. One of the potential reasons
is that, as noted in [51], large stocks are covered in the news media more frequently
than small stocks, resulting in a significant amount of ambiguous information to in-
vestors. This paper aims to investigate a different aspect of information ambiguity.
By focusing on the events generating the influx of ambiguous information, we are able
to capture the time variation of information ambiguity about firm fundamentals.
Second, this paper empirically contributes to the literature on information am-
biguity by proposing a proxy to assess information ambiguity. [51] theoretically show
the relation of ambiguous information and expected stock returns, and [77] exami-
nes the interaction between risk and information ambiguity and its effect on optimal
portfolios. We complement the literature not only by developing a measure to empi-
rically proxy information ambiguity but also by examining the impact of information
ambiguity using realized skewness on investor behavior and subsequent stock return
dynamics.
Third, this paper provides evidence that realized skewness can be a proxy for
information ambiguity concerning a firm. Although information ambiguity generates
significant frictions in financial markets, few proxies measure information ambiguity
with clear directional interpretation and theoretical guidance. Realized skewness has
5In particular, we use an average of daily realized skewness over a three-day window centered on
the day of ambiguous information release.
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advantages over exiting proxies due to rich information on intra-day return dynamics
and distribution that are not available when using other existing proxies, such as the
bid-ask spread, illiquidity, change in the turnover ratio, or idiosyncratic volatility.6
Fourth, we contribute to the literature on return predictability by showing that
realized skewness as a measure of information ambiguity predicts subsequent stock
returns. While [109] finds that greater information ambiguity generates stronger
price drifts, [51] predict that ambiguity-averse investors require compensation for
information ambiguity in the form of higher expected returns. Our finding supports
that of [109] in a sense that greater information ambiguity, as measured by realized
skewness computed with high-frequency data, predicts lower subsequent returns by
generating stronger under-reaction of investor. To the best of our knowledge, the
present paper is the only paper to both demonstrate that realized skewness indeed
captures the information ambiguity of a firm, and that realized skewness can play a
role in refining our understanding of return predictability around news releases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the
sample data and provides summary statistics, Section 3.3 presents the main finding of
the paper, Section 3.4 shows the economic significance of main findings by providing
a profitable trading strategy, and Section 3.5 examines the relationship of realized
skewness with other existing proxies for information ambiguity. In Section 3.6, we
demonstrate the robustness of the main finding, and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Data and Sample Description
Our main objective is to capture asymmetric responses of investors due to ambiguous
information releases. As stock prices incorporate newly released information much
quickly by virtue of technological advances in financial markets ([27]), high-frequency
6For example, see [40] and [64] for the bid-ask spread, [5] and [100] for liquidity, and [37] and [93]
for idiosyncratic volatility regarding their informational content. Further discussion is provided in
Section 3.5.
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data is ideal to capture the responses at a high frequency such as a daily basis. Thus,
in our empirical analysis, we investigate all stocks listed in the Trade and Quote
(TAQ) database. The sample period for our analysis is from January 2, 2001 to
May 30, 2014. We consider this recent sample period to mitigate concerns regarding
infrequent trading and illiquidity problems that may contaminate our main findings.
To calculate higher moments, we record the prices of all stocks in the TAQ database at
five-minute intervals from 09:30 EST until 16:00 EST, and construct the five-minute
returns as the difference between log prices with five-minute marks, as in [8]. To filter
out stocks with infrequent trading, we require a stock to have at least 100 transactions
per day7 and use the recorded prices close to the five-minute interval time grid. In
addition to these requirements, we further exclude stocks that have a closing price of
less than five dollars.
In the present paper, we consider analyst earnings forecasts and recommendation
releases as main examples of ambiguous news about a firm’s future cash flows. Because
the chosen information events are firm specific, we collect all firm-day observations for
both events from the International Brokers Estimation System (I/B/E/S) database
from January 2001 to May 2014.8 Several studies on analyst recommendations and
earnings forecasts document that these information events tend to occur overnight.9
When firm-related events occur during the day, analysts usually examine the issues
during business hours and release their reports on the same day or one day after the
event. In certain cases, analysts can release their reports on a firm before the issue is
7Different thresholds for the minimum number of transactions within a day do not alter the main
findings of our paper.
8Although we use high-frequency data to calculate realized higher moments, our analysis does
not depend on time stamps at the intra-day level for these information releases. This is because our
study considers how the realized moments of stock returns accompanied by information releases at
the daily level affect returns over the next 5 to 20 trading days. Hence, the intra-day time-stamp
delay concern that [23] raise is not an issue for our study.
9[3] report that the percentage of overnight recommendation releases is 61%. [23] report that
this percentage is over 70% and earnings releases occur overnight in over 80% of cases after the year
2003.
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released to the public in order to offer their prior expectations. For all these reasons,
when we identify the dates of information releases, we cover one day before and after
the release dates recorded in the I/B/E/S database.
These firm-specific news events are widely considered as the most influential in-
formation events, which contain a significant amount of intangible information about
a firm’s future cash flow.10 This choice is also motivated by the finding that return
dynamics are significantly altered in response to information arrivals (see [7]). The
other reason that we select these two types of information is that they cover most
firm-related news for a given firm. While earnings forecasts provide valuable infor-
mation on cash flow, analyst reports offer an extensive coverage of a wide array of
information (see [102]). Thus, by including not only earnings forecasts but also ana-
lyst reports for a firm, we expect to consider a comprehensive set of information about
the firm.
We obtain data on market capitalizations, trading volumes, and daily bid-ask
spreads from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Accounting
data, such as the book values of individual firms, are obtained from the COMPUSTAT
database. For returns over horizons beyond one trading day, we use daily returns
from the CRSP database for corresponding firms and dates instead of using high-
frequency returns from the TAQ database. Given all these filtering requirements, the
total number of companies covered in our sample varies, ranging from 1,748 to 3,903
per year, depending on changes in market conditions over the sample period.
We measure the asymmetric response at a daily level using realized daily skew-
ness11 computed with high-frequency returns. To control for other effects of realized
10As a robustness check, we also consider analyst recommendations and earnings forecasts se-
parately to distinguish between the effects of the two types of information and find that analyst
recommendation reports are the main driver of our results. However, including both types of infor-
mation strengthens the main findings of our paper, which indicates that it is impossible to perfectly
distinguish between the effects of these information events because of confounding event times bet-
ween the two.
11[95] proposes an alternative measure of realized skewness. Because our main objective is not
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higher moments, we include realized daily volatility and kurtosis in our main analysis.
[4] use these measures to examine the relationship between realized higher moments
and the subsequent week’s returns.
We define the five-minute log return as the difference between log prices observed
at five-minute intervals. A l-th intra-day return for a k-th firm on day t is first
constructed by
rk,t,l = logPk,t,l+1 − logPk,t,l, (24)
where Pk,t,l is a l-th intra-day price of the k-th firm observed on day t. From the five-
minute log returns obtained above, our measure of information ambiguity, realized
daily skewness (RDSkewk,t) for the k-th firm on day t, is computed as the sum of


















Since we record five-minute prices from 09:30 ETS to 16:00 ETS, we have n = 78
for each day. As one of our control variables, we also use realized daily kurtosis









to obtain a true measure of realized skewness but rather to examine the relationship between the
asymmetric distribution of high-frequency returns and future stock returns, we do not follow his
approach. In addition, the approach that [95] proposes is not applicable to our analysis because
our primary objective is to capture the effect of daily-level information on asymmetries in high-
frequency returns. As the methodology of [95] employs daily options data to estimate a lower-
frequency measure of realized skewness (for example, weekly or monthly realized skewness), it is not
appropriate for the purpose of our analysis.
12[4] use weekly measures of higher moments by taking averages of daily moments and demonstrate
the predictability of realized skewness in the next week’s returns and the robustness of the realized
higher moment inference to microstructure noise. As our main objective is different from theirs and
focuses on realized skewness as a proxy for information ambiguity concerning a firm’s fundamentals,
we use a daily measure of realized skewness using five-minute returns to precisely capture the impact
of information.




It is inevitable that high-frequency returns contain microstructure noise and that
realized moments on a daily basis computed from high-frequency returns are also
contaminated with such noise. In fact, it is not the main objective of this paper to
separate these components. However, a five-minute grid is a reasonable choice for the
optimal sampling frequency that optimizes the trade-off between bias and efficiency
gain in the estimation of realized moments (see, for example, [13, 14]). Using a Monte
Carlo simulation, [4] show that realized daily moments from a finite sample are well
behaved. Thus, despite the microstructure noise embedded in high-frequency data, it
seems safe to implicitly assume that realized daily skewness captures the asymmetry
of the distribution of intra-day returns.
Table 1 presents the time-series summary statistics of the annual means and me-
dians for the main variables used in this paper. This table shows that the number of
firms in our sample decreased significantly during the period of the recent financial
crisis. For example, in 2005, the number of stocks in our sample is 3,903, while this
number decreases to 1,748 in 2009. We also observe a considerably higher average
(median) realized daily volatility of 3.4% (2.8%) in 2008 when compared to 1.8%
(1.6%) in the years 2006 or 2007. As realized daily volatility shows a clear time-series
pattern that depends on market conditions, realized daily skewness also captures
time-varying properties of returns. While average realized daily skewness typically
remains positive during normal market conditions, it became negative during the
recent financial crisis. Realized daily kurtosis clearly exhibits higher average values
in the early period of the sample (2001-2003) and around the recent financial crisis
(2007) than in other periods. Overall, realized daily moments (variance, skewness,
and kurtosis) display similar time variations to the sample moments. The other con-
trol variables for our regression analysis, such as the book-to-market ratio and the
ratio (in percentage) of trading volume to total shares outstanding, also exhibit time
variations, as expected.
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To examine how ambiguous news releases (analyst earnings forecasts and re-
commendations) affect realized skewness of a firm, which leads to differential cross-
sectional variations in subsequent stock returns, we create subsamples with and wit-
hout these firm-specific information releases. Table 29 presents the time-series sum-
mary statistics (by year) for all firm-day observations in our full sample, observations
with earnings forecasts, observations with analyst recommendation releases, obser-
vations with either one of two information releases, and observations without any
of these information releases. For each year, we list the total number of all firm-
trading day observations and average firm sizes in each of the five categories. We
have more than 6 million firm-day observations in our full sample. We then sepa-
rately report those statistics for the subsamples accompanied by earnings forecasts
and analyst recommendation releases. Because we are not interested in the separate
impacts of earnings forecasts and analyst recommendations on the relationship bet-
ween realized skewness and subsequent stock returns, we combine the two subsamples
and call the resulting sample the Information sample and the rest of the sample the
No-information sample. For each sample, we now take an average of realized daily
skewness over three days in order to minimize noise in high-frequency data and to
be consistent with the identification of information events in I/B/E/S data. The fact
that the impacts of earnings forecasts and analyst recommendation releases can be
confounded with one another is not a concern in this study, as we are interested in
how these types of intangible (ambiguous) information affect the (higher moments
of) stock return distribution and the degree of return predictability in a subsequent
period. From the descriptive statistics in Table 29, it is noteworthy that the Informa-
tion sample includes larger firms than the No-information sample14 with the average
size in the Information sample being $11.7 billion, while that for the No-information
14The reason that the Information sample has larger-sized firms than the No-information sample
is largely that analysts usually follow firms with large market capitalization.
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sample is $5.6 billion.
3.3 Empirical Findings
3.3.1 The Impact of Ambiguous Information on Realized Moments
In this subsection, we study the impact of ambiguous information releases on rea-
lized daily moments in order to observe how our proposed measure of information
ambiguity, realized skewness, behaves in response to information arrivals.
Table 30 reports the averages of realized daily higher moments for the full sam-
ple (Full), the subsamples accompanied by either earnings forecasts (Forecast) or
analyst recommendations (Recommendation), the Information sample (Information),
and the No-information sample (No-information). The differences in the measures
between the Information sample and the No-information sample are reported in the
last column. Realized daily skewness decreases significantly when earnings forecasts
or recommendation reports are released, while realized volatility and realized kurtosis
increase. The strong statistical significance of these differences suggests that these
information releases affect the distribution of high-frequency returns, implying that
realized daily moments are directly related to a firm’s informational environment.
[51] theoretically show that ambiguity of information generates skewness in stock
returns and that returns become more negatively skewed as information is more am-
biguous. Their concept of ambiguity depends on the importance of intangible infor-
mation (for example, analyst recommendations, earnings forecasts, or media reports)
relative to tangible information (for example, dividend announcements). In line with
the concept of ambiguity in [51], days with information (earnings forecasts and ana-
lyst recommendations) releases are accompanied by more intangible information than
days without these information releases. In Table 30, we find evidence that realized
daily skewness in the Information sample decreases significantly compared to the No-
information sample, consistent with the argument in [51] that greater information
112
ambiguity leads to more negative skewness of stock returns.
3.3.2 Double-sorting on Contemporaneous Return and Realized Skew-
ness
To examine the specific role of realized skewness as a measure of information am-
biguity, we investigate its relationship with subsequent stock returns, depending on
the information releases. For this analysis, it is crucial to distinguish the relationship
from well-known factors of return reversals and continuations. For example, the lite-
rature on return reversals and continuations shows that price changes on days with
information releases (for example, earnings announcements, headline news, or ana-
lyst reports) are followed by drift, while those on no-information days tend to reverse
(see, for example, [33] and [102], among many others). Thus, in this subsection, we
document the behavior of realized skewness depending on information releases and
the impact of realized skewness on subsequent returns while accounting for return
reversals and continuations.
To examine the role of realized skewness in explaining subsequent returns while
controlling for contemporaneous returns, we first double-sort stocks in each sample
based on contemporaneous returns and realized daily skewness. That is, for each day,
we sort stocks based on their contemporaneous returns (Retk,t) into tercile portfolios.
Within each of these terciles, stocks are sorted into tercile portfolios based on realized
daily skewness (RDSkewk,t). All portfolios are constructed with equal weights.
15 All
portfolio returns and return differences of the top terciles and the bottom terciles
(H-L) are exhibited in basis points. These double-sorted portfolios based on contem-
poraneous returns and realized daily skewness are constructed daily using the Full
sample, the Information sample, and the No-information sample, and their next 5-,
10-, and 20-day cumulative returns are reported in Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of
Table 31, respectively.
15All results are robust to a value-weigthing scheme.
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In Panel A of Table 31, the negative and significant return differences between
the highest contemporaneous return portfolios and the lowest contemporaneous return
portfolios (H-L) for all subsequent 5-, 10-, and 20-day returns show the prevalence of
return reversals. The impact of realized skewness is statistically significant only in the
highest contemporaneous return terciles. When we focus on the Information sample
in Panel B, we find a statistically significant and positive relationship between realized
skewness and subsequent stock returns. The statistical significance is shown in the
highest and the lowest terciles of contemporaneous returns: the return difference
between the highest and the lowest realized skewness terciles among the lowest (the
highest) contemporaneous return stocks is 10.60 bps (10.69 bps) over the next 20
trading days. As expected, in Panel C, we find the evidence of return reversals and
no strong evidence of realized skewness in explaining subsequent returns when we
focus on days without an influx of ambiguous information.
Overall, the findings in Table 31 imply that realized daily skewness is an important
factor in explaining the under-reaction of investors on information days as realized
daily skewness absorbs return continuations in the Information sample. While the
double-sorting analysis reveals a univariate relationship between realized skewness
and future returns after controlling for contemporaneous return, we examine a mul-
tivariate relationship using the [58] regression in the next subsection.
3.3.3 Fama-MacBeth Regression Result
In order to test the impact of information ambiguity on subsequent stock returns
while controlling for other existing factors that affect stock returns, we estimate the
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following specification using the [58] regression:16
Retk,t+i,t+j = α+β1RDSkewk,t+β2RDV olk,t+β3RDKurtk,t+γ
′Xk,t+uk,t+i,t+j, (28)
where Retk,t+i,t+j is the cumulative return (in bps) of the k-th stock over a period
from day t+ i to day t+ j, and realized higher moments, RDSkewk,t, RDV olk,t, and
RDKurtk,t, of the k-th stock returns on day t are computed using equations (25),
(26), and (27). Xk,t represents a vector of several control variables for the k-th firm
observed at the end of day t, and uk,t+i,t+j is an error term.
As discussed in the previous section, one of the major concerns associated with
using regression specification (28) are the well-known return reversals and continuati-
ons. Recently, [102] documents that large price changes accompanied by information
releases are followed by return continuations, while those with no information result
in reversals. [97], [33], and [105] also obtain a similar empirical finding using dif-
ferent sets of information. Thus, to control for the existing evidence on short-term
return predictability, we include the return (in bps) of firm k on day t, Retk,t, in all
regressions as one of the main control variables.
Because it is well documented in the literature that size, book-to-market, and
momentum predict the cross-section of stock returns ([54], [56], [83]), we include
a log of market size (LogMEk,t), a log of book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), and
cumulative return from the previous 12 months to the previous 2 months as of day
t (Momentumk,t) in the set of control variables, Xk,t. As other papers ([39], [88])
present evidence of a relationship between trading volume and future stock returns,
we also include trading volume (volume(%)k,t) as a ratio (in percentage) of trading
volume relative to total shares outstanding. By including these control variables in
16The objective of the regression can also be achieved by using an interaction term with an in-
formation indicator variable, which is equal to one if an observation is accompanied by information
release. We examine the results with the information dummy variable, and the finding is quantitati-
vely and qualitatively similar to the result with subsamples. The results with the indicator variable
are available upon request.
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all regressions, we ensure that our findings are not attributable to the relationship
between stock returns and other firm characteristics. In the [58] regression with the
above specification, the dependent variable has an overlapping period. For example,
the daily regression estimation of the next 5-day cumulative returns on the dependent
variables explained above has four days of overlap. Due to these overlapping windows
in the dependent variables, we apply the Newey-West standard error correction with
a lag of 4, 9, and 19 for the regressions of the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumulative
returns, respectively.
The regression results are provided in Table 32. As stated in the data description
in Section 3.2, we use separate subsamples, the Information sample and the No-
information sample, for the [58] regressions because we are interested in the impact
of information releases on the role of realized moments in explaining subsequent re-
turns. Panel A and Panel B show the results of the [58] regressions on the Information
sample and the No-information sample, respectively. Comparing the coefficient esti-
mates for realized daily skewness (RDSkewk,t) and contemporaneous return (Retk,t)
yields one of the main findings of the present paper: even after controlling for con-
temporaneous returns, realized daily skewness computed using high-frequency returns
plays a significant role in explaining subsequent stock returns. Furthermore, the sta-
tistical significance and economic significance of realized skewness are strengthened
when ambiguous information is released, which leads us to regard realized skewness
as a proxy for the information ambiguity concerning a firm.
[109] documents that information ambiguity concerning firms (which is measured
by firm size, firm age, analyst coverage, analyst forecast dispersion, and return vola-
tility) generates the cross-sectional variation in return continuations. To investigate
our finding with respect to the argument of [109], we further separate the Informa-
tion sample and the No-information sample into samples with negative skewness and
others with positive skewness.
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Table 33 reports the regression results for the subdivided samples. Consistent
with our previous finding, we document that realized daily skewness plays a signifi-
cant role in explaining subsequent stock returns in the sample with negative skewness
(Panel A), regardless of the presence of ambiguous information releases. The sig-
nificant and positive coefficients for realized daily skewness in Panel A confirm the
finding of [109]. In Panel B, we expect and find insignificant estimates because the
observations in Panel B do not exhibit a strong under-reaction by investors in the
absence of greater information ambiguity, represented by positive realized skewness.
While the larger magnitude of coefficients in the Information sample relative to the
No-information sample is expected, we also observe significant positive coefficients
in the No-information sample in Panel A, which indicates that the significance of
realized daily skewness as a measure of information ambiguity is not limited to days
with information releases under our consideration.
While [109] finds that greater information ambiguity generates greater price drift,
[51] predict that ambiguity-averse investors require compensation for information am-
biguity in the form of higher expected returns. Our finding supports that of [109]
that greater information ambiguity, measured by realized skewness, predicts lower
subsequent returns by generating stronger under-reaction by investors. To the best
of our knowledge, the present paper is the only one to document that realized daily
skewness indeed captures the information ambiguity concerning a firm and further re-
lates it to the cross-sectional variation in return continuations on information days. A
detailed analysis of realized skewness as a proxy for information ambiguity is provided
in Section 3.5.
3.4 Economic Significance of Main Findings
In previous sections, we show that the realized daily skewness, which captures infor-
mation ambiguity about a firm’s fundamentals, positively predicts subsequent stock
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returns in the presence of intangible information releases. In addition, we document
that return reversals prevail on no-information days, whereas the positive relations-
hip between realized skewness and subsequent returns around information days is
robust to the inclusion of contemporaneous return. In this section, we design a zero-
net investment trading strategy based on the main finding of the present paper and
demonstrate the profitability of the strategy.
Our main finding is on a daily basis, as the role of realized skewness as a proxy
for information ambiguity is driven largely by information releases, which should
be considered at a high-frequency level to precisely capture the impact. However,
employing a daily trading strategy to incorporate our finding would entail tremendous
transaction costs. Thus, we propose a monthly trading strategy that utilizes a role of
realized skewness in the Information sample and a role of contemporaneous returns
in the No-information sample.
Specifically, over the last week of each month, we first examine whether firms ex-
perience earnings forecasts or analyst recommendations releases. For firms with these
information releases, we further examine whether their average realized skewness over
the week is positive or negative to exploit the predictive ability of realized skewness
on information days. For firms without that information, we instead examine whether
their average return over the same week is positive or negative to exploit the strong
return reversals on no-information days. Based on these two criteria, we construct
four portfolios at the end of each month: no-information with positive previous-week
return, no-information with negative previous-week return, information with positive
skewness, and information with negative skewness portfolios.
Using these four portfolios, we construct two zero-investment portfolios and hold
them over the next month: No-information portfolio (which takes a long position
on the no-information with a negative previous-week return portfolio and a short
position on the no-information with a positive previous-week return portfolio) and
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Information portfolio (which takes a long position on the information with a positive
previous-week skewness portfolio and a short position on the information with a nega-
tive previous-week skewness portfolio). As these two portfolios separately utilize our
finding on the negative and the positive relationships, we construct another portfo-
lio, called Combined portfolio, which takes long positions on the no-information with
negative previous-week return and the information with positive previous-week skew-
ness portfolios and short positions on the no-information with positive previous-week
return and the information with negative previous-week skewness portfolios.17 We
expect to obtain positive returns from both No-information portfolio and Informa-
tion portfolio because of the return reversals and the role of skewness as a proxy for
information ambiguity, respectively. In addition to these two zero-investment portfo-
lios, Combined portfolio exploits both simultaneously; thus, it is expected to yield a
higher return than either No-information portfolio or Information portfolio.
Table 34 provides summary statistics and pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients
of returns on the three zero-investment portfolios (No-Info, Info, and Combined) and
other well-known zero-investment risk factors, including MKT (market portfolio in
excess a risk-free rate), SMB (small-minus-big), HML (high-minus-low), and UMD
(up-minus-down). Information portfolio (No-information portfolio) yields a 0.20%
(0.63%) monthly return with a 1.35% (1.94%) monthly standard deviation. While
the monthly returns of No-information and Information portfolios are not remarkably
high relative to other well-known risk factors, the Sharpe ratios (annualized) of these
two portfolios are higher than those of other portfolios due to their substantially low
volatility. The results for Combined portfolio are even more interesting. Combined
portfolio provides a 0.83% monthly return with a 1.62% standard deviation, resulting
in the highest Sharpe ratio, 1.766, of all zero-investment portfolios.
17The three zero-investment portfolios, Information, No-information, and Combined, are con-
structed with equal weights. Our finding is robust to value-weighted portfolios.
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Figure 4 illustrates the performance of the zero-investment trading strategies by
plotting the cumulative returns on the portfolios beginning from January 2001 to
June 2014.18 It is clear that the three zero-investment strategies experience much
less volatile paths relative to other portfolios over the sample period, even during the
recent financial crisis. An investment of $1 in Information portfolio (No-information
portfolio) over 161 months yields $1.35 ($2.67) at the end of June 2014, while investing
the same amount in Combined portfolio yields $3.69 over the same horizon. The time-
series plot in Figure 4 displays the superior performance of Combined portfolio (solid
red line), and its remarkable performance during the recent financial crisis is even
more noteworthy.
From Figure 4, it appears that most of the profitability of Combined portfolio is
attributable to a return reversal trading strategy (No-information portfolio). Howe-
ver, the stable performance of Information portfolio makes a significant contribution
to generating the higher Sharpe ratio of Combined portfolio. A strong negative corre-
lation coefficient (-0.567) between Information portfolio and No-information portfolio
indicates that our finding on realized skewness largely complements Combined port-
folio with higher monthly returns and lower volatility, resulting in an approximately
57% increase in the Sharpe ratio, from 1.126 to 1.766.
In Table 35, we examine whether the performance of the three zero-investment
portfolios is due to compensation for the existing risk factors. To test this, we employ
the [58] regressions of zero-investment portfolio returns on the common risk factors
(MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD). Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C of Table 35 report
raw returns and alphas from the [56] three-factor model and from the [30] 4-factor
model of No-information, Information, and Combined portfolios. Both returns from
18The last period of portfolio construction is the end of May 2014. Thus, the analysis on portfolio
performances ends at the end of June 2014.
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No-information and Information portfolios only have significant exposure to the mar-
ket factor (MKT, market excess return), while being neutral to other systematic risk
factors. More interestingly, the return on Combined portfolio, which yields the best
performance, does not have any significant exposure to the common risk factors.
Thus, consistent with the findings in Figure 4 and Table 34, the performance of Com-
bined portfolio is independent of well-known systematic risk factors and is superior
throughout the sample period.
3.5 Realized Skewness as a Proxy for Information
Ambiguity
In this section, we examine how realized skewness is linked to other existing alternative
measures of information ambiguity and show that realized skewness captures a unique
feature of information ambiguity beyond existing proxies.
The finding that realized skewness has a strong predictive power in explaining
subsequent stock returns on information days suggests that realized skewness captu-
res information ambiguity concerning a firm even at a daily frequency. To test this
implication, we collect alternative measures of information ambiguity in the existing
literature and examine their relationship with realized skewness. As discussed previ-
ously, there are few measures of information ambiguity in the literature with higher
than monthly frequencies and with a theoretical guidance and directional informa-
tion. For example, [109] uses firm size, firm age, analyst forecast dispersion, analyst
coverage, stock return volatility, and cash flow volatility as proxies for information
ambiguity.
A release of information contains a signal of the true value of a firm with noise.
The notion of information ambiguity in this paper is in regard to the difficulty of
interpreting the signal, which does not distinguish the true value of the signal from the
noise component. As the literature on information asymmetry focuses on information
ambiguity regarding a firm’s fundamentals, it is inevitable that realized skewness
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shares some common features of existing proxies for information asymmetry, that
are also available at frequencies comparable to our study. Thus, we borrow existing
proxies from the literature on information asymmetry. We implicitly assume that
these proxies measure the ambiguity of information because information asymmetry
is directly related to the quality of information.
In the literature on information asymmetry, [63] show that the bid-ask spread
contains a component related to asymmetric information. [106] document that asym-
metric information, measured by the bid-ask spread, increases around information
releases. Regarding liquidity and trading volume, [26] document that asymmetric in-
formation between informed and uninformed investors generates illiquidity. [46] show
that the probability of informed trading is negatively related to the trading volume of
a stock. Following the finding of [10] on the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle that stocks
with high idiosyncratic volatility yield low future returns, [84] further document that
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility predict low future earnings due to uncertainty
from a firm’s information disclosure. Based on existing findings in the literature, we
compare our proposed measure of information ambiguity – realized skewness – with
the bid-ask spread (BAspread), idiosyncratic volatility of stock returns (Idio vol),
[5] illiquidity measure (Amihud), and change in the turnover ratio (∆Turnover) as
existing proxies for information asymmetry.19
As a first step to confirm whether a measure of realized daily skewness can serve
as a proxy for information ambiguity, we examine the relationship between realized
daily skewness and existing proxies for information ambiguity (asymmetry).20 Table
36 reports regression coefficients for realized daily skewness on the bid-ask spread
(BAspread), idiosyncratic volatility (Idio vol), Amihud liquidity measure (Amihud),
19Other alternative measures of information ambiguity or divergence of opinion are analyst co-
verage and analyst forecast dispersion. Due to sample limitations and because these measures are
at a lower-than-daily frequency, we are unable to use those measures in our analysis.
20We confirm that these existing proxies for information asymmetry play some role in explaining
subsequent returns around information releases. The results are available upon request.
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and change in turnover ratio (∆Turnover). From the results in Table 36, we argue
that realized skewness can be a proxy for information ambiguity, but we need to in-
terpret the result with caution. Although these existing proxies are well documented
to be strongly related to information asymmetry and ambiguity concerning a firm,
the direction of the relationship between information ambiguity and these proxies is
unclear. While it is unambiguous that the information releases considered in this pa-
per increase the ambiguity of a firm’s value, there is no conclusive evidence regarding
how these existing proxies should behave in this context.
The interpretation of the bid-ask spread, idiosyncratic volatility, and the illiqui-
dity measure is straightforward. The increase in information ambiguity widens the
bid-ask spread and increases idiosyncratic volatility and illiquidity. As [51]’s model
predicts, realized daily skewness should decrease as information ambiguity increases.
The significant negative regression coefficients on BAspread, Idio vol, and Amihud
confirm this prediction. Because the direction of realized daily skewness given an
increase in information ambiguity is clear, we are able to further infer how other
existing proxies related to information ambiguity actually behave. The negative and
significant coefficients on the interaction terms between these three proxies and an
information indicator variable, which is equal to one when there is an information
release, further confirm this relationship.
The relationship between realized daily skewness and changes in the turnover
ratio requires further attention. On normal days, there is a significantly positive re-
lationship between changes in turnover and realized daily skewness, suggesting that
an increase in changes in turnover indicates a decrease in information ambiguity. Ho-
wever, when there are large inflows of ambiguous information regarding a firm, this
positive relationship becomes negative (∆Turnvoer×d Info).21 [31] documents that
21[36] investigate the determinants of negative skewness in stock returns and find that large diffe-
rences in investors’ opinions predict (measured by the increase in trading volume) negative skewness
in the next six months. While their main objective is to forecast a substantial decline in stock returns
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the trading volume of a stock is negatively correlated with information asymmetry
before scheduled announcements and positively correlated with asymmetry after such
announcements. Thus, our finding regarding the relationship between realized daily
skewness and changes in turnover and on the differential shape of this relationship
in the context of ambiguous information releases further confirms the finding of [31].
Overall, the findings in Table 36 provide evidence that realized daily skewness, as a
proxy for information ambiguity, captures the common features of information am-
biguity and information asymmetry, similar to existing proxies.
Realized daily skewness computed with high-frequency returns has a unique and
complementary feature that other existing proxies for information ambiguity or asym-
metry do not provide. Because high-frequency returns are used to construct realized
daily skewness, it contains the intra-day dynamics of return series and information
on the distribution of returns, whereas the bid-ask spread changes as a dealer (or
a market maker) updates his belief concerning the expected gains from uninformed
traders and the expected losses to informed traders. That is, when a dealer expects
greater losses to informed traders due to an influx of information, he will increase
the bid-ask spread to offset such losses. Thus, the magnitude of the bid-ask spread
is directly related to the degree of information asymmetry (see [40] and [64]).
The measures related to liquidity, the [5] illiquidity measure and turnover ratio,
are supposed to capture the ease of trading a given stock. Liquidity and turnover
are directly associated with the trading dynamics of a dealer or a broker, especially
around informational events. Furthermore, idiosyncratic volatility is proven to cap-
ture information asymmetry of a firm in the context of asset pricing and the corporate
finance literature because higher idiosyncratic volatility implies greater difficulties in
measured by negative skewness, our main interest is in the role of realized skewness as a measure of
information ambiguity at a daily frequency. Thus, the relationship between realized skewness and
the turnover ratio in this section is contemporaneous in an effort to observe the connection among
measures of information ambiguity, whereas the aim of their specification is to predict negative
skewness using trading volume at a semi-annual frequency.
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evaluating the value of a firm (see, for example, [37] and [93]). Compared to these
existing proxies, our proposed measure of information ambiguity, realized daily ske-
wness, enables us to capture richer information on the intra-day returns distribution.
The shape of the returns distribution contains valuable information on the divergence
of opinion among investors and investors’ expectations regarding tail events. Thus, we
argue that realized daily skewness makes it possible to capture exclusive components
of information ambiguity regarding a firm.
To demonstrate any complementary features of realized daily skewness as a proxy
for information ambiguity over existing measures, we take a projection of realized
daily skewness on four other alternative proxies borrowed from the literature on in-
formation. That is, we extract an orthogonal component of realized daily skewness,
called OrthRDSkew, that accounts for the effect of existing measures. If realized
skewness has a unique contribution in measuring the ambiguity of information con-
cerning a firm beyond other existing proxies, a coefficient estimate on OrthRDSkew
in predicting subsequent stock returns should remain statistically significant. Table
37 shows the [58] regression result of subsequent stock returns on orthogonalized re-
alized skewness and other control variables. When there is no information release,
the significance of realized skewness remains over a short time period (Retk,t+1,t+5).
The coefficient estimates are stronger and significant over 10 days on information
days, which is consistent with our main finding. Thus, the results in Table 36 and
37 suggest that realized daily skewness makes a significant contribution to explaining
the cross-sectional variation in investors’ under-reaction as a proxy for information
ambiguity beyond other alternative proxies for information ambiguity.
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3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Drift-adjusted Realized Higher Moments
The implicit assumption in computing realized daily moments using equations (25),
(26), and (27) is that the high-frequency return converges to zero as the sampling
frequency increases. If this assumption is violated because of discrete sampling in
the implementation, the findings on realized skewness as a proxy for information
ambiguity and its role in explaining return continuations might be contaminated.
To mitigate this concern, we compute drift-adjusted realized moments following [4]
and repeat the analysis in Section 3.3 with drift-adjusted measures. Drift-adjusted






































where µk,t is the daily return of firm k on day t. That is, the mean-adjusted realized
volatility, realized skewness, and realized kurtosis are computed using drift-adjusted
5-minute returns.
Table 38 reports the coefficient estimates from the [58] regression of equation
(28) using drift-adjusted realized skewness (equation (29)) instead of realized daily
skewness (equation (25)). Comparing the results in Panel B of Table 32, we still
observe statistical significance for AdjRDSkewk,t, and the significance and magnitude
are stronger in the Information sample. Despite the use of a drift-adjusted measure of
realized skewness, the positive relationship with subsequent returns becomes stronger
than the result with the original measure of realized skewness. The findings in Table
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38 further confirm that the impact of realized skewness on information days is not
merely the return continuation of daily returns.
3.6.2 Reversals/Continuations of Major Price Changes
In a recent contribution, [102] documents that large price changes accompanied by in-
formation (using analyst reports as a proxy) are followed by drift (momentum), while
those unaccompanied by information experience reversals. Other papers, including
[25] and [41], also examine price dynamics following large price changes. To compare
our finding with the results in the existing literature, we conduct our main analysis
after excluding large price changes. We filter out observations if their daily returns
are greater than 10% (5%) or less than -10% (-5%). These ±10% and ±5% filtering
requirements for large price changes exclude 79,054 and 433,995 observations, which
represent 1.31% and 7.17% of the total number of observations, respectively.
In Panel A (Panel B) of Table 39, we examine our main results for the samples
without ±10% (±5%) changes in daily stock prices. The result also includes the ana-
lysis with drift-adjusted realized skewness AdjRDSKew. From the results in Table 39,
it is evident that realized skewness plays a significant role in predicting subsequent
returns, and its role becomes further pronounced on information days, even after ex-
cluding large stock price changes. Regarding the results with drift-adjusted skewness
and daily return, the positive relationship strongly persists even after controlling for
the return continuations, whereas the negative relationship appears to be attributable
to return reversals.
3.6.3 Liquidity Provision of Market Makers
Liquidity has been documented as an important attribute of stock returns (see, for
example, [6], among many others). Around the news release, informed traders have
a superior informational advantage to trade even before the news releases. Due to
this information asymmetry, market makers would be wary of adverse price changes
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around the news events. Therefore, market makers would not only demand high com-
pensation for adverse price changes but also be reluctant to provide liquidity before
the events. From this evidence in the literature on liquidity and market microstruc-
ture, one might doubt that our finding on realized skewness as a proxy for information
ambiguity is manifestation of liquidity concerns of market makers around information
events.
[94] shows that the liquidity provision of market makers can be well proxied using
lagged stock returns. Thus, to test the robustness of our finding, we follow [94] and
use lagged returns as a noisy proxy for the liquidity provision. Table 40 provides
the [58] regression result that includes a lagged return (Retk,t−3,t−1) as an additional
control variable in the specification. Consistent with the finding in [94], the liquidity
provision, proxied by the lagged return, plays a significant role in explaining the
return reversals in the No-information sample. However, the statistical significance
of realized skewness remains intact in the Information-sample as well as in the No-
information sample. Thus, our finding on realized skewness cannot be explained by
the liquidity provision of market makers around the news releases.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the role of realized skewness as a proxy for information
ambiguity. We find that realized daily skewness plays an important role in explaining
subsequent stock returns, even after controlling for return reversals and continua-
tions. The role of realized skewness becomes strong on information days, and the
statistically significant impact of realized skewness on subsequent returns is attri-
butable primarily to observations with negative skewness. We show that realized
skewness measures information ambiguity concerning a firm’s fundamentals and cap-
tures a unique feature of information ambiguity not captured by other alternative
proxies. A zero-net investment trading strategy that exploits our main finding yields
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a superior performance with a Sharpe ratio of 1.766 compared to other well-known
zero-investment portfolios over the sample period from January 2001 to June 2014.
The present paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it provides
evidence that realized daily skewness can be a proxy for information ambiguity about
a firm’s fundamentals. Although information ambiguity generates significant frictions
in relevant markets, there are few proxies with a clear theoretical guidance to measure
information ambiguity concerning a firm’s fundamentals at higher frequency due to
data limitations. We demonstrate that realized daily skewness, which is computed
using high-frequency data, is able to assess the ambiguity of information.
Second, we contribute to the literature on return predictability by demonstrating
that realized daily skewness, as a measure of information ambiguity, predicts subse-
quent stock returns. While [109] finds that greater information ambiguity generates
greater price drifts, [51] predict that ambiguity-averse investors require compensation
for information ambiguity in the form of higher expected returns. Our finding sup-
ports that of [109] that greater information ambiguity measured by realized skewness
computed with high-frequency data predicts lower subsequent returns by generating
stronger under-reaction by investors.
[2] proposes a theoretical asset pricing model to explain contrasting evidence on
skewness in stock returns: positive skewness in firm-level stock returns and negative
skewness in aggregate stock market returns. He argues that the cross-sectional hetero-
geneity in the timing of firms’ cash-flow news leads to negative skewness in aggregate
stock returns, while firm-level stock returns exhibit positive skewness. Our finding
on realized skewness as a proxy for information ambiguity might also be extended
to explain the difference in realized skewness between firm-level and aggregate-level
stock returns. We might expect to observe greater negative skewness in aggregate
stock market returns relative to firm-level stock returns because an aggregate stock
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portfolio, such as the S&P 500 index, contains considerably more intangible informa-
tion (relative to tangible information, for example, cash-flow news) and has a complex
information environment.
The findings in this paper shed light on the importance of realized daily mo-
ments, such as realized daily volatility, skewness, and kurtosis. Compared to other
well-known important asset-pricing variables, such as daily returns and trading vo-
lumes, higher-frequency returns are able to provide much richer information on the
return distribution of underlying assets than daily or monthly returns. The present
paper documents an aspect of realized skewness on the information ambiguity of a
firm’s fundamentals. Our finding suggests that other higher moments may contain
valuable information about a firm, not only regarding information ambiguity but also
concerning the trading behavior of informed and uninformed traders, which is left for
future research.
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Figure 4: Performance of zero-investment trading strategies
The figure presents the performance of zero-investment trading strategies using cumulative gains
from January 2001 to June 2014. No-information, Information, and Combined portfolios are the
zero-investment portfolios based on the findings of the present paper. The three zero-investment
portfolios, No-information portfolio (Noinfo), Information portfolio (Info), and Combined portfolio
(Combined) are constructed as follows. Over the last week of each month, we first examine whether
firms experience analyst earnings forecast or recommendation report releases. In a set of stocks
with these information releases, we examine whether their average realized daily skewness over the
corresponding week is positive or negative. In the other set of stocks without information releases,
we examine whether their average daily returns over the week are positive or negative. Based on
these two criteria, we construct four portfolios at the end of every month: no-information with
positive skewness, no-information with negative skewness, information with positive skewness, and
information with negative skewness portfolios. Noinfo is the return on No-information portfolio
over the next month, which takes a long position on the no-information with negative previous-
week return portfolio and a short position on the no-information with positive previous-week return
portfolio. Info is the return on Information portfolio over the next month, which takes a long
position on the information with positive previous-week skewness portfolio and a short position on
the information with negative previous-week skewness portfolio. Combined is the return on Combined
portfolio constructed by taking a long position on No-information portfolio and a short position on
Information portfolio.The plots of MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD represent the cumulative gains from

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 30: Impact of information on realized daily moments
This table shows the impact of information release on daily return and realized daily moments.
Realized daily skewness, realized daily volatility, and realized daily kurtosis are computed using 5-
minute returns and equations (25), (26), and (27). The column under Full reports the averages of
realized daily moments. The next two columns, Forecast and Recommendation, show the averages
when the observations are accompanied by earnings forecasts and by analyst recommendations,
respectively. Information and No-information report the averages of moments of the Information
sample and those of the No-information sample. The last column reports the differences in moments
between values reported in Information and No-information. *, **, and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Realized moments in each subsample
Full Forecast Recommendation Information No-information Diff(Info - No-info)
RDSkew 0.0144 0.0073 0.0075 0.0076 0.0170 -0.0094***
Returns 0.0010 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0011 -0.0002***
RDVol 0.0229 0.0235 0.0251 0.0236 0.0227 0.0009***
RDKurt 7.4831 7.3346 7.6031 7.3697 7.5263 -0.1565***
Panel B. Pairwise correlation coefficients
Daily Return Realized Vol Realized Skew
Realized Vol 0.024
Realized Skew 0.408 -0.009


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 32: Realized skewness and future stock returns: Information vs. No-information
This table investigates the patterns of relationships between realized daily higher moments and
future stock returns depending on the information releases at the firm-day observation level. The
dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumulative returns (Retk,t+1,t+5, Retk,t+1,t+10,
and Retk,t+1,t+20). Realized daily skewness (RDSkewk,t), realized daily volatility (RDV olk,t), and
realized daily kurtosis (RDKurtk,t) are computed using 5-minute returns with equations (25), (26),
and (27), respectively. A contemporaneous return Retk,t is included to control for the well-known
factors of return reversals and continuations. In addition to daily higher moments, the market size
of a firm (LogMEk,t), the book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), the cumulative returns over 11 months
from the previous 12-month to the previous 2-month period (Momentumk,t), and the percentage
of daily trading volume (V olume(%)k,t) are included as control variables. The coefficient estimates
and t-statistics are computed using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) regression. Because of a possible
autocorrelation structure in overlapping windows on dependent variables, we employ the Newey-
West standard error correction with corresponding horizon for future stock returns. That is, in the
regression with next 5-, 10-, and 20-day returns, we employ the Newey-West correction with a lag
of 4, 9, or 19, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A. Information sample Panel B. No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
RDSkew 1.88*** 2.51*** 1.93* 0.74** 0.52 -0.13
(3.25) (3.20) (1.96) (2.04) (1.04) (-0.17)
RDVol 386.03* 754.29** 1328.43** 676.30*** 1156.38*** 2155.68***
(1.82) (2.11) (2.07) (3.31) (3.34) (3.33)
RDKurt -0.38* -0.56 -1.08* -0.41** -0.45 -0.80
(-1.67) (-1.55) (-1.78) (-2.19) (-1.46) (-1.53)
Ret 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.39) (0.50) (1.40) (-12.34) (-8.78) (-6.77)
LogME -6.16*** -10.87*** -20.19*** -6.17*** -11.74*** -21.48***
(-6.09) (-6.01) (-5.84) (-6.72) (-6.72) (-6.21)
LogBM 5.02*** 7.70*** 13.98** 3.46*** 6.76*** 13.69***
(3.32) (2.73) (2.38) (2.95) (2.86) (2.80)
Momentum -0.10 -4.78 -13.17 -3.19 -8.59 -16.66
(-0.01) (-0.31) (-0.42) (-0.55) (-0.73) (-0.66)
Volume (%) -235.92*** -456.95*** -908.38*** 29.49 -162.31 -580.76**
(-2.70) (-3.35) (-3.88) (0.41) (-1.22) (-2.47)
Constant 69.18*** 122.21*** 236.63*** 59.78*** 114.43*** 220.02***
(5.69) (5.18) (4.95) (5.85) (5.66) (5.40)
Observations 1280100 1280100 1280100 4774766 4774766 4774766
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06
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Table 33: Subsample analysis on realized skewness and subsequent returns: Positive
and negative skewness samples
This table examines the relationship between realized skewness and subsequent stock returns in
separate subsamples: one with negative realized daily skewness (Panel A) and another with positive
realized daily skewness (Panel B). The dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumula-
tive returns (Retk,t+1,t+5, Retk,t+1,t+10, and Retk,t+1,t+20). Realized daily skewness (RDSkewk,t),
realized daily volatility (RDV olk,t), and realized daily kurtosis (RDKurtk,t) are computed using
5-minute returns with equations (25), (26), and (27), respectively. A contemporaneous return Retk,t
is included to control for the well-known factors of return reversals and continuations. In addition to
daily higher moments, the market size of a firm (LogMEk,t), the book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t),
the cumulative returns over the 11 months from the previous 12-month to the previous 2-month
period (Momentumk,t), and the percentage of daily trading volume (V olume(%)k,t) are included
as control variables. The coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics are computed using
Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Newey-West standard errors. In the Newey-West standard
error correction, a lag of 4, 9, or 19 is applied to the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day returns, respectively.
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Sample with negative skewness
Information sample No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
RDSkew 4.20*** 4.74*** 6.31*** 2.23*** 2.36*** 2.06*
(3.76) (3.30) (3.18) (3.37) (2.71) (1.79)
Ret 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.09***
(0.75) (0.34) (1.04) (-12.84) (-10.88) (-10.48)
LogME -6.14*** -12.31*** -23.35*** -9.01*** -17.03*** -31.49***
(-7.29) (-10.98) (-15.29) (-12.27) (-17.10) (-22.14)
LogBM 3.66*** 6.07*** 11.24*** 2.12*** 4.34*** 9.61***
(2.95) (3.63) (4.85) (2.70) (3.97) (6.12)
Momentum 0.67 -7.20 -20.65** -1.68 -9.74* -20.95***
(0.12) (-0.99) (-1.99) (-0.45) (-1.88) (-2.76)
Volume (%) -157.80 -355.03** -724.24*** 114.35 -54.00 -309.44**
(-1.57) (-2.57) (-4.11) (1.58) (-0.52) (-2.24)
Constant 77.29*** 148.96*** 287.49*** 91.85*** 175.42*** 332.10***
(7.91) (11.54) (15.79) (10.59) (15.23) (20.35)
Observations 638129 638129 638129 2371820 2371820 2371820
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06
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Panel B. Sample with positive skewness
Information sample No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
RDSkew 0.88 2.12 1.95 -0.21 0.48 -1.23
(0.81) (1.52) (1.00) (-0.34) (0.57) (-1.09)
Ret 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03***
(0.68) (0.81) (1.11) (-8.97) (-6.63) (-4.24)
LogME -9.39*** -15.14*** -24.89*** -9.35*** -16.47*** -29.89***
(-11.11) (-13.82) (-14.50) (-12.80) (-16.53) (-20.82)
LogBM 6.28*** 8.45*** 15.00*** 2.12*** 4.81*** 9.68***
(5.08) (4.99) (6.19) (2.77) (4.42) (6.17)
Momentum -9.76* -16.84** -29.33*** -8.56** -14.54*** -24.93***
(-1.79) (-2.21) (-2.74) (-2.25) (-2.71) (-3.17)
Volume (%) -70.73 -263.12** -489.14*** 174.07** 101.27 -224.83*
(-0.69) (-1.96) (-2.75) (2.38) (1.02) (-1.72)
Constant 104.60*** 171.90*** 296.36*** 95.80*** 170.14*** 320.33***
(10.83) (13.57) (14.98) (11.11) (14.78) (19.43)
Observations 641971 641971 641971 2402946 2402946 2402946
R2 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.06
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Table 34: Zero-investment portfolios: Information, No-information, and Combined
portfolios
This table reports the summary statistics for the [56] three factors (market excess return (MKT ),
small-minus-big (SMB), and high-minus-low (HML)), the momentum factor (up-minus-down
(UMD)), and the three zero-investment portfolios proposed in the paper over 161 months from Fe-
bruary 2001 to June 2014. The three zero-investment portfolios - No-information portfolio (Noinfo),
Information portfolio (Info), and Combined portfolio (Combined) - are constructed as follows. Over
the last week of each month, we first examine whether firms experience earnings forecasts or recom-
mendations releases. For firms with these releases, we further examine whether their average realized
skewness over the week is positive or negative. For the firms without that information, we instead
examine whether their average return over the same week is positive or negative. Based on these
two criteria, we construct four portfolios at the end of each month: no-information with positive
return, no-information with negative return, information with positive skewness, and information
with negative skewness portfolios. Noinfo is the return on the No-information portfolio over the next
month, which takes a long position on the no-information with negative return portfolio and a short
position on the no-information with positive return portfolio. Info is the return on the Information
portfolio over the next month, which takes a long position on the information with positive skewness
portfolio and a short position on the information with negative skewness portfolio. Combined is
the return on the Combined portfolio constructed by combining No-information portfolio and In-
formation portfolio to exploit both the return reversals and the predictability of realized skewness.
Panel A reports the summary statistics of each portfolio, and Panel B provides pairwise Pearson
correlation coefficients among well-known zero-investment portfolios and the three zero-investment
portfolios proposed in the present paper.
Panel A. Summary statistics
Portfolio Obs Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Sharpe Ratio
MKT 161 0.42% 4.56% -17.2% 11.4% 0.321
SMB 161 0.37% 2.53% -6.6% 6.9% 0.509
HML 161 0.36% 2.72% -9.9% 13.9% 0.459
UMD 161 0.21% 5.22% -34.7% 12.5% 0.138
Noinfo 161 0.63% 1.94% -4.5% 8.8% 1.126
Info 161 0.20% 1.35% -7.1% 3.3% 0.503
Combined 161 0.83% 1.62% -3.3% 6.5% 1.766
Panel B. Correlation coefficients
MKT SMB HML UMD Noinfo Info
SMB 0.356
HML 0.018 0.023
UMD -0.500 -0.137 0.041
Noinfo 0.081 0.009 -0.217 -0.151
Info -0.161 -0.172 0.252 0.186 -0.567
Combined -0.037 -0.132 -0.050 -0.026 0.727 0.154
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Table 35: Calendar-time trading strategy: Zero-investment portfolios
This table presents the profitability of zero-investment portfolios based on our finding of a re-
lationship between realized daily skewness and subsequent returns. The table reports coefficient
estimates using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions for the following specification: Rportt,t+1month =




t,t+1month is an error term.
The dependent variables are the returns of zero-investment portfolios over one month from the
date of portfolio construction (day t), which is the last day of each month. The vector of expla-
natory variables, Xt,t+1month, includes common risk factors: MKT, SMB, HML, and UMD. The
zero-investment trading strategy that is used in this table is as follows. Over the last week of each
month, we first examine whether firms experience earnings forecasts or recommendations releases.
For firms with these releases, we further examine whether their average realized skewness over the
week is positive or negative. For the firms without that information, we instead examine whether
their average return over the same week is positive or negative. Based on these two criteria, we con-
struct four portfolios at the end of each month: no-information with positive return, no-information
with negative return, information with positive skewness, and information with negative skewness
portfolios. Panel A provides the results for the zero-investment strategy that takes a long position
on the no-information with negative return portfolio and a short position on the no-information with
positive return portfolio, called the No-information portfolio. Panel B provides the results of a zero-
investment strategy that takes a long position on the information with positive skewness portfolio
and a short position on the information with negative skewness portfolio, called the Information
portfolio. In Panel C, to exploit both the return reversals and the predictability of realized skew-
ness, the Combined portfolio is constructed by combining No-information portfolio and Information
portfolio. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
α βMKT βSMB βHML βUMD
Panel A. No-information portfolio
Raw return Mean 63.0509***
t-stat (4.12)
CAPM Mean 61.5962*** 0.0344
t-stat (3.91) (0.80)
3-Factor Mean 65.8348*** 0.0434 -0.0123 -0.1413
t-stat (4.06) (1.01) (-0.15) (-1.53)
4-Factor Mean 67.9585*** 0.0111 -0.0040 -0.1405 -0.0539
t-stat (4.16) (0.25) (-0.05) (-1.56) (-1.33)
Panel B. Information portfolio
Raw return Mean 19.5961*
t-stat (1.84)
CAPM Mean 21.6101** -0.0476*
t-stat (2.09) (-1.73)
3-Factor Mean 20.3584* -0.0403 -0.0774 0.1281**
t-stat (-1.96) (-1.40) (-1.30) (2.16)
4-Factor Mean 18.8107* -0.0168 -0.0834 0.1275** 0.0393
t-stat (1.75) (-0.55) (-1.38) (2.25) (1.40)
Panel C. Combined portfolio
Raw return Mean 82.6470***
t-stat (6.47)
CAPM Mean 83.2063*** -0.0132
t-stat (6.21) (-0.39)
3-Factor Mean 86.1932*** 0.0031 -0.0896 -0.0132
t-stat (6.35) (0.09) (-1.31) (-0.21)
4-Factor Mean 86.7691*** -0.0056 -0.0874 -0.0130 -0.0146
t-stat (6.45) (-0.15) (-1.26) (-0.20) (-0.49)
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Table 36: Realized skewness and information ambiguity
This table examines the relationship between realized daily skewness and various measures of infor-
mation ambiguity for firms over the period from January 2001 to May 2014. The panel dataset is at
the firm-day level. Panel A reports the pairwise correlation coefficients. Panel B reports the panel
regression results of realized daily skewness on other proxies for information ambiguity interacting
with the information dummy variable, d Info, which is equal to 1 if a firm-day observation is ac-
companied by intangible information releases (i.e., an analyst recommendation or earnings forecast)
and 0 otherwise. The variable BAspread is computed as the ratio of the difference between ask and
bid prices to the mid-point of ask and bid prices, and the idiosyncratic volatility of a firm (Idio
vol) is the standard deviation of residuals of the previous 60-day returns from the [56] three-factor
model. Amihud is an illiquidity measure of [5]. ∆Turnover is the change in the ratio of daily trading
volume to the total shares of outstanding. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Panel A. Correlation matrix
RDSkew BAspread Idio vol Amihud ∆Turnover
RDSkew 1.0000
BAspread -0.0034 1.0000
Idio vol -0.0051 0.2037 1.0000
Amihud -0.0116 0.1478 0.5441 1.0000
∆Turnover 0.0068 0.0001 -0.0059 0.0232 1.0000
Panel B. Realized daily skewness on information ambiguity

















Observations 5897483 6045930 6045949 6039164
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Table 37: Incremental role of realized daily skewness: Orthogonalized realized skewness
This table investigates the incremental role of realized daily skewness. To examine the additional
contribution of the measure over the alternative proxies for information ambiguity, we orthogona-
lize realized daily skewness on four daily measures of information asymmetry (BAspread, Idio vol,
Amihud, and ∆Turnover). That is, the residuals from the [58] regression of realized daily skew-
ness on four proxies are used as orthogonalized realized skewness (OrthRDSkewk,t). Using these
orthogonalized realized skewness results as the main independent variables, we estimate similar re-
gressions to Table 32. The dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumulative returns
(Retk,t+1,t+5, Retk,t+1,t+10, and Retk,t+1,t+20). Realized daily volatility (RDV olk,t) and realized
daily kurtosis (RDKurtk,t) are computed using 5-minute returns with equations (26) and (27). A
contemporaneous return Retk,t is included to control for the well-known factors of return reversals
and continuations. In addition to daily higher moments, the market size of a firm (LogMEk,t), the
book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), the cumulative returns over the 11 months from the previous
12-month to the previous 2-month period (Momentumk,t), and the percentage of daily trading vo-
lume (V olume(%)k,t) are included as control variables. The coefficient estimates and corresponding
t-statistics are computed using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Newey-West standard errors.
In the Newey-West standard error correction, a lag of 4, 9, or 19 is applied to the next 5-, 10-, and
20-day returns, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Information sample No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
OrthRDSkew 1.87** 2.03* 1.37 0.69 0.50 -0.66
(2.55) (1.88) (0.92) (1.41) (0.75) (-0.61)
RDVol 456.82** 850.59** 1460.59** 685.36*** 1160.22*** 2282.04***
(2.16) (2.34) (2.28) (3.31) (3.32) (3.47)
RDKurt -0.39* -0.65* -1.14* -0.42** -0.46 -0.90*
(-1.68) (-1.76) (-1.85) (-2.23) (-1.46) (-1.68)
Ret -0.00 -0.00 0.01 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.07***
(-0.77) (-0.27) (0.63) (-12.85) (-9.66) (-7.57)
LogME -6.14*** -10.45*** -19.59*** -6.11*** -11.91*** -21.66***
(-6.10) (-5.60) (-5.43) (-6.46) (-6.69) (-6.17)
LogBM 4.72*** 7.86** 14.95** 3.70*** 7.08*** 14.21***
(3.01) (2.53) (2.37) (2.99) (2.85) (2.78)
Momentum 3.68 -1.55 -10.25 -3.65 -8.43 -15.67
(0.47) (-0.10) (-0.32) (-0.64) (-0.73) (-0.64)
Volume (%) -217.38** -420.27*** -901.83*** 27.42 -178.87 -602.17**
(-2.47) (-3.05) (-3.70) (0.38) (-1.34) (-2.52)
Constant 67.73*** 116.32*** 226.14*** 59.51*** 115.72*** 219.78***
(5.52) (4.80) (4.62) (5.69) (5.67) (5.38)
Observations 1622226 1622226 1622226 4269197 4269197 4269197
R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06
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Table 38: Realized skewness and future returns: Drift-adjusted realized daily skewness
This table examines the relationship between realized skewness and future stock returns depending
on intangible information releases using a modified measure of realized daily skewness to mitigate
the effect of daily realized returns. Drift-adjusted realized daily skewness AdjRDSkewk,t, volatility
AdjRDV olk,t, and kurtosis AdjRDKurtk,t are computed using equations (29), (30), and (32), re-
spectively. The dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumulative returns (Retk,t+1,t+5,
Retk,t+1,t+10, and Retk,t+1,t+20). A contemporaneous return Retk,t is included to control for the
well-known factors of return reversals and continuations. As other control variables, we include
the market size of a firm (LogMEk,t), book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), cumulative returns over
the 11 months from the previous 12-month to the previous 2-month period (Momentumk,t), and
percentage of daily trading volume (V olume(%)k,t). The coefficient estimates and corresponding
t-statistics are computed using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Newey-West standard errors.
In the Newey-West standard error correction, a lag of 4, 9, or 19 is applied to the next 5-, 10-, and
20-day returns, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Information sample No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
AdjRDSkew 2.81*** 3.69*** 3.53*** 0.65* 0.62 0.25
(4.67) (4.50) (3.48) (1.76) (1.25) (0.32)
AdjRDVol 385.30* 750.93** 1332.26** 679.88*** 1161.89*** 2166.84***
(1.81) (2.09) (2.06) (3.32) (3.34) (3.33)
AdjRDKurt -0.37 -0.54 -1.09* -0.42** -0.45 -0.82
(-1.60) (-1.48) (-1.75) (-2.20) (-1.45) (-1.52)
Ret 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.06***
(0.48) (0.59) (1.37) (-12.27) (-8.80) (-6.88)
LogME -6.17*** -10.89*** -20.18*** -6.18*** -11.73*** -21.47***
(-6.10) (-6.03) (-5.84) (-6.73) (-6.73) (-6.21)
LogBM 5.01*** 7.69*** 13.97** 3.47*** 6.76*** 13.68***
(3.32) (2.72) (2.38) (2.95) (2.86) (2.80)
Momentum -0.05 -4.73 -13.12 -3.20 -8.61 -16.67
(-0.01) (-0.31) (-0.42) (-0.55) (-0.73) (-0.66)
Volume (%) -238.16*** -457.48*** -906.11*** 30.70 -160.33 -576.38**
(-2.73) (-3.36) (-3.89) (0.43) (-1.21) (-2.45)
Constant 69.15*** 122.25*** 236.61*** 59.81*** 114.33*** 219.85***
(5.68) (5.17) (4.95) (5.85) (5.65) (5.39)
Observations 1280100 1280100 1280100 4774766 4774766 4774766
R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.06
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Table 39: Realized skewness and future returns: Excluding major price shocks
This table examines the relationship between realized skewness and future stock returns depending
on intangible information releases after excluding large price changes to mitigate concerns of return
reversal or continuation. In Panel A, the firm-day observations with daily returns greater than 10%
or less than -10% are excluded. For further robustness, we exclude the observations with daily
returns greater than 5% or less than -5% in Panel B. Realized daily skewness (RDSkewk,t) is com-
puted from equation (25), and mean-adjusted realized daily skewness (AdjRDSkewk,t) is computed
using equation (29). The dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-day cumulative returns
(Retk,t+1,t+5, Retk,t+1,t+10, and Retk,t+1,t+20). The information dummy variable, d Infok,t, is equal
to 1 if a firm-day observation is accompanied by information releases (i.e., analyst earnings forecast
or recommendation) and 0 otherwise. A contemporaneous return Retk,t is included to control for
the well-known factors of return reversals and continuations. As other control variables, we include
the market size of a firm (LogMEk,t), book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), cumulative returns over
the 11 months from the previous 12-month to the previous 2-month period (Momentumk,t), and
percentage of daily trading volume (V olume(%)k,t). The coefficient estimates and corresponding
t-statistics are computed using Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions with Newey-West standard errors.
In the Newey-West standard error correction, a lag of 4, 9, or 19 is applied to the next 5-, 10-, and
20-day returns, respectively. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Panel A. Excluding ±10% changes
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDSkew 1.57*** 1.82*** 1.66**
(4.16) (3.57) (2.16)
RDSkew×d Info 0.58 1.72** 2.21**
(1.06) (2.28) (2.14)
AdjRDSkew 1.18*** 1.51*** 1.45*
(3.18) (3.00) (1.92)
AdjRDSkew×d Info 1.49*** 2.75*** 3.24***
(2.60) (3.48) (3.04)
Ret -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(-12.34) (-12.16) (-10.32) (-10.10) (-8.63) (-8.55)
Ret×d Info 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.07***
(12.05) (12.33) (10.14) (10.60) (8.51) (9.00)
LogME -7.97*** -7.99*** -14.70*** -14.72*** -27.10*** -27.12***
(-6.75) (-6.75) (-6.43) (-6.43) (-5.98) (-5.97)
LogBM 2.52* 2.51* 4.63* 4.62* 9.71* 9.70*
(1.93) (1.92) (1.74) (1.73) (1.79) (1.78)
Momentum -3.49 -3.52 -10.67 -10.71 -21.40 -21.45
(-0.51) (-0.51) (-0.78) (-0.78) (-0.74) (-0.74)
Volume (%) 53.45 54.74 -55.50 -53.19 -370.77 -368.07
(0.58) (0.60) (-0.33) (-0.31) (-1.19) (-1.18)
Constant 87.66*** 87.69*** 161.56*** 161.58*** 305.90*** 305.86***
(5.94) (5.94) (5.71) (5.70) (5.41) (5.41)
Observations 5975812 5975812 5975812 5975812 5975812 5975812
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05144
Panel A. Excluding ±5% changes
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDSkew 1.76*** 1.88*** 1.61**
(4.52) (3.44) (2.06)
RDSkew×d Info 0.87 2.54*** 3.00***
(1.51) (2.95) (2.65)
AdjRDSkew 1.41*** 1.57*** 1.40*
(3.58) (2.86) (1.81)
AdjRDSkew×d Info 1.58*** 3.42*** 3.87***
(2.61) (3.77) (3.26)
Ret -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.08***
(-11.55) (-11.30) (-9.13) (-8.91) (-7.62) (-7.54)
Ret×d Info 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.05***
(7.70) (7.98) (6.28) (6.84) (5.30) (5.80)
LogME -7.40*** -7.41*** -13.62*** -13.63*** -25.29*** -25.31***
(-6.33) (-6.33) (-6.08) (-6.09) (-5.68) (-5.68)
LogBM 2.20* 2.19* 4.17 4.16 8.47 8.46
(1.75) (1.75) (1.64) (1.64) (1.62) (1.62)
Momentum -3.48 -3.52 -10.07 -10.12 -19.20 -19.24
(-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.73) (-0.73) (-0.67) (-0.67)
Volume (%) 37.22 37.89 -72.61 -71.33 -417.17 -416.06
(0.35) (0.36) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-1.17) (-1.17)
Constant 83.54*** 83.56*** 153.26*** 153.28*** 291.85*** 291.85***
(5.75) (5.75) (5.51) (5.51) (5.23) (5.23)
Observations 5620871 5620871 5620871 5620871 5620871 5620871
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
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Table 40: Robustness: Liquidity provisions
This table shows the results of robustness tests on realized skewness to the liquidity provision of
market makers around news releases. Realized daily skewness (RDSkewk,t), realized daily volatility
(RDV olk,t), and realized daily kurtosis (RDKurtk,t) are computed using 5-minute returns with
equations (25), (26), and (27), respectively. The dependent variables are the next 5-, 10-, and 20-
day cumulative returns (Retk,t+1,t+5, Retk,t+1,t+10, and Retk,t+1,t+20). A contemporaneous return
Retk,t is included to control for the well-known factors of return reversals and continuations. The
other main control variable in this table is Retk,t−3,t−1 to control for the liquidity provision of
market makers. As other control variables, we include the market size of a firm (LogMEk,t),
book-to-market ratio (LogBMk,t), cumulative returns over the 11 months from the previous 12-
month to the previous 2-month period (Momentumk,t), and percentage of daily trading volume
(V olume(%)k,t). The coefficient estimates and corresponding t-statistics are computed using Fama-
MacBeth (1973) regressions. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
Information sample No-information sample
Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20 Rett+1,t+5 Rett+1,t+10 Rett+1,t+20
RDSkew 1.90*** 2.52*** 2.16** 0.81** 0.63 0.10
(3.38) (3.48) (2.20) (2.40) (1.40) (0.16)
RDVol 384.97*** 742.85*** 1287.29*** 690.64*** 1162.55*** 2126.93***
(2.96) (4.46) (5.74) (6.07) (8.16) (11.10)
RDKurt -0.40** -0.57*** -1.06*** -0.41*** -0.47*** -0.79***
(-2.56) (-2.91) (-4.03) (-3.75) (-3.32) (-4.32)
Ret 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06***
(0.29) (0.28) (1.52) (-14.45) (-11.68) (-10.33)
Rett−3,t−1 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03***
(-1.25) (-0.83) (0.62) (-9.65) (-8.19) (-7.52)
LogME -6.19*** -10.85*** -19.98*** -6.24*** -11.85*** -21.57***
(-9.90) (-13.14) (-17.32) (-11.83) (-16.71) (-21.19)
LogBM 4.66*** 7.24*** 13.61*** 3.06*** 6.34*** 13.03***
(5.23) (5.83) (7.60) (4.83) (7.08) (9.88)
Momentum -0.92 -6.42 -13.73 -4.01 -9.81** -16.77***
(-0.21) (-1.06) (-1.58) (-1.32) (-2.23) (-2.60)
Volume (%) -241.77*** -468.60*** -912.17*** 40.35 -152.15** -568.17***
(-3.96) (-5.89) (-8.85) (0.95) (-2.56) (-7.24)
Constant 69.81*** 123.27*** 235.18*** 60.29*** 116.25*** 220.24***
(9.70) (12.36) (16.22) (10.53) (14.60) (18.99)
Observations 1279953 1279953 1279953 4773072 4773072 4773072
R2 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.07
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APPENDIX A
MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 1
A.1 Pricing Error of Hasbrouck (1993)
In this appendix, I explain how to construct one of price efficiency measures used in
the paper: the pricing error proposed by [73]. I follow the procedure and notations
prescribed in his paper. [73] defines the log transaction price at transaction time t,
pt, as the sum of a random walk component, mt, and a transitory pricing error, st:
pt = mt + st. (33)
That is, mt is defined as the unobservable efficient price or the expected value of the
security conditional on all available information at time t whereas the pricing error st
captures deviations from the efficient price, which may result from non-information-
related market frictions such as inventory cost or transaction cost. He proposes the
standard deviation of the pricing error, σ(s), as a measure of market quality, because
this measure captures the magnitude of deviations from the efficient price.
In the empirical estimation, I follow [73] in which he estimates the following vector
autoregression system with five lags:
rt = a1rt−1 + a2rt−2 + · · ·+ b1xt−1 + b2xt−2 + · · ·+ v1,t,
xt = c1rt−1 + c2rt−2 + · · ·+ d1xt−1 + d2xt−2 + · · ·+ v2,t,
(34)
where rt is the difference in the log prices pt, and xt is a vector of trade-related
variables: a trade sign indicator, signed trading volume, and signed square root of
trading volume to allow for concavity between prices and trades. v1,t and v2,t are
zero-mean, serially uncorrelated disturbances from the return and the trade equati-
ons, respectively. As noted in [73], the above VAR system can be converted to its
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vector moving average (VMA) representation that expresses the variables in terms of














2v1,t−2 + · · ·+ d∗0v2,t + d∗1v2,t−1 + d∗2v2,t−2 + · · ·
(35)
Using Equation (35) and the identification restriction of [19], the pricing error can be
expressed as
st = α0v1,t + α1v1,t−1 + · · ·+ β0v2,t + β1v2,t−1 + · · · , (36)








k. Then the variance of pricing error








In the implementation, I use transaction data in the TAQ database and a filter
used in [20]. To assign trade direction, I use the algorithm of [89]. To assure mea-
ningful analyses, I scale the standard deviation of the pricing error by the standard
deviation of log transaction prices σ(p). Thus, the ratio of the standard deviation of
the pricing errors to that of the efficient price, σ(s)/σ(p), is referred to as the pricing
error in the main analysis.
A.2 Control Variables for Liquidity
In this section, I provide details on how to construct variables used in my main re-
gressions in order to control for liquidity. [67] examine various measures of liquidity
and their performance in capturing the price impact, and find that a measure in-
troduced by [5] and number of days with positive trading volume and zero returns
(zeros) outperform relative to other measures. Thus, in main regressions, I include
two measures of liquidity as control variables: an illiquidity measure of [5] and zeros
defined as the proportion of positive days with zero-returns.
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The measure of illiquidity introduced by [5] captures the daily price response
associated with a dollar of trading volume. Thus, the Amihud measure for firm i in









where Rit,d and V
i
t,d are a return and a dollar trading volume on stock i in day d in
month t.
[67] introduce a variable to capture liquidity, defined as the proportion of days
(with positive trading volume) with zero returns, as stocks with higher transaction
costs have less private information acquisition because it is more difficult to overcome
high transaction costs, which leads to have no-information revelation and zero-return
days. Thus, the variable, Zeros, is constructed as
Zerosi,t =
(# of positive-volume days with zero returns of stock i in month t )
(# of trading days in month t)
.
(39)
That is, Zeros is the proportion of trading days with positive trading volume and
zero return in a given month.
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APPENDIX B
MISCELLANEOUS SECTION FOR CHAPTER 2
B.1 A List of Variables and Their Construction
In this appendix, we provide additional information about variables used in the paper.
• ME : Market capitalization of firms as the product of the closing prices and the
number of shares outstanding of securities obtained from CRSP.
• BM : Ratio of book equity (as of December of the previous calendar year obtai-
ned from COMPUSTAT) to market capitalization (CRSP).
• vol : Trading volumes of securities obtained from CRSP.







where |ri,t,k| is the k-th 5-minute return of firm i on day t, dvoli,t,k is a dollar
trading volume (pricei,t,k× volumei,t,k) over the k-th 5-minute interval on day t
for firm i, and M = 78 because of 5-minute sampling frequency in a day using
TAQ database.
• Stock Spread(%): Percentage spread of bid and ask prices computed as




where Bidi,t and Aski,t are bid and ask prices of security i on day t (CRSP).
• O/S ratio: Ratio of aggregate trading volume of listed options (obtained from
OptionMetrics) of an underlying security to trading volume of the security
(obtained from CRSP).
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• Slope IVS : Slope of implied volatilities of traded options estimated from the
regression of implied volatilities on their deltas (with deltas of put options being
reversed in sign). Implied volatilities and deltas of options are obtained from
OptionMetrics.
• Option Spread(%): Percentage spread as the average bid-ask spread divided by
the midpoint of bid and ask prices over all options traded. Bid and ask prices
of options are obtained from OptionMetrics.
• Delta: Average of deltas of options obtained from OptionMetrics (with deltas
of put options being reversed in sign).
• Analyst Disp: Standard deviation of analyst earnings forecasts obtained from
the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S).
• IO ratio: Fraction of a firm’s outstanding shares held by institutions obtained
from CRSP and Thomson Financial.
• avg Ivol : Average of implied volatilities of options traded. Implied volatilities
of options are obtained from OptionMetrics.
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